30. Transcript SC 12 December 2000




The plaintiff appeared in person
Mr Nicholls appeared for the defendant

HIS HONOUR: What is the application that is before the court?

NICHOLLS: It is the state's application for summary dismissal of the statement of claim filed by Mr Wilson.

HIS HONOUR: Let me have the file. Mr Nicholls, give me your assistance. There is somewhere a notice of motion filed by Mr Wilson.

NICHOLLS: Filed by the state, that was filed on 17 May.

HIS HONOUR: It has to do with the statement of claim filed by Mr Wilson on 11 April 2000. I have got that. How have pleadings progressed or have they not progressed beyond application to strike out the statement of claim?

NICHOLLS: That's right.

WILSON: You have no jurisdiction-

HIS HONOUR: I understand. Mr Wilson, sit down and I will hear you on that point in a moment.

WILSON: I thought jurisdiction should be clarified before a word is said.

HIS HONOUR: It will be clarified before the matter is heard. There was a notice of motion filed on 17 May?


HIS HONOUR: I hand you down the document that I have got. Just confirm that that is the notice of motion about which you are speaking.

NICHOLLS: Yes, that is the motion.

HIS HONOUR: Thank you. In relation to that, I imagine there have been affidavits filed in support of the notice of motion, is that right?

NICHOLLS: There are two affidavits relied upon. One has been filed and that was filed on 17 May 2000.

HIS HONOUR: Just a moment. It is an affidavit of?

NICHOLLS: Natalie Jane Adams.

HIS HONOUR: Again I will hand you down what I have in the court file. Just check that that is the one about which we are speaking.

NICHOLLS: That's correct. Can I hand up a further affidavit sworn on 11 December 2000 by Neil Richard Guy. I seek leave to file it and rely on it.

HIS HONOUR: We will come back in a moment with that one. Those are the only affidavits that you have filed or will tile, as the case might be, upon which your notice of motion depends?

NICHOLLS: Subject to this further affidavit.

HIS HONOUR: There is only one affidavit, one to be filed, upon which you want to rely, if we go on.

NICHOLLS:That's correct.

HIS HONOUR:  Mr Wilson, just before we come to the question of jurisdiction, I will be glad if you would help me to sort out the formalities of your side of the record. First of all, have you filed any affidavit in connection with the notice of motion to strike out your statement of claim?

WILSON: No, because it should go before the jury.

HIS HONOUR: But you have not filed any affidavits in answer to the affidavit of Natalie Jane Adams?


HIS HONOUR:And there are no affidavits, I take it, that you are wanting to file at this stage?

WILSON: Not today.*

HIS HONOUR: I understand. So there is the preliminary point that you wish to take concerning the jurisdiction of the court, is that right?

WILSON: That's right.

HIS HONOUR: Just tell me simply and clearly what is the point you take.

WILSON: That you have no jurisdiction in this matter to hear o~ judge the whole or any part of this matter. If you proceed your actions would be unlawful and malicious. Malicious being defined as premeditated, designed to do evil and injure me and the people of Australia. You will be denying natural justice. I would like to ask you a series of questions.

HIS HONOUR: The court is not here to answer questions.

WILSON: Before you answer, I would like you to swear on the bible to tell the truth and nothing but the truth so help you God.

HIS HONOUR: The court is not here to answer questions.. How do you make good that the court has no jurisdiction?

WILSON:I am not talking about the court, you are the judge.

HIS HONOUR: I am the court, for the purposes of this application.

WILSON: You are not. You have no jurisdiction in this matter. I have named you as being one of the judicial officers implicated in this case. The officers I have named on 9 November are James Wood, David Hunt, Terence Greenwood, John Hamilton, Mathew Clarke, Alan Abadee, Kirby, Toohey, Dawson, Brian Murray, Caroline Simpson, David Levine, Peter Hidden, Kenneth Handley, Paul Stein, Ian Allen, Gaudron, John Dunford, Timothy Studdert, Graham Barr, Megan Latham, and your name, Brian Sully, Rex Smart, Hackett, Steve Jupp, Murray Gleeson, William Fisher, Penman, Reginald Blanche, Michael Campbell, Ian Pike, Brian Beaumont, Rodenick Meagher, Dyson Heydon, and Charles Sheller. I have already named you as being implicated.

HIS HONOUR: I do not quite understand. What do you mean?

WILSON: In the transcript of 9 November in the Supreme Court before Carruthers AJ on p 7 line 48. Also in the affidavit- -

HIS HONOUR: I want to follow what you are putting. I want to see what is recorded in the transcript. Pardon .me a moment while I do that. What was the basis upon which those particular names were chosen?

WILSON: Because they were all implicated in this affair. Affair meaning collection of cases which started in 1996 when I first brought an action against the St George Bank over uncertainty of terms.

HIS HONOUR: What am I supposed to have done?

WILSON: You have denied the right of the trial by jury. I have already prepared for you, on 6 September-


WILSON: 1999.

HIS HONOUR: Do you have the transcript?

WILSON: I am just looking for it now. Yes, here it is.

HIS HONOUR: May I have a look at it, I do not have that?

WILSON: The judgment is attached to that, as well.

HIS HONOUR: I have read that.

WILSON: To expand upon that point, last week I distributed what I call press releases explaining judges judging themselves. I have several copies of that. I would like to pass up a copy for you and f or the other side.



WILSON: Further to the point of your lack of jurisdiction, are you employed by the defendant?

HIS HONOUR: I am listening to your submission.

WILSON: Are you?

HIS HONOUR: You are not here to ask questions.

WILSON: I am here to clarify the judges' jurisdiction.

