7

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
SYDNEY REGISTRY

COMMON LAW DIVISION File No; 20137/00


AFFIDAVIT

I, John Wilson of 19 Elm Place, North Rocks in the State of New South Wales, say on oath:

1. I am the Deponent.

2. I truly believe that I have been denied natural justice by being unlawfully imprisoned and, in support of this belief, I have composed the following Affidavit which consists of:-

                      Part I, which is made up of extracts from commentaries on the trial by jury by three authorities who are (i) Sir William Blackstone (1723 - 1780); (ii)Alexander Hamilton (1755 - 1804); and (iii) Lysander Spooner (1808 - 1887);

          Part II, which is the text of the argument I filed in the High Court of Australia in the matter of S127/98;

Part III, which is the text of the argument I filed in the NSW Court of Appeal in the matter of CA40731/99; and

3. Part I:-

(i)  SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE (1723 - 1780)

Extracts from "COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND":

3.1 BOOK I, CHAPTER I, PAGE 118:-

the primary and principal objects of the law are RIGHTS, and WRONGS.....3. Private wrongs, or civil injuries; with the means of redressing them by law. 4. Public wrongs, or crimes and misdemesnors; with the means of prevention and punushments.

3.2 PAGE 123:-

FIRST, by the great charter of liberties, which was obtained, sword in hand, from king John; and afterwards, with some alteration, confirmed in parliament by king Henry the third, his son. Which charter contained very few new grants; but, as sir Edward Coke observes, was for the most part declaratory of the (PAGE 124) principal grounds of the fundamental laws of England. Afterwards by the statute called confirmatio cartarum, whereby the great charter is directed to be allowed as the common law; all judgments contrary to it are declared void; ........... Then, after a long interval, by the petition of right; which was a parliamentary declaration of the liberties of the people, assented to by king Charles the first in the beginning of his reign. Which was closely followed by the still more ample concessions made by that unhappy prince to his parliament, before that fatal rapture between them; and by the many salutary laws, particularly the habeas corpus act, passed under Charles the second. To these succeeded the bill of rights, or the declaration delivered by the lords and commons to the prince and princess of Orange 13 February 1688;..

3.3 PAGE 125:- 

1. THE right of personal security consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation.

3.4 PAGE 130:-

5. THE security of his reputation or good name from the arts of detraction and slander, are rights to which every man is entitled, by reason of natural justice; since without these it is impossible to have the perfect enjoyment of any advantage or right.

11.NEXT to personal security, the law of England regards, asserts, and preserves the personal liberty of individuals. This personal liberty consists of the power to loco-motion, of changing situation, or removing one's person to whatever place one's own inclination may direct; without imprisonment or retraint, unless by due course of law. Concerning which we may take the same observations as upon the preceding article; that it is a right strictly natural; that the laws of England have never abridged it without sufficient cause; and that in this kingdom it cannot ever be abridged at the mere discretion of the magistrate, without the explicit permission of the laws. Here again the language of the great charter is, that no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, (PAGE 131) but by the lawfuljudgment of his equals, or by the law of the land. And many subsequent old statutes expressly direct, that no man shall be taken or imprisoned by suggestion or petition to the king, or his council, unless it be by legal indictment, or the process of common law. ...............OF great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty; for if once it were left in th power of any, the highest magistrate to imprison arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought propoer, (as in France it is daily practiced by the crown) there would soon be an end of all rights and immunities..................To bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation or trial, would be so gross an act of despotism, as must at once (PAGE 132) convey the alarm of tryanny throughout the whole kingdom. But confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to goal, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten; is a less public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government."


3.5 BOOK III, CHAPTER 23:- 

PAGE 349:-

"...the trial by jury; called also the trial per pais or by the country. A trial that hath been used time out of m ind in this nation, and seems to have been co-eval with the first civil government thereof.....(PAGE 350) .. the truth seems to be, that this tribunal was universally established among all the northern nations, and so interwoven in their very constitution,. It's establishment however and use ... was always so highly esteemed and valued by the people, that no conquest, no change of government, could ever prevail to abolish it. In magna carta it is more than once insisted on as the principal bulwark of our liberties;........the more it is searched into and understaood, the more it is sure to be valued. And this is a species of knowledge most absolutely necessary for every gentleman in the kingdom: as well because he may be frequently (PAGE 351) called upon to determine in this capacity the rights of others, his fellow-subjects; as because his own property, his liberty, and his life; depend upon maintaining, in it's legal force, the constitutional trial by jury."

3.6 PAGE 365:-

We may here again observe, and observing we cannot but admire, how scrupulously delicate and how impartially just the law of England approves itself, in the constitution and frame of a tribunal, this excellently contrived for the test and investigation of truth; which appears most remarkably, 1. In the avoiding of frauds and secret management, by electing the twelve jurors out of the whole panel by lot. 2. In it's caution against all partiality and bias......

3.7 PAGE 370:-

"...the jury from other circumstances will judge of their credibility (ie: of the witnesses' credibility) ..."

3.8 PAGE 372:-

"THE oath administered to the witness is not only that what he deposes shall be true, but that he shall also depose the whole truth: so that he is not to conceal any part of what he knows, whether interrogated particularly to that point or not. And all this evidence is to be given in open court, in the presence of the parties, their attorneys, the counsel, and all by-standers: and before the judge and jury: each party having liberty to except to it's competency, which exceptions are publicly stated, and by the judge openly and publicly allowed or disallowed, in the face of the country; which must curb any secret bias or partiality, that might arise in his own breast. And if, either in his directions or decisions, he mis-states the law by ignorance, inadvertence, or design, the counsel on either side may require him publicly to seal a bill of exceptions; stating the point wherein he is supposed to err: and this he is obliged to seal by statute Westm. 2. 13 Edw. 1. C. 31 or, if he refuses so to do, the party may have a compulsort writ against him, commanding him to seal it, if the fact alleged be truly stated: and if he returns, that the fact is untruly stated, when the case is otherwise, an action will lie against him for making a false return."

3.9 PAGE 374:-

"AS to such evidence as the jury may have in their own consciences, by their private knowledge of facts, it was an antient doctrine, that this had as much right to sway their judgment as the written or parole evidence which is delivered in court. And therefore it hath been often held, that though no proofs be produced on either side, yet the jury might bring in a verdict. For the oath of the jurors, to find according to their evidence, was construed to be, to do it according to the best of their knowledge.......(PAGE 375) .....if a juror knows any thing of the matter in issue, he may be sworn as a witness, and give his evidence publicly in court.........the judge in the presence of the parties, the counsel, and all others, sums up the whole to the jury...and giving his opinion in matters of laws arising upon that evidence."

3.10 PAGE 377:-

"... the only effectual and legal verdict is the public verdict; in which they openly declare to have found the issue for the plaintiff, or for the defendant; and if for the plaintiff, they assess the damages also sustained by the plaintiff, in consequence of the injury upon which the action is brought."

3.11 PAGE 378:-

"...the jury may, if they think proper, take upon themselves to determine at their own hazard, the complicated question of fact and law; ...."

3.12 PAGE 379:-

"UPON these accounts the trial by jury ever has been, and I trust ever will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law. And, if it has so great an advantage over others in regulating civil property, how much must that advantage be heightened, when it is applied to criminal cases! But this we must refer to the ensuing book of these commentaries: only observing for the present, that it is the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy, or with for, that he cannot be affected either in his property, his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbours and equals. A constitution, that I may venture to affirm has, under providence, secured the just liberties of this nation for a long succession of ages. And therefore a celebrated French writer (Montesq. Sp.L.xi.6), who concludes, that because Rome, Sparta, and Carthage have lost their liberties, therefore those of England in time must perish, should have recollected that Rome, Sparta, and Carthage, were strangers to the trial by jury.

GREAT as this eulogium may seem, it is no more than this admirable constitution, when traced to it's principles, will be found in sober reason to deserve. The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our persons and our properties, is the great end of civil society. But is that be entirely entrusted to the magistracy, a select body of men, and those generally selected by the prince or such as enjoy the highest offices in the state, their decisions, in spight of their own natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary bias towards those of their own rank and dignity: it is not to be expected from human nature, that the few should be always attentive to the interests and good of the many."


3.13 PAGE 380:-

"Here therefore a competent number of sensible and upright jurymen, chosen by lot from among those of the middle rank, will be found the best investigators of truth, and the surest guardians of public justice. For the most powerful individual in the state will be cautious of committing any flagrant invasion of another's right, when he knows that the fact of his oppression must be examined and decided by twelve indifferent men, not appointed till the hour of trial; and that, when once the fact is ascertained, the law must of course redress it. This therefore preserves in the hands of the people that share which they ought to have in the administration of public justice, and prevents the encroachments of the powerful and wealthy citizens. Every new tribunal, erected for the decision of facts, without the intervention of a jury, (whether composed of justices of the peace, commissioners of the revenue, judges of a court of conscience, or any other standing magistrates) is a step towards establishing aristocracy, the most oppressive of absolute governments.........And in every (PAGE 381) country on the continent, as the trial by the peers has been gradually disused, so the nobles have increased in power, till the state has been torn to pieces by rival factions, and oligarchy in effect has been established, ......It is therefore, upon the whole, a duty which every man owes to his country, his friends, his prosterity, and himself, to maintain to the utmost of his power this valuable constitution in all it's rights "

3.14 BOOK IV, CHAPTER 10:-

PAGE 140:-

"21. THERE is yet another offence against public justice, which is a crime of deep malignity; and so much the deeper, as there are many opportunities of putting it in practice, and the power and wealth of the offenders may often deter the injured from a legal prosecution. This is the oppression and tyrannical partiality of judges, justices, and other magistrates, in the administration and under the colour of their office. However, when prosecuted, either by impeachment in parliament, or by information in the court of king's bench, (according to the rank of the offenders) it is sure to be severely punished with the forfeiture of their offices, fines, imprisonment, or other discretionary censure, regulated by the nature and aggravations of the offence committed."

3.15 BOOK IV, CHAPTER 30:-

PAGE 383:-

"...if any judgment whatever be given by persons, who had no good commission to proceed against the person condemned, it is void;..(PAGE 384) ..it being a high misdemesnor in the judges so proceeding, .....(PAGE 386) But when judgment, pronounced upon conviction, is falsified or reversed, all former proceedings are absolutely set aside, and the party stands as if he had never been at all accused; restored in his credit, his capacity, his blood, and his estates; ....... But he still remains liable to another prosecution for the same offence: for, the first being erroneous, he never was in jeopardy thereby."