HIS HONOUR: What are your submissions on the proposition that the court has no jurisdiction?

WILSON: I submit that you are employed by the defendant and therefore you are ineligible to judge any part of this case.

HIS HONOUR: Do you say that no judge of this Court has any jurisdiction over any part of the proceedings commenced by your statement of claim?

WILSON: It must be by a jury. That's the only tribunal which could be competent, independent, and impartial.

HIS HONOUR: But I want to be clear about the submission, it is that no judge of this Count has jurisdiction to hear and judge or in any way to dispose of any part of the proceedings commenced by the plaintiff's statement of claim filed on 11 April; is that the essence of the submission?

WILSON: There is more to it. There is the role of a jury. The role of a jury is very briefly summarised in a videotape put by the Sheriff's Office of the Attorney General.

HIS HONOUR: That's the obverse side of the submission you put to me. The only tribunal having any jurisdiction of that kind is a jury?

WILSON:Is a jury.

HIS HONOUR: That is your real submission.

WILSON: Oh, yes.

HIS HONOUR: I understand. And how in your submission is the jury to be empanelled?

WILSON: It is empanelled by the court.

HIS HONOUR: But the court has no jurisdiction-

WILSON: I am saying no judges-

HIS HONOUR: Who empanels the jury?

WILSON: The normal procedure of empanelling the jury.

HIS HONOUR: What is the normal procedure, as you understand it, of empanelling a jury?

WILSON: My understanding is that jury notices are sent out, people come into court, they go through a qualifying or question and answer period to determine whether they are eligible on the ground of being competent, independent, and impartial. Once they have satisfied those to the satisfaction of both sides, which is the plaintiff and the defendant, then the jury can be empanelled.

HIS HONOUR: How does that actually happen? Who does the empanelling of the jury?

WILSON: It is empanelled by the oath.

HIS HONOUR: Who administers the oath?

WILSON: The sheriff-

HIS HONOUR: Wrong. Before whom is the oath sworn?

WILSON: Before God.

HIS HONOUR: Partly right. In imperatorial terms, before whom is the oath sworn?

WILSON: Before the court.

HIS HONOUR: Who is the court?

WILSON: The court is the judge and jury. 

HIS HONOUR: But the jury has not been empanelled. It follows that the judge is at least entitled to administer the oath and do the other formalities that are necessary to empanel the jury, in order that the jury may have proper standing in the proceedings.

WILSON: The judge can act as Clerk of the Court and do necessary paperwork, in order to administer justice.

HIS HONOUR: That is completely clear: To do necessary paperwork and to administer justice.

WILSON: It is their responsibility not the judge's. The purpose of doing the paperwork is so that justice can be administered.

HIS HONOUR: So that justice can be administered. Does the clerical work that the judge is entitled to do, do you submit, extend to controlling the good order of the conduct of the proceedings before the jury, so that the rules of evidence are complied with and the parties have a proper chance to explain to the jury whatever their cases are, respectively?

WILSON: Yes, I think the plaintiff is entitled to inform the jury of their responsibilities, that the responsibilities of the jury is to determine the facts, determine what is the law, judge the justice of the law, decide if the law is good if it is appropriate to that particular case, to judge the moral intentions of the parties, and to vote purely on their consideration and not to dictate to any party in the proceedings.

HIS HONOUR: It is the practice of the court for the judge to give the jury such assistance by way of direction and instructions that the jury might require in the matter of law as distinct as to the facts. Do you contend that the court has no jurisdiction to do that?

WILSON: The court is the jury and the jury will decide what the law is. It will not be thrusted upon them by any party. Evidence shall be presented that this is the certain law. In fact, the jury has a duty to nullify bad laws.

HIS HONOUR: That is completely clear. Thank you. Is there any case law that you want to cite in support of any of those propositions?

WILSON: I can go back to my files and bring up cases if necessary. I do not think I brought any with me. I have a few instances here which I have just taken of f the internet. I am quite happy to submit that.

HIS HONOUR: Yes. I will have a look at it. I noticed that these are all United States authorities.

WILSON:I got that off the internet.

HIS HONOUR: Are there any Australian authorities?

WILSON: If you are looking at English cases, there is the 1670 case of William Penn where a jury refused to convict William Penn because they considered that the law was bad. That is a precedent, as f an as English law is concerned.

HIS HONOUR: Do you have a copy of it?

WILSON: Probably not.

HIS HONOUR: I take it, this is the only copy of this document that you have?

WILSON: At the moment. It is on my computer.

HIS HONOUR: I will have it marked in due course as NFl 2 on the present preliminary point. Do you have any Australian authorities?

WILSON: I do not know.

HIS HONOUR: What's your next submission.

WILSON: It is to do with the fact that a jury is indispensable. I refer to this videotape made by the Sheriff's Office with the introductory segments by Spigelman CJ, Chief Justice of New South Wales, who said about juries that they are an essential part in the protection of personal liberties. He said the word "essential". Essential means indispensable, necessary, all important, crucial, imperative, mandatory, it cannot be dispensed with.

We are talking about the administration of justice. I have a legal definition of what is justice out of the Oxford Legal Dictionary. It says, "moral ideal that the law seeks to uphold in the protection of rights and the punishment of wrongs. Justice is not synonymous with law. It is possible for a law to be called unjust."

HIS HONOUR: I understand all of that. In connection with this preliminary point that you are taking, can you tell me this, Mr Wilson-

WILSON: That you have no jurisdiction.

HIS HONOUR: No, you have told me that. You can take it that I understand with complete clarity that that is what you are wanting to argue.