(ii) ALEXANDER HAMILTON (1755 - 1804)

Extracts from FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 83:

3.16 "A power to constitute courts is a power to prescribe the mode of trial; and consequently,  if nothing was said in the Constitution on the subject of juries, the legislature would be at liberty either to adopt that institution or to let it alone. This discretion, in regard to criminal cause, is abridged by the express injunction of trial by jury in all such cases;.....The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of free government. For my own part, the more the operayion of the institution has fallen under my observation, the more reason I have discovered for holding it in high estimation; and it would be altogether superfluous to examine to what extent it deserves to be esteemed useful or essential in a representative republic, or how much more merit it may be entitled to, as a defense against the oppressions of an hereditary monarchy, than as a barrier to the tyranny of popular magistrates in a popular government.....Arbutrary impeachments, arbitrary methods of prosecuting pretended offenses, and arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions, have ever appeared to me to be the great engines of judicial despotism; and these have all relation to criminal proceedings.....The strongest argument in its favour is, that it is security against corruption. As there is always more time and better opportunity to tamper with a standing body of magistrates than with a jury summoned for the occasion, ... the trial by jury must still be a valuable check upon corruption. It greatly multiplies the impediments to its success. As matters now stand, it would be necessary to corrupt both court and jury; .....By increasing the obstacles to success, it discourages attempts to seduce the integrity of either...."


(iii) LYSANDER SPOONER (1808 - 1887)

AN ESSAY ON THE TRIAL BY JURY, 1852:-

THE RIGHT OF JURIES TO JUDGE OF THE JUSTICE OF LAWS.


3.17 "For more than six hundred years - that is, since Magna Carta, in 1215 - there has been no clearer principle of English or American constitutional law, than that, in criminal cases, it is not only the right and duty of juries to judge what are the facts, what is the law, and what was the moral intent of the accused; but that it is also their right, and their primary and paramount duty, to judge the justice of the law, and to hold all laws invalid, that are, in their opinion, unjust or oppressive, and all persons guiltless in violating, or resisting the execution of, such laws.

3.18 Unless such be the right and duty of jurors, it is plain that, instead of juries being a "palladium of liberty" - a barrier against the tyranny and oppression of the government - they are really mere tools in its hands, for carrying into execution any injustice and oppression it may desire to have executed.

3.19 "The trial by jury", then, is a "trial by the country" - that is, by the people - as distinguished from a trial by the government.

3.20 How is it possible that juries can do anything to protect the liberties of the people against the government; if they are not allowed to determine what those liberties are?

3.21 In short, if the jury have no right to judge of the justice of a law of the government, they plainly can do nothing to protect the people against the oppressions of the government; for there are no oppressions which the government may not authorize by law.

3.22 The jury are also to judge whether the laws are rightly expounded to them by the court.

3.23 They must also judge whether there realyy be any such law,..

3.24 The jury must also judge of the laws of evidence. If the government can dictate to the jury the laws of evidence, it can not only shut out any evidence it pleases, tending to vindicate the accused, but it can require that any evidence whatever, that it pleases to offer, be held as conclusive proof of ay offence whatever which the governemnt chooses to allege.

3.25 It is manifest, therefore, that the jury must judge of and try the whole case, and every part and parcel of the case, free of any dictation or authority on the part of the government................By such trials the government will determine its own powers over the people, instead of the people's determining their own liberties against the government; and it will be an entire delusion to talk, as for centuries we have done, of the trial by the jury, as a "palladium of liberty", or as any protection to the people against the oppression and tyranny of the government.

3.26 The question, then, between trial by jury, as thus described, and trial by the government, is simply a question between liberty and despotism.


3.27 Those who are capable of tyranny, are capable of perjury to sustain it.

3.28 The trial by jury is based upon a recognition of this principle, and therefore forbids the government to executed any of its laws, by punishing violators, in any case whatever, without first getting the consent of "the country", or the people, through a jury. In this way, the people at all times, hold their liberties in their own hands, and never surrender them, even for a moment,  into the hands of the government.

3.29 And if there be so much as a reasonable doubt of the justice of the laws, the benefit of that doubt must be given to the defendant, and not to the government. So that the government must keep its laws clearly within the limits of justice, if it would as a jury to enforce them.

3.30 The legal effect of these constitutional recognitions of the right of individuals to defend their property, liberties, and lives, against the government, is to legalize resistance to all injustice and oppression, of every name and nature whatsoever, on the part of the government.

3.31 The bounds set to the power of the government, by the trial by jury, as will hereafter be shown, are these - that the government shall never touch the property, person, or natural or civil rights of an individual, against his consent, (except for the purpose of bringing them before a jury for trial,) unless in pursuance and execution of a judgment, or decree, rendered by a jury in each individual case, upon such evidence, and such law, as are satisfactory to their own understandings and consciences, irrespective of all legislation of the government.

3.32 As a moral proposition, it is perfectly self-evident that, unless juries have all the legal rights that have been claimed for them in the preceding chapters, -- that is, the rights of judging what the law is, whether the law be a just one, what evidence is admissible, what wright the evidence is entitled to, whether an act were done with a criminal intent, and the right also to limit the sentence, free from all dictation from any quarter, -- they have no moral right to sit in the trial at all, and cannot do so without making themselves accomplices in any injustice that they may have reason to believe may result from their verdict. It is absurd to say that they have no moral responsibility for the use that may be made of their verdict by the government, when they have reason to suppose it will be used for purposes of injustice.

3.33 It is absurd, also, to say that jurors have no moral responsibility for any cruel and unusual sentence that may be inflicted even upon a guilty man, when they consent to render a verdict which they have reason to believe will be used by the government as a justification for the infliction of such a sentence.

3.34 The same principles apply to civil cases as criminal. If a jury consent, at the dictaion of the court, as to either law or evidence, to render a verdict, on the strength of which they have reason to believe that a man's property will be taken from him and given to another, against their own notions of justice, they make themselves morally responsible for the wrong.

3.35 Every man, therefore, ought to refuse to sit in a jury, and to take the oath of a juror, unless the form of the oath be such as to allow him to use his own judgment, on every part of the case, free of all dictation whatsoever, and to hold in his own hand a veto upon the verdict that can be rendered against a defendant, and any sentence that can be inflicted upon him, even if he be guilty.

3.36 The only oath which it would seem that a man can rightfully take as a juror, in eith a civil or criminal case, is, that he "will try the case according to his conscience." Of course, the form may admit variation, but this should be the substance. Such, we have seen, were the ancient common law oaths."

4. Part II:

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SYDNEY OFFICE OF THE REGISTRY

No. S 127 of 1998

BETWEEN JOHN WILSON
Applicant
and

THE PROTHONOTARY
Respondent

A BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE APPLICANT'S ARGUMENT 


4.1 MAGNA CARTA & REASONS FOR GRANTING SPECIAL LEAVE

CAP XXIX of the Magna Carta 1297 says: "To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay, Right or Justice." and the reasons for granting leave to appeal, as stated in Supreme Court Procedure (NSW) Part 7 - Appeal to the Court of Appeal, s. 101.4 Appeal from interlocatory order at 1164.1 Butterworths, are (a) "the determination of substantive rights" and (b) to avoid "a substantive injustice". 

4.2THE PROTECTION OF MAGNA CARTA

Magna Carta is protected by section 43 of the Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 No. 30 which says: "Any person guilty of any offence under any Imperial enactment included in Part 1 of the Second Schedule for which no punishment is otherwise provided is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years or to a fine not exceeding 20 penalty units, or to both imprisonment and fine.". Justice Peter Hidden has denied the applicant the right to trial by jury and should be indicted to face trial by jury for that offence. Handley JA and Stein JA have endorsed Justice Peter Hidden's actions by refusing leave to appeal and have made themselves party to the offence.

4.3 ABSOLUTE POWER OF JUDGES

Judges must never be given nor allowed to assume absolute power whereby they can conceal their own incompetence and their own corruption. Judges are not above the law nor are they unaccountable to the people.

4.4 JUDICIAL OATH & SAVING RIGHTS

Judges swear before God an Oath to "well and truly serve" Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II who has sworn, also before God, to govern the people of Australia in Law and Justice and with Mercy. She cannot extinguish the rights of Her subjects and nor can judges. To extinguish or override the rights of the people is an act of tyranny and oppression. Not even the repealing of legislation can extinguish the rights of the individual and proof of this reality is seen in the "Savings" section of the Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 No. 30 which says: "9. (1). The repeal by this Act of any Imperial enactment does not: ..(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred under any Imperial enactment so repealed:".

4.5 TRIAL BY JURY IN THE U.S.A.

Article the eighth (Amendment VI) of the United States of America's Bill of Rights says "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury" and Article the ninth (Amendment VII) similarly says that "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved". Is an Australian less equal before the law than an American?

4.6 MAGNA CARTA & THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY

CAP XXIX of the Magna Carta 1297 says: "NO freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold, or his liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or in any other wise destroyed, nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him unless by the lawful judgement of his Peers or by the law of the land.".

4.7 THE LAW OF THE LAND

The law of the land is the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 which says, in clause 5 that "This Act, and all laws made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth under the Constitution, shall be binding on the courts, judges, and people of every State and of every part of the Commonwealth, notwithstanding anything in the laws of any State:".

4.8 THE CONSTITUTION & THE JUDICIARY ACT & THE CRIMES ACT

The Constitution says in section 80, about trial by jury, that: "The trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by jury," and contempt of court is an offence against a Commonwealth law, being section 24 of the Judiciary Act 1903, and section 4A of the Crimes Act 1914 (a Commonwealth law) says that: ""indictment" includes an information and a presentment".

4.9 SECTION 109 OF THE CONSTITUTION

The Constitution says in section 109 that: "When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.". Therefore, because contempt of court shall have trial by jury under a Commonwealth law, contempt of court shall have trial by jury under a State law.


4.10 THE IMPERIAL ACTS APPLICATION ACT & GALEA

As far as section 6 of the Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 No. 30 is concerned, any State law which is invalid by virtue of being inconsistent with a Commonwealth law cannot affect an Imperial enactment such as Magna Carta. Therefore, Justice Peter Hidden's referral to Galea v New South Wales Egg Corporation (C of A, unreported, 21 November 1989) has no substance and his argument that "any guarantee of trial by jury in Magna Carta can be, and has been, overridden by the Supreme Court Act and Rules as far as contempt is concerned." is wrong.

The Galea proceedings were to do with a "Motion for leave to appeal out of time against the orders of Needham J dated 9 February 1988" (with no mention of the right to trial by jury) and to an "Appeal from the orders of Needham J of 19 August 1988" as to whether the Egg Industry Act 1983 met the requirements of s. 5 of the NSW Constitution Act 1902 in regard to the counting of hens and eggs.