WILSON: Or any judge.

HIS HONOUR: You can take it that I understand that. What was the result of the way in which Mr Acting Justice Carruthers dealt with the matter on 9 November? His Honour seems to have had the idea that you might be given some legal assistance of some kind, is that right?

WILSON: Yes, and Justice Kirby before him. That is dealt with in the transcript of 9 November.

HIS HONOUR: But can you tell me what actually happened? Did you apply f or Legal Aid?

WILSON: Justice Carruthers made out an order.

HIS HONOUR: He gave a certificate.

WILSON: He made out an order and I have a copy of the order. The Principal Registrar, Nenida Johnson, did line up a barrister to give advice and an instructing solicitor. The solicitor faxed me the advice from the barrister, who is Kim Mornissey, and I rejected that as being no good advice. In fact, I put that into an affidavit, which I have already filed.

HIS HONOUR: Could you tell me this. I see that from the concluding paragraph of Carruthers J's judgment on 9 November that his Honour-

WILSON: There was no judgment.

HIS HONOUR: -- that his Honour asked the Registrar that the matter be referred back to him after appropriate pro bono assistance had been tendered to you.

WILSON: I got in touch with his associate and she said he is no longer available because he had been put in the Court of Criminal Appeal. He then sent a copy of my letter to Justice Kirby and he is then appointed you.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, I understand. What other submission do you have on this preliminary point?

WILSON: It is to do with what is a court. A count by definition is a place where justice is administered. Justice must be seen to be done. So on the issue of bias, I am suing the Crown according to the Crown Proceedings Act under the title of the State of New South Wales.

There is another pertinent question I have to ask you, even though you don't want to. Have you sworn an oath of allegiance to the Queen?

HIS HONOUR: That question is noted.
WILSON: In pursuit of justice, bias, and jurisdiction, it is a necessary question.

HIS HONOUR: You have no right to ask it. Why are you making a submission like that to the court in support of your preliminary point? What's your next submission?

WILSON: That you by swearing an oath of allegiance to the Queen are sworn to uphold what she has sworn to uphold in her coronation oath. I would like to find a copy of it-

HIS HONOUR: There is rio need. I am familiar with the terms of the coronation oath.

WILSON: You are aware that she's sworn to execute justice with mercy? You realise she has accepted the Holy Bible as Royal law? Do you understand what Royal law is?


WILSON: Royal Law is mentioned in Matthew Chapter 22 Verses 35 to 40. I would just like to be allowed to find that.

Matthew Chapter 22 Verse 35:

"Then one of the lawyers asked him a question testing him saying, 'Teacher, which is the greatest commandment of all in the law?' Jesus said to him, 'You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind. This is the first and greatest commandment. You shall love your neighbour as yourself.' And the final verse 40 says: 'On these two commandments and all the law and all the prophets'

So that is why bad laws must be nullified. Any law that attempts to deny the right of trial by jury certainly qualifies to be nullified.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, I understand. What's your next submission on this question of jurisdiction?

WILSON: I will just have a look. So you have already got the copy of judges judging themselves. Then there is this circular I put out entitled "Judges versus Democracy." (Handed up and added to MFl 1.)

HIS HONOUR: I have read that.

WILSON: At the trial before a jury, I will be submitting not only-

HIS HONOUR: You need not tell me what you are submitting to the jury, that is not yet a question for me. The question is whether I have jurisdiction to deal with the Crown's notice of motion. You submit that I do not have jurisdiction. I simply want to know the propositions of law upon which you rely in support of the submission that I have no jurisdiction to deal with the notice of motion that is before me.

WILSON: That is contained on a CD of my website. I would like to submit it

HIS HONOUR: I reject. It is not relevant.

WILSON: It is because it contains many, many issues along the path-

HIS HONOUR: I am sure it does. I reject it. What is your next submission, please?

WILSON: My submission goes along the same lines as the argument I have already put many, many times, that an Australian citizen is entitled to the right of trial by jury and cannot be denied it.

HIS HONOUR: I am familiar with the argument. Is there anything in text that you wish to put in support of your present submission that I have no jurisdiction to entertain the notice of motion?

WILSON: I would like to submit my publication which contains many of the arguments relating to the incidences of a jury and the fact that a judge cannot judge in his own cause.

HIS HONOUR: I reject that document.

WILSON: You are rejecting that?

HIS HONOUR: I reject the document because it adds nothing to the very succinct statement in the two prereleases which are NFl 1 which were completely clear in what they have to say as to the argument that you are trying to develop. What is your next submission?

WILSON: What happened to the transcript of Acting Justice Carruthers, do you still have that?

HIS HONOUR: Yes, I do.

WILSON: In that I mention the fact that motions must be heard by a jury in this case. Have you read that paragraph?


WILSON: I am referring in particular to the Supreme Court Procedure Act (1903) section 3. (Read)

HIS HONOUR: Has that not Act been repealed by the Supreme Court Act (1970)?

WILSON: It would not matter if it had because any rights cannot be disposed of even if an Act is repealed. That is in the Interpretations Act.

HIS HONOUR: So any Act repealing the 1903 Act by the Supreme Court Act of 1970 would be ineffective because?

WILSON : Because it says in the Interpretations Act-

HIS HONOUR: What section, please?

WILSON: Section 30 of the Interpretations Act (1987) number 15 (read). So that right is not abolished by any Act that supersedes it.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, I understand. What is the next submission?

WILSON: The requirements for a jury, as I say, I have outlaid in the affidavits which I have been filing and I think there is about fourteen or fifteen affidavits, and it is all contained within already filed affidavits. Have you read all those affidavits?