4.11 THE INTERPRETATION ACT SAVING RIGHTS

The Galea judgement did quote section 30 of the Interpretation Act 1987 No. 15 which says: "(1) The amendment or repeal of an Act or statutory rule does not: ... (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the Act or statutory rule,". This restates the same protection of rights found in section 9 of the Imperial Acts Application Act 1969. Therefore, the Supreme Court Act and Rules cannot take away the right of the individual to trial by jury.

4.12 THE CONSTITUTION & STATE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

Section 118 of the Australian Constitution says that: "Full faith and credit shall be given, throughout the Commonwealth to the laws, the public Acts and records, and the judicial proceedings of every State.", and section 51 (xxiv) says the Federal "Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws ... with respect to ...The service and execution throughout the Commonwealth of the civil and criminal process and the judgements of the courts of the States:".

These reinforce sections 80 and 109 of the Constitution which ensure that contempt of court shall proceed by trial by jury. 

4.13 SECTION 5 OF THE NSW CONSTITUTION & TELECASTERS

Handley JA, on 24 AUG 1998, was wrong when he said that: ".. in the Constitution nor in an Act made in Canberra is there a law, ...., that is a Commonwealth law, which says there must be trial by jury for state offences. That's a matter which under our federal system is left to the states.". The New South Wales Constitution Act 1902 No. 32, General legislative powers, section 5. says: "The Legislature shall, subject to the provisions of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, have power to make laws for the peace, welfare, and good government of New South Wales in all cases whatsoever:". Because of section 109 and 80 of the Australian Constitution, New South Wales cannot make a law to deny trial by jury for contempt of court. Therefore, such "a matter" is not "left to the states" and when in United Telecasters Sydney Limited v Hardie (1991) 23 NSWLR 323 Meagher JJA said; "Contempt committed in the face of a State court, whatever jurisdiction is being exercised, is a matter for State law.", the State law must be consistent with Commonwealth law, ie: there must trial by jury for both the Commonwealth offence of contempt of court and the State offence of contempt of court to be consistent (section 109 of the Australian Constitution). 


4.14 COURTS DECLARING LAWS VOID

In the Annotated Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, p. 791, John Quick and Robert Randolph Garran say: "In the exercise of the duty of interpretation and adjudication not only in the High Court, but every court of competent jurisdiction, has the right to declare that a law of the Commonwealth or of a State is void by reason of transgressing the Constitution. This is a duty cast upon the courts by the very nature of the judicial function. The federal Parliament and the State Parliaments are not sovereign bodies; they are legislatures with limited powers; and any law which they attempt to pass in excess of those powers is no law at all it is simply a nullity, entitled to no obedience.".

Section 31 of the Interpretation Act 1987 No. 15 says: "(1) An Act or instrument shall be construed as operative to the full extent of, but so as not to exceed, the legislative power of Parliament.".

Parliament does not have the power to extinguish the right to trial by jury which is an integral part of the common law which "was assumed by, and controlled, the Constitution" (Sir Owen Dixon - Jesting Pilate, pp 198 - 202, 203 - 13) ( from The High Court and the Constitution by Leslie Zines p 400 ).

4.15 JUDGES DON'T MAKE LAWS & THE REFERENDUM OF 1988

Nor is the judiciary a sovereign body having the ultimate authority to make and impose laws. They must comply with the law of the land, being the Australian Constitution, which embodies the will of the people. Article 21.3 of the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights says that: " The will of the people shall be the basis of authority of government:" and the will of the people was expressed in Referenda before the Constitution Bill could be made the law of the land and again in 1988 when a proposed law to alter section 80 of the Constitution to exclude contempt of court from trial by jury was defeated in every State. The published "WHY YOU SHOULD VOTE 'NO' - ON TRIAL BY JURY" in newspapers at the time immediately prior to the referendum said that the proposed law "would undermine our existing rights enshrined for seven centuries since Magna Carta. At present, a person charged with any serious offence has the right to a jury trial.". The voters rejected excluding contempt of court from trial by jury. Government and the judiciary must obey the will of the people.

4.16 JUDGEMENTS REPUGNANT TO MAGNA CARTA ARE VOID

CAP II of the CONFIRMATIO CARTARUM 1297 says that "AND we will, that if any Judgement be given from henceforth contrary to the Points of the Charters aforesaid by the Justices, or by any other Officers that hold Plea before them against the Points of the Charters, they shall be undone, and holden for nought.". Therefore, no court has jurisdiction to conduct a trial for contempt of court against me unless it accords me my right to a jury trial.

"The consent to be tried summarily must be clear and unequivocal and a failure to carry out the procedures for obtaining the consent will deprive the court of jurisdiction to determine the matters summarily." - Halsbury's Laws of Australia, para (130 - 13460) at 250,997.

4.17 TRIAL BY JURY NOT "OBSOLETE" ...... WILLESEE

Justice Peter Hidden was wrong when on 16 MAR 98 he said, when referring to The Registrar of Court of Appeal v Willesee & Ors (1984) 2 NSWLR 378, that: "Willesee is clear authority for the proposition that trial by jury for contempt is obsolete ..." because Magna Carta, in CAP I, granted that right "for evermore" -which means it can never become "obsolete". 

4.18 FAILURE TO INFORM OF RIGHTS

Justice Peter Hidden went on to say: "..and that summary trial is now the normal procedure.". But if summary trial was not elected by the accused because he/she was not informed of their inalienable rights, then those judgments (no matter how many) are "to be undone and holden for nought". 

4.19 HANDLEY JA & NORMAN GALLAGHER

Handley JA (24 AUG 98) said of a case against Norman Gallagher "about 10 or 12 years ago", "he was tried for contempt of the Federal Court by the federal Court and without a jury.". I replied: "Was he given the choice, was he given an election?". Handley JA said: "I don't believe he was given any choice.". I said: "Well, I'd say his rights were infringed if he wasn't.". Handley JA said: "He didn't argue, his counsel didn't argue that he was entitled to a trial by jury.".       

4.20 FAILURE TO INFORM OF RIGHTS

This is the deplorable situation of Australian citizens not knowing of their Constitutional and inherited rights and, at the same time, judges and lawyers being equally ignorant or else failing to advise the accused person of their rights.

4.21 WORKING TO IMPOSE A SUBSTANTIVE INJUSTICE

Besides "the determination of a substantive right",  the other main criterion for granting leave to appeal is that the judgement appealed from "must also work to impose a substantive injustice:" (Supreme Court Procedure, Part 7, s.101.4 Appeal from interlocatory order) . The injustice which would result if leave to appeal is not granted is that bank fraud, in the form of variable interest rate loans, would continue to be concealed by the corrupt practices of the judiciary which presently places the entire system of justice in Australia in jeopardy.

4.22 CONCEALING JUDICIAL CORRUPTION

Justice Peter Hidden's judgement imposes "a substantive injustice" in that it serves to protect the concealing of extensive judicial corruption which was the subject of the proceedings heard by Acting Justice Brian Murray and which gave rise to the incident of the 5th of September, 1997.

Judicial corruption comes under Part III of the Crimes Act 1914 which is a Commonwealth law "binding on the courts, judges, and people of every State and of every part of the Commonwealth, notwithstanding anything in the laws of any State;". 

4.23 CONCEALING FRAUD

The injustice also extends to victims of bank fraud in the form of variable interest rate loan contracts being denied restitution because corrupt judges refuse to declare that variable means uncertain and certain means not variable and, therefore, variable interest rates render a loan contract void for uncertainty. This is the claim which originally drew me to the courts in 1996 to establish this simple truth. 


4.24 JURIES DO WHAT JUDGES DON'T FOR JUSTICE

"For more than six hundred years 0 that is, since Magna Carta, in 1215 -- there has been no clearer principle of English or American constitutional law, than that, in criminal cases, it is not only the right and duty of juries to judge what are the facts, what is the law, and what was the moral intent of the accused; but that it is also their right, and their primary and paramount duty, to judge the justice of the law, and to hold all laws invalid, that are, in their opinion, unjust or oppressive, and all persons guiltless in violating, or resisting the execution of, such law." - An Essay on The Trial By Jury by Lysander Spooner, 1852.

"Trial by jury has long been considered a fundamental safeguard of fairness and impartiality in the administration of justice, especially of criminal justice. Jury trial stemmed from a deep-seated conviction about the exercise of judicial power, that it should not in matters affecting the liberty of the subject be entrusted unchecked to any official, judge or administrator but should be vested in ordinary citizens." - The Laws of Australia 21.6, Part D, (38), p. 47.


4.25 JUDGES OUGHT NOT HEAR THIS CASE

Under the Supreme Court Rules, Part 51, rule 23.8, it says that "A judge ought not hear a case if there is a reasonable apprehension that an impartial mind will not be brought to bear on the resolution of proceedings.". I have already expressed such an apprehension when I filed an Affidavit in the Court of Appeal to support a Notice of Motion to that effect on 26 JUN 98 to which I annexed one of my leaflets entitled "BANK FRAUD & CORRUPT JUDGES".

4.26 WITHDRAWAL OF FIRST CHARGE GOING TO A JURY & INJUSTICE

The first charge imposed on the Applicant, under section 326 of the Crimes Act 1900, over the incident of 5 SEP 97 was withdrawn by the Public Prosecutor on 19 MAR 98 in the Downing Centre Local Court when it was proceeding to trial by jury. I had made it clear in the Downing Centre that I would be presenting evidence of judicial corruption to a jury and that a jury should hear "The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth". During those proceedings, on 26 SEP 97, the magistrate in the Downing Centre imposed additional and oppressive terms to the bail to imprison me in the Silverwater Remand Centre for the period 26 SEP 97 to 28 SEP 97 when a friend guarantied surety for me. I truly believe this action also constitutes a violation of my human rights by wrongful imprisonment.

4.27 THE INJUSTICE IS THE PERVERSION OF JUSTICE

Whilever the right to trial by jury, which is the tribunal of the people, is denied and judges continue to use their authority to perpetuate the lie that "the rate itself is indeed certain" and to protect themselves, there can be no justice. 

4.28 INALIENABLE RIGHTS

Rights granted by Imperial enactments such as Magna Carta cannot be taken away or "overridden" by politicians, bankers or judges.
 