HIS HONOUR: No. You told me at the beginning that there were no affidavits that you wanted to rely on for the reason that I had no jurisdiction anyway.

WILSON: No, you asked-

HIS HONOUR: Mr Wilson, I will ask the court reporter to go back to the beginning and read out what was said.



WILSON: I ask for an adjournment so I can prepare a case under your particular directions that it will be heard by a judge. As far as I am concerned, you have no jurisdiction. You have ignored the issues. You have made judgment in this before.

HIS HONOUR: I understand entirely all of that. Your preliminary objection is over-ruled. Now what do you want to do?

WILSON: Well, I place all my assertions on the fact that you do not have jurisdiction. I still maintain that. So therefore I require time to onganise an adequate defence against this notice of motion from the Crown with whom you are employed and with whom you are not impartial.

HIS HONOUR: How much time do you say you want?

WILSON: I would say at least possibly five weeks.

HIS HONOUR: What are your movements, Mr Wilson, in the second week of January, that is the week of 7 or 8 January?

WILSON: Nothing I can think of, at the moment. Just regular work.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Nicholls, will you be available?

NICHOLLS: I am not available at that time, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: I am thinking of this, it is desirable that this matter be brought to a head one way or the other, sooner rather than later.

WILSON: I require time to get a transcript of what you said so I can inform the people of Australia of your judgment. have to put an application to the Reporting Services and to get it back and then have to feed it out to other Australian citizens from whom I am drawing advice and support.

HIS HONOUR: I understand. I imagine you know that the Court Reporting Service will take out a transcript of what I have said. I will correct it, if that is necessary. I do not mean I will alter it, I mean will correct it. The it can be engrossed and made available to you in the normal way. There is no problem about that. I would hope that will be done by this week, so it will be available for you, say, from the beginning of next week.

WILSON: I require time for my supporters to offer their advice because there is an awful upsurge of the Australian people against the injustices perpetrated by judges and the outrage is becoming quite paramount.

HIS HONOUR: I think you should understand two things. I hope you will not mind my saying this. You are perfectly entitled, as far as I am concerned, to say, within the limits of the law, whatever you please to your fellow citizens. But, first, there is no purpose served by making to me a speech of that kind. None at all. Secondly, I would like you to understand this, just in case you have any doubt about it, I am not afraid of any of those threats that I understand you to be making. You achieve absolutely nothing by making those military rhetorical statements in court. Make them if you wish, however that cuts absolutely no ice with me.

WILSON: It is natural justice.

HIS HONOUR: Natural justice may be thought to entail a certain civility and prudent balance in the kind of allegation that one makes in public. But that is also a matter for you. Five weeks, you say?

WILSON: Natural justices entails that you cannot judge in your own cause.

HIS HONOUR: You would be available on 5 January?

WILSON: I would prefer at least another week after that.

HIS HONOUR: When are you back, Mr Nicholls?

NICHOLLS: Approximately 24 January or thereabouts. We oppose any adjournment.

HIS HONOUR: I will grant it simply because the preliminary point has been over-ruled. I propose, or if not me somebody else, to deal with the notice of motion in proper form and that requires that Mr Wilson should have a proper opportunity to put on affidavits, if that is what he wants to do. I will give directions as to the timing, but in the case of somebody, who has Mr Wilson's altitude and who is appearing for himself, I think that is the proper way to do it.

NICHOLLS: I do not wish to be say anything against what you are suggesting, however, the circumstances of this case are peculiar, in the sense that this motion was filed on 17 May this year. Mr Wilson has had ever opportunity to file affidavits and, in fact, he has filed in excess of ten affidavits in the proceedings.

HIS HONOUR: Let me put the proposition the other way. Has there been prejudice to the present applicant in the course that I propose?

NICHOLLS: The only prejudice is in respect of costs.

HIS HONOUR: There is no problem as to costs, that can be protected by proper order in a form which both can and will be enforced.

NICHOLLS: I cannot point to substantive prejudice except to say this: Mr Wilson has been afforded every opportunity by this Court to file affidavits and to obtain legal advice.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Nicholls, he has had advice and it is his right not to accept it and he does not accept it. That being so, I think he should be given reasonable opportunity to think through what he wishes to do in connection with the hearing of the notice of motion which is going to proceed in the court. I have no idea what assistance Mr Wilson may wish to take. I think within the bounds of what is reasonable he is entitled to have that opportunity. I have no idea whether Mr Wilson will wish to rely formally upon the fourteen affidavits which he tells me has filed or some of them or none of them or some additional affidavit or affidavits that he wants to file.

NICHOLLS: Yes. I can't say anything further than what I have.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Nicholls, let me ask you this. It happens that I am the vacation judge on 16 January.

WILSON: There is issue as to whether I wish to appeal against your interlocutory judgment. What time limit do I have? I believe it is 28 days.

HIS HONOUR: Yes, that is affected by the commencement on Monday of next week of the fixed summer vacation during which generally time does not run, is that right?

NICHOLLS: That is correct. I think Mr Wilson requires to file an application for leave to appeal which has to be filed within fourteen days.

HIS HONOUR: Why then do I not do this: Stand the hearing of the notice of motion to a date to be fixed by the list judge. Direct that the matter go before the list judge for mention on Friday of this week by which time it ought to be possible for both of you and Mr Wilson to have an idea of what you are wanting to do. The list judge can then set the necessary time limits and make all the necessary orders; is that not the sensible thing to do?

NICHOLLS: Would your Honour be minded to make directions in connection with the filing of affidavits?

HIS HONOUR: No, not until I know what Mr Wilson wants to do, whether he is going to make an application for leave.

I think the simplest way is to require him and you to make up your mind, respectively, by end of term on Friday, so the list judge can do what is necessary to bring the matter to a head in some proper way.

NICHOLLS: As your Honour pleases. The difficulty is this, there has been a long history of litigation which you have not touched on because it is not relevant to this aspect of the motion this morning. It is stretching back to three or four years. Mr Wilson has taken every opportunity to appeal every interlocutory judgment or indeed any judgment over that period.

HIS HONOUR: But why is that a matter of complaint? He is entitled to do that.

NICHOLLS: In respect of this particular application, there is no utility in further adjourning the matter.

HIS HONOUR: Let us speak frankly about the matter. Whether we like it or not, the phenomenon of litigants appearing in person is becoming an increasing frequent one in the court. There is no point in being overwhelmed about it. They are extremely difficult matters to deal with, for the judge is expected to do the impossible. There is no point in complaining about the situation. That is the fact on the ground. So far as it concerns the matters that we are discussing, the litigation commenced years ago, but it was against the filing of a statement of claim. What was done in connection with the incident is done. The courts have to look at those things and there is no profit in rehatching all of that. The question is, is the amended statement of claim justiciable in the court? Where is the merits? Now that just cannot be dealt with in a series of short sharp blows.

NICHOLLS: My submission is this, Mr Wilson has been given every opportunity by the court to present his case and has been given the opportunity to obtain legal advice which he has not accepted.

HIS HONOUR: I have some sympathy with that point of view. But once again, let us be practical. Mr Wilson has a ruling of substance made against him on the preliminary point. I do not see that it is unreasonable that he wants some opportunity to look at the text of what has been said in the judgment and to consider whether he wishes to make an application for leave to appeal. I do not think that he is entitled to have, as it were, at his dissertation an open end opportunity, but a reasonable opportunity to consider that. That alone would justify the course I was proposing to you a moment ago. There is no prejudice at all that I can see. The substantive hearing of the notice of motion will stand to Friday of this week, 15 December at 10 am before the list judge, Justice Kirby. The matter is referred to his Honour by this Court so that his Honour can make appropriate orders as to the listing of the hearing of the notice of motion any other ancillary order that might be appropriate. Mr Wilson, will you make sure that my associate has your address to which a copy of your judgment can be sent? Do you have a fax?


HIS HONOUR: We will fax a copy of the judgment when the text of it has been typed out. Mr Wilson, I ask this of you. On the Friday when the matter is before Kirby J, I think you ought to be in a position to tell the judge whether or not you are going to make an application to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against my interlocutory judgment this morning. You would understand, as matter of commonsense, that that is a very important practical matter. If you have made up your mind that you want to make an application to the Court of Appeal f or leave to appeal, then Justice Kirby will make certain facilitating orders. If you have decided that you do not want to do that, that you want to fight out the substance of the notice of motion, then the judge will fix that hearing for a day on which both you and Mr Nicholls can be available and on which the matter can be litigated to some sort of finality.

WILSON: I think at this point, the appeal against your judgment is crucial to the administration of justice.

HIS HONOUR: I have nothing to say about that. It is a matter for you as to whether or not you want to do that. All I am saying to you is I will see to it that you have a copy of the reasons that I gave this morning and that you have them prior to Friday. We should be able to let you have them tomorrow. The court will want to know on Friday what decision you have made in principle about making an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Would you just give consideration to that and be able to tell the court on Friday where you stand in that regard?
Any outstanding questions of costs are reserved..

31. Transcript SC 15 December 2000



FRIDAY 15 DECEMBER 2000           

No appearance for the Plaintiff at 9.00 am.
Mr N A Nicholls for the Defendant.
The Plaintiff appeared in person at 9.10 am.


HIS HONOUR: It might be noted that Mr Wilson was called and there is was appearance. What are you seeking, Mr Nicholls?

NICHOLLS: The position in this case is that there is currently before a court a motion for summary dismissal of the proceedings commenced by Mr Wilson. That motion came been Justice Sully - -

HIS HONOUR: I have read the judgment and as I understood it this morning was to give Mr Wilson the opportunity to do one of two things; first, to indicate whether or not he wished to seek leave to appeal against the interlocutory order made by Justice Sully, in which case it would be appropriate for me to put him on terms as to the time for the taking of that step or, secondly, to have the matter set down for hearing of your Notice of Motion.

Since Mr Wilson is not here - though I note from the file that a fax was sent to him notifying him of this hearing on 13 December 2000 - it seems to me that the appropriate course is to set the matter down for hearing. What is your estimate as to the length and what dates are you seeking

NICHOLLS: My assessment of the length of the hearing would be one and a half hours, taking into account Mr Wilson is a litigant in person, he indicated on the 12th that he would file some affidavit material in relation to the motion and we
would seek that that be done within three weeks.

HIS HONOUR: In terms of the actual hearing date after that three weeks? Does the time for filing of affidavits run during the vacation? In other words, if I were to make an order for filing it within three weeks, is that in any suspended by reason of the law vacation?

NICHOLLS: Not by reason of the whole vacation. There will be a few days that will not be reckoned, but there is no need for that to be taken into account. We would seek a week following 22 January or early February.

HIS HONOUR: The order I make is in these terms; first, that Mr Wilson file, by 4 pm on 19 January, such affidavits and other material upon which he wishes to rely. Is it anticipated that you would want to file any material in reply?

NICHOLLS: No, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR: Secondly, the matter be set down for hearing on Wednesday 24 January 2001 before the Duty Judge, estimate one and a half hours. I think it is appropriate to go before the Duty Judge at that time - - - -


PLAINTIFF: I was told 10 am.