4.29 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES, ETC.
1.Magna Carta 1297, CAP XXIX, CAP I.
2.Supreme Court Procedure (NSW), Part 7, s. 101.4.
3.Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 No. 30, s. 43, s. 9(1), s. 6.
4.Judicial Oath.
5.Coronation Oath.
6.U.S.A. Bill of Rights 1789, Article 8, Article 9.
7.Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, cl. 5, s. 80, s. 109, s. 118, s. 51 (xxiv).
8.Judiciary Act 1902, s.24.
9. Crimes Act 1914, s. 4A, and Part III.
10.Interpretation Act 1987 No. 15, s. 30 (1), s.31 (1).
11.Constitution Act 1902 No. 32, s. 5.
12.Annotated Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia by Quick and Garran, p. 791.
13.The High Court and the Constitution by Leslie Zines, p. 400.
14.Referendum 1988, Question 4 - Religion, Jury and Property.
15.United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21.3
16.Confirmatio Cartarum 1297, CAP II.
17.Halsbury's Laws of Australia, para (130 - 13460) at 250,997.
18.Transcript of 24 AUG 1998, Court of Appeal, p. 3, lines 40 - 55.
19.Supreme Court Rules, Part 51, r. 23.8.
20.An Essay on The Trial By Jury - Lysander Spooner, 1852.
21.The laws of Australia - The Law Book Company Limited, 21.6, Part D, (38), p. 47.
22.Supreme Court Rules, Part 51, rule 23.8.
23.Crimes Act 1900, s. 326.

5.  Part III:-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
NEW SOUTH WALES
SYDNEY REGISTRY

COURT OF APPEAL File No:  40731 of  1999.

COURT BELOW File No:  12914  of  1999.

SUMMARY OF CLAIMANT'S ARGUMENT

5.1I truly believe that Justice Sully's decision to dismiss my application requisitioning trial by jury was wrong "in law and in fact", to use his words from his judgement from the hearing of the application in the Supreme Court of New South Wales on Monday the 6th of September, 1999.

5.2. Justice Scully was wrong to say that my "submissions ... are ... wholly and transparently without merit either in law or in fact".

5.3 Judges must never be given nor allowed to assume absolute power whereby they can conceal their own incompetence, corruption and treachery.

Are Australian Judges and Courts Competent?

5.4 My Notice of Motion requisitioning trial by jury was filed on 19 August 1999 and accompanied by an Affidavit sworn to on 18 August 1999 which quoted and based these particular submissions on Article 14 of the United Nations' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

5.5 That United Nations' covenant is international law and is binding on Australia which means it is as covering clause 7 of the "Draft Bill To Constitute the Commonwealth of Australia, Victoriae Reginae A.D. 1897" says, ie: "This Constitution established by this Act, and all laws made by The Parliament of the Commonwealth in pursuance of the powers conferred by the Constitution, and all treaties made by the Commonwealth, shall, according to their tenour, be binding on the Courts, Judges, and people, of every State, and every part of the Commonwealth, anything in the laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding; and the laws and treaties of the Commonwealth shall be in force on board of all British ships whose last port of clearance or whose port of destination is in the Commonwealth.". 

5.6 The fact that the Parliament of the United Kingdom removed treaties from this paragraph 7 of the Draft Bill, which became covering clause 5, and enacted their amended Act to Constitute the Commonwealth of Australia, 63 & 64 Victoria, Chapter 12, 19th July, 1900, without the approval by referendum of the voters of Australia, is proof that Australia was still very much a colony and subject to legislation imposed on it by the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, the power to make or enter into treaties belongs to the monarch, acting on the advice of government ministers. Clearly, the Parliament of the United Kingdom were not prepared to allow the Commonwealth of Australia to make or enter into treaties as a sovereign nation would. 

5.7 However, on June 28th 1919, the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. "Billy" Hughes, signed the Peace Treaty of Versailles and on January 20th 1920, Australia joined the League of Nations as a full member state. The prerequisite for becoming a member was sovereignty. Therefore, under International Law, Australia was a sovereign nation. The United Kingdom became a foreign power to Australia and United Kingdom laws, including the Act to Constitute the Commonwealth of Australia, were extinguished in line with Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations 1919. The status of the United Kingdom as a foreign power was confirmed recently in the High Court of Australia's ruling in the Heather Hill case.

5.8 In the United Kingdom a treaty does not become part of municipal law until brought into force by an Act of Parliament. In Australia, that protocol is said to persist, ie: that treaties are not binding on a signatory nation unless that nation creates its own specific local laws to allow the substance of the treaties to flow on to its people. Having regard to this incongruity, the United Nations' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can be found as Schedule 2 of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (a law enacted by the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia). Article 14 of that covenant can be found on page 52 of Reprint No. 3, reprinted as at 31 March 1994. 

5.9 Therefore, Article 14 of the United Nations' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has merit in law.

5.10 Whether the Australian Constitution, itself, has "merit in law" is another question which will have to be decided by the United Nations, in time, and will form the basis of a Notice of a Constitutional Matter under section 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 to the Federal Attorney-General.

5.11 If there is no valid Australian Constitution, Australian courts can have no credentials, competence, nor jurisdiction.

5.12 Justice Scully was wrong to say my "submissions ... are ... without merit ... in fact". My submission is that I am "equal before the courts and tribunals" and that "In the determination of any criminal charge against (me), or of (my) rights and obligations in a suit of law, (I am) entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial established by law".

5.13 At the hearing of the Motion for Trial by Jury, on Monday 6 September 1999, in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, I said, "In the Courts of Australia, there are two forms of trial: One, trial by jury; and, secondly, trial by judge or judges. This matter is about my right to protest and take action against bank fraud, corrupt judges and how those corrupt judges are misusing the Court to oppress and victimise the people of this country.". His Honour replied: "You are saying it is your right to throw paint over a member of the Court?". I then said, "It is my right to trial by jury; and, in my defence, I will bring out all the issues.".