HIS HONOUR: I will vacate those orders now that Mr Wilson has arrived. Mr Wilson, I had proposed to make some orders, but perhaps you would like to moment to compose yourself?

PLAINTIFF: While ever judges conceal bank fraud, and by that I mean variable interest rate loans, and the fact that banks create their own money, while every judge continues to deny people their rights which would enable them to defend themselves against fraud and corruption, banks will just sit back and laugh at their victims. A court is a place where justice is supposed to be administered. In these courts justice is not being administered. These courts have become corrupt. That is my opening volley.

HIS HONOUR: The business for today, Mr Wilson, really concerns two things. First, Mr Justice Sully having given his judgment, which I have read, on 12 December 2000, the appropriate course really is to do one of two things; the first is for you to consider your position which, as I understand it, just Sully enjoined you to do, as to whether or not you intend to seek special leave to appeal against his interlocutory order. If you do, then it would be appropriate for me to impose some form of term upon you as to the time within which you do that.

The alternative to that is that I will set the matter down, and I had proposed to set the matter down for late January, perhaps 24 January before the Duty Judge. They are the courses that are open.

Mr Wilson, I am sitting here as List Judge. I am not sitting here in any way to hear the merits and you might just address those two alternatives.

PLAINTIFF: I will, because the judgment made by Justice Sully on Tuesday is unlawful and malicious.
HIS HONOUR: Do you intend to appeal against it?

PLAINTIFF: I am appealing here right now.

HIS HONOUR: I am not a Court of Appeal. You have got to file a document which seeks leave from the Court of Appeal to appeal against what is an interlocutory order. It is not a final order

PLAINTIFF: The well recognised principle is that in the exercise of its lawful jurisdiction the court may employ all the appropriate remedies, and that principle is not affected by the fact that in certain cases the nature of the remedy sought is made on grounds of jurisdiction. So you have the capacity to set unlawful and malicious judgments aside and set the matter down itself for trial by jury.
HIS HONOUR: Mr Wilson, I will not repeat it - perhaps I will so I am absolutely clear that you have got it; if you tell me now that you intend to appeal, then I will make an order that you do so within a certain time. If you do not respond to that, I will certainly set the matter down for hearing on 24 January, 2001.

PLAINTIFF: I intend to defend my rights as an Australian citizen.

HIS HONOUR: If you intend it appeal, that's fine, but you do so in the appropriate way, which is by lodging an appeal and you are familiar with the process. That has to be done within a certain time.

PLAINTIFF: I certainly intend to defend my rights in every way I can, and if you refuse to administer justice by setting aside this unlawful and malicious judgment - I was faxed by the judge's this on Wednesday, (Indicated) - and during the course of that hearing on Tuesday, I presented to Justice Sully documents which proved conclusively that he has no jurisdiction to make any such judgment whatsoever. The two most serious accusations have been the fact that he himself is implicated in the denial of the right of trial by jury and I presented him a transcript of his own hearing and judgment - -

HIS HONOUR: I assume, Mr Wilson - just to interrupt you for a moment, because I do not want to go into the merits of the matter - you want to appeal. Therefore, the order I will make is that you lodge your application for leave to appeal within the time prescribed by the rules.

I will make a further order that if you fail to do so, then I give the State of New South Wales leave to approach the list office to have the matter listed for the hearing of the merits of their Notice of Motion.

PLAINTIFF: I have already said I will be appealing to the ends of the earth to defend my rights.

HIS HONOUR: I understand that, and you have that right, and I am sure you will exercise it, but all I have done is to remind you that there is a time limit that applies in respect of have - I think it is 28 days.

NICHOLLS: I think it might be shorter for an application for leave to appeal, but I will just check that.

HIS HONOUR: We will look up the time limit for you, Mr Wilson

PLAINTIFF: Do you refuse to set aside Justice Sully's judgment of Tuesday?

HIS HONOUR: Yes, I do.

PLAINTIFF: Then you are failing your duty.

HIS HONOUR: I understand that that is your point of view, but I believe myself to be doing my duty. But, in any event the time limit, which is the only concern we have is - and it is just being looked up

PLAINTIFF: The legal definition of malice is a premeditated, pre-designed act to do evil, and that has been consistent with judges to do evil in these courts. The document I produced on Tuesday, and Justice Sully accepted and marked it as Exhibit 1, is this document which describes judges judging themselves and it goes into the fact that Justice Sully on, I think, 9 September 1999, not only made a judgment denying the right of trial by jury, but also rejected my submissions relating to the United Nations Civil Rights Act. Now, that is a gross, gross miscarriage of justice.

HIS HONOUR: Can I ask Mr Nicholls, have you been able to find that?

NICHOLLS: 28 days is the appropriate time.

HIS HONOUR: It appears you have 28 days to file a notice of appeal and I am sure the registry will assist you in that regard

PLAINTIFF: Again, that will be before a judge? This is the whole point, because judges have conspired to deny access to juries.

NICHOLLS: Can I say one last thing with the directions your Honour propose. Your Honour will appreciate the Crown's anxiety to have the matter dealt with. We would press f or a hearing date of the motion in any event. The filing of the appeal could not ultimately have any consequence upon the hearing of the motion itself for summary dismissal.

HIS HONOUR: As I understood what Justice Sully was proposing, it was either that Mr Wilson appeal against, or seek leave to appeal against, his order or, alternatively, that I, as the List Judge, set the motion down, one or the other. What you say may ultimately be right, but I am sure the matter has got to pursue its course and endeavours to shore cut are the longest way home.

NICHOLLS: The reason I say that is that if the motion is successful and the proceedings are dismissed, then any application for leave to appeal can, no doubt, be amended to include, as no doubt we expect Mr Wilson to appeal any order on the motion, and the appeal can be lodged. The state would be very concerned if Mr Wilson were permitted to appeal each and interlocutory order, which will extend the proceedings out an extraordinary length of time.

HIS HONOUR: As I understood it, Justice Sully set the matter down before me

NICHOLLS: His Honour certainly did invite Mr Wilson to indicate what he proposed to do in connection with that interlocutory judgment, however I don't think his Honour indicated quite so clearly that he required one or two of those courses to be pursued.

PLAINTIFF: I protest the hearing put of being put on at 9 am today. I have a document here stating that it would be proceeding on 15 December at 10 am.

HIS HONOUR: You are quite right. Looking at that, that is mistake

PLAINTIFF: Another miscarriage of justice. It is a premeditated act.

HIS HONOUR: It overlooks the fact that I have another case at 10 am and I am the List Judge and handle a lift every morning at 9 o'clock.

PLAINTIFF: I was not informed of the 9 o'clock start.

HIS HONOUR: But you are here now

WILSON: By chance I happened to get off the train at Town Hall, there was another train to Bondi Junction on the other station. I just happened to get onto that train, otherwise I could be another 20 minutes late and sure as eggs, it would be assumed that I was not here and you would just proceed without me or strike out any sort of - it is a premeditated design to do evil.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Nicholls, I am just addressing your point. It is not obvious to me, locking at the judgment again, exactly what Justice Sully had in mind, but thinking it through, it seems to me that Mr Wilson should file his application for leave to appeal.

PLAINTIFF: I request that that be before a jury

HIS HONOUR: And the issue of whether or not the Notice of Motion should, in that circumstance, be reinstated and given a hearing date, can be revisited once that has been done. In other words, if in the absence of an investigation of the rules and following it through - I do not feel inclined to deal with that issue today - but I give the State of New South Wales leave to have the matter restored to the list in order that the Notice of Motion may be set down, notwithstanding any application for leave to appeal.

NICHOLLS: Thank you, that may be an appropriate course.

PLAINTIFF: Can I ask you about leave to appeal?

HIS HONOUR: I am not in a position to give you advice

PLAINTIFF: As far as procedures go, to appeal to judges alone - can I appeal to the High Court direct?

HIS HONOUR: No. I will adjourn.

32. Judgement SC (Sully) 15 December 2000

GPO Box 3,
Sydney, 2001

Judges' Chambers,
Supreme Court,
Queen's square,

13 December 2000

Mr. John Wilson,
331 North Rocks Road,
FAX - 9872.1661

Dear Mr. Wilson,

20137/2000 - John Wilson v State of NSW

As agreed, attached is Judgment given by his Honour on preliminary point on 12 December 2000.

The orders given by his Honour at the conclusion of the mention were:

"Substantive hearing of Notice of Motion will stand to Friday 15 December at 10.00 a.m. before the List Judge, Justice Kirby. The matter is referred to his Honour by this Court so that his Honour can make appropriate orders as to the listing of the hearing of the Notice of Motion and any other ancillary orders that might be appropriate.

Costs reserved."

Yours sincerely,

Joan Altwasser
Assoc. to Mr. Justice Sully






HIS HONOUR: Before the Court this morning is a notice of motion to strike out a statement of claim in principal proceedings current in the Court. The principal proceedings were commenced by the filing on 12. April 2000 of a statement of claim. The plaintiff in the statement of claim is Mr John Wilson. Mr Wilson himself drew and filed the statement of claim; and my understanding of the fact is that Mr Wilson has thereafter, at least in every substantive sense, continued to represent himself in connection with the progress of the proceedings commenced in the Court by the filing of his statement of claim.

In the circumstances of the present case it is, I think, important to attend with some care to the way in which the statement of claim has been framed.

The pleading begins by setting out in three numbered paragraphs and as follows what are described as 'Particulars" -

"1. I have been imprisoned unlawfully on two separate occasions. The first was from 26 September 1997 to 28 September 1997 and the second was from 9 November 1999 to 29 February 2000.

2.The first episode of imprisonment relates to charges under section 326 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).

3.The second episode relates to the charge of contempt of court (a Common Law offence) ." Thereafter, there is stated as follows the substance of the relief claimed by Mr Wilson in the proceedings thus commenced: -

"1. That the Crown is vicariously liable for the unlawful imprisonment under section 8 of the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 which states: "(1) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the Crown is vicariously liable in respect of the tort committed by a person in the service of the Crown in the performance or purported performance by the person of a function (including an independent function) ..."

2. That the Crown may be sued under the Crown Proceedings Act 1988.

3.Relief by:

(i) the Jury and the Court adjudging the awards, doings and proceedings in the matter of File No: 12914 of 1997 in the Supreme Court of New South Wales Common Law Division, Queen's Square, Sydney on 9 November 1999 to be of no consequence or example, in accordance with the Petition of Right 1628.

(ii) the Jury and the Court adjudging the awards, doings and proceedings in the matter of File No: 40928 of 1999 in the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Appeal, Queen's Square, Sydney on 29 February 2000 to be of no consequence or example, in accordance with the Petition of Right 1628.

(iii) the payment of compensation for the denial of my right ("mon droit") , the injustice caused, time spent in prison, loss of earnings whilst in prison, the loss of earnings caused by interruption to business, damage to reputation, distress cased to my family and self. The amount in Australian dollars to be 5 (five) million."

The statement of claim cites as defendant the State of New South Wales. That defendant, by a notice of motion filed on 17 May 2000, has applied for relief as follows:

"1. That these proceedings be dismissed pursuant to SCR Part 13 rule 5 on the ground that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed.

2. Further, or in the alternative, that the proceedings be dismissed pursuant to 5CR Part 13 rule S on the ground that the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious.

3. Further, or in the alternative, that the proceedings be dismissed pursuant to 5CR Part 13 rule S on the ground that the proceedings are an abuse of the process of the Court.

4. Such further or other orders as the Court may deem fit.


That notice of motion has been returned this morning before this Court. Mr Wilson, who appears for himself, has taken a preliminary point, the substance of which is that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the notice of motion. As will be seen presently, the substance of the preliminary point as argued ranges much more widely than that bald statement of it would suggest; but the essence of the point goes to that asserted lack of jurisdiction to deal at all with the notice of motion.

The substance of what Mr Wilson has submitted in support of his preliminary objection to jurisdiction can be summarised in the terms of his closing submission, which can be paraphrased fairly as follows: Mr Wilson has been wrongfully imprisoned as a consequence of decisions of particular judges of this Court; and it must follow that no judge of this Court can have any jurisdiction to deal in any substantive way with anything to do with any part of Mr Wilson's claims for relief as pleaded in his statement of claim. Insofar as there exists any jurisdiction of that kind, it resides in, and only in a jury, empanelled for the purpose of trying the proceedings commenced by the statement of claim.

Mr Wilson has not put the point in quite the following terms, but I take his objection to embrace the proposition that even an interlocutory application, such as the present notice of motion, cannot be adjudicated in any way at all by a Judge of the Court, but only by a jury empanelled for the purpose.

Mr Wilson has put a number of particular arguments in support of the preliminary point that he now argues. He has tendered to the Court copies of two documents published by him, which copy documents I have marked MFI 1. It is not necessary to canvass the detail of the documents, for the reason that they are completely clear in what they say; and they can stand, therefore, to speak for themselves. I have read and considered the contents of each.

Mr Wilson has tendered also a document which I have marked for identification MFI 2, and which contains excerpts from a large number of United States cases and various other documents. Some of the decisions thus cited are decisions of Federal Courts in the United States of America, and others of them are decisions of various State Courts in that country. No Australian authority has been cited. As to English authority, there has been a reference to a case involving William Penn, but it has not been cited in its detail,

For the sake of completeness it should be noted that the present interlocutory notice of motion came before his Honour Carruthers AJ on 9 November last. His Honour gave an ex ternpore judgment. His Honour gave ex tempore what was,
in fact, a judgment expressing his Honour's conclusion, insofar as he found it possible to reach any as matters then stood. A copy of what his Honour had to say has been engrossed and filed with the relevant Court file. It is not necessary to canvass in detail what his Honour said. It is sufficient to understand that his Honour felt that, in the circumstances as they then presented, it would be desirable that arrangements be made, if possible, for Mr Wilson to have the benefit of some properly qualified professional advice; and his Honour granted, in accordance with form 70B of the Supreme Court Rules, a certificate intended to make available to Mr Wilson professional assistance of that kind. I understand, from what Mr Wilson has said this morning, that some such advice was provided for him, but that he was not, and is not, disposed to accept it. That is his right, and there is nothing more that this Court either can, or should, say in connection with that aspect of the matter.

The submissions which Mr Wilson has put have pointed in various ways to the importance in the administration of justice of the institution of the jury. No Judge of this Court would ever wish to be heard to the contrary. It is axiomatic that juries properly chosen, properly empanelled, properly directed as to the relevant law, and properly assisted as to the relevant facts and evidence, have a timehonoured, a well-entrenched, and universally recognised role to play in the administration of justice. It needs, however, to be clearly understood that the way in which, in practical terms, juries are thus to be employed is, and must in the nature of things be, subject to such lawful prescriptions as may be made, from time to time, by Parliament, in the form of relevant legislation; and by the Court itself, in the form of relevant and lawful Rules of Court.

Mr Wilson has submitted that, so far as is relevant at least to his present point, the only function that is properly exercisable by a Judge of the Court is a purely clerical function, in the sense that the Judge is entitled, and empowered, to do nothing more than what has been described by the submission as "necessary paperwork so that justice can be administered." This is, to speak simply and plainly, a wholly misconceived notion. It does not accord with constitutional law and practice; nor does it accord with common law and practice; nor does it accord with the prescriptions of any lawful and relevant statutory or regulatory enactment. The submissions have continued to the effect that in proceedings of the present character "it is for the jury to say what the law is. The jury has a duty to nullify bad laws." I think that it is sufficient to say that those notions, also, are wholly misconceived, and wholly misapprehend the relevant constitutional law and practice; the relevant common law and practice; the relevant statute law and practice.

The notice of motion which the plaintiff has brought is grounded in the provisions of Part 13 Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court. There is no cause shown in any of the submissions put by Mr Wilson this morning for the drawing of a conclusion that Part 13 Rule S is irregular, or in any other sense unlawful. It seems to me to be beyond any serious dispute that the Rule is both lawful and regular. The applicant in the present notice of motion, the defendant in the principal proceedings of which T have earlier spoken, is in my opinion perfectly entitled to invoke the Rule and to claim from the Court, upon proper cause being shown, the relief claimed in the notice of motion. I do not think that there is any serious basis upon which it could be contended that the Court does not have jurisdiction to deal with the notice of motion. The preliminary point taken to the contrary is over-ruled. The matter will proceed accordingly.

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