5.14 Magna Carta 1297 guaranties me "Right and Justice" and should this be denied, the United Nations' Human Rights Commission will be told of all previous legal argument in my quest for trial by jury wherein the incompetence, corruption and treachery of Australian judges will be revealed to that Commission. 

Are Australian Judges Independent and Impartial?

5.15 I have composed a book entitled "Banks and Judges" which covers these issues of bank fraud and judicial corruption. The ISBN is 1 74018 020 8. I will include this book as part of my presentation to the Court of Appeal should leave be granted for the Appeal.

5.16 At the same hearing, I quoted from Article 14 of the United Nations' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and added, "Now that competent, independent, impartial tribunal cannot be before a judge because of the involvement of judicial corruption." and "At my trial for contempt of court, I will subpoena the judges involved in the initial corruption, involved ... leading (to the) incident on 5 September 1997. No other judge or judges can qualify under Article 14 of the United Nations' Covenant for a competent, independent and impartial trib(un)al in the determination of my rights nor of justice. Should this application for trial by jury be dismissed, then I will appeal through the Court of Appeal to the High Court and then on to the United Nations' Human Rights Commission in Geneva in Switzerland, once all domestic remedies have been exhausted, which is the requirement to be met before their Optionl Protocol comes into effect. I would like to point out to you something in this very room. Above your head is the Royal Coat of Arms which has the inscription on it which says "God and my right". It is my right to have (a) tribunal before a jury.".

5.17 At my trial for contempt of court I will question judges on their rulings in matters numbered CL 20680/96, CA 40593/9, S 190/96 and CL 20723/97 as to the why they lied, supported lies, and concealed fraud in the form of variable interest rate loan contracts issued by the banks. Under common law, for a contract to be created, there must be "certainty of terms". "Variable", on the other hand, means "uncertain" and "certain" means "not variable" which renders loan contracts having variable interest rates void for uncertainty.

5.18 Questioning of those judges at that time must not be before another judge or judges because such a tribunal would not be "independent and impartial".

5.19 Contempt of court concerns "interferring with the administration of justice". Only a jury of my peers who are "honest and true" and who are "competent, independent and impartial" can judge what are the facts, what is the law, judge the justice of the law and determine my guilt or innocence. 

5.20 Those judges, whom I will question, will not be on trial on that occasion. It will I who will be on trial.

5.21 There must be no temptation for a judge or judges to obstruct the presentation of evidence and my defence. To quote Lysander Spooner from his "Essay on the Trial by Jury" (1852), "the jury must judge of and try the whole case, and every part and parcel of the case". 

5.22 There must be no temptation for a judge or judges to violate their Oath of Allegiance and Judicial Oath which are to "be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second" and "to do right to all manner of people after the laws and usages of this State without fear or favour, affection or ill-will, SO HELP ME, GOD" where Her Majesty, at Her Coronation, received the Holy Bible to be "royal Law" and swore to "cause Law and Justice, in Mercy, to be executed in all (Her) judgements' and received the Sword from the Archbishop of Canterbury with the prayer "that she may not bear the Sword in vain; but may use it as the minister of God for the terror and punishment of evil-doers, and for the protection and encouragement of those who do well, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.". There is no greater force for evil than the banks who, through fraud, have inflicted untold deprivation, misery and hardship on ordinary men, women and children. And there are no greater evil-doers than the banks who have corrupted an entire judiciary to have them lie, commit crimes, betray their people and betray the oaths they have sworn before God.

5.23 A tribunal of a judge or judges cannot constitute "a competent, independent and impartial tribunal" for the determination of a charge of contempt of court against me or of my rights and obligations.

5.24 The Star Chamber was banished in England in 1640 because "the Proceedings, Censure and Decrees of that Court have by Experience been found to be an intolerable Burthen to the Subjects, and the means to introduce a arbitrary Power and Government;". 

5.25 Australian judges claim some "Doctrine of Immunity" (?) which make them "immune from suit". However, judges are not above the law but are indeed liable to punishment when they commit crimes in or out of the courtroom. To deny trial by jury in this case is to attempt to prevent evidence of judicial corruption being presented to a tribunal of the people and it is the people to whom the judges are accountable in this world.

5.26  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES, ETC.

1.United Nations' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 14.
2.Draft Bill to Constitute the Commonwealth of Australia, Victoriae Reginae A.D. 1897, Covering Clause 7.
3.Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986.
4.Act to Constitute the Commonwealth of Australia, 63 & 64 Victoria,  Chapter 12, 19th July, 1900, Covering Clause 5.
5.Peace Treaty of Versailles, Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919.
6.The Royal Coat of Arms.
7."Essay on the Trial by Jury" by Lysander Spooner, 1852.
8."Banks and Judges" by J. Wilson, 2nd ed., 1999.

.........John Wilson..........

Sworn at ......North Rocks..................

on ...18th May..... , 2000

before me ...A Burrows.....................
(Justice of the Peace 7100108)

......................................................
Claimant


8

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
NEW SOUTH WALES
SYDNEY REGISTRY
COMMON LAW DIVISION File No: 20137/00

AFFIDAVIT

I, John Wilson of 19 Elm Place, North Rocks in the State of New South Wales, say on oath:

1. I am the Deponent.

2. I truly believe that this matter of suing the Crown under the Crown Proceedings Act 1988 for unlawful imprisonment can only be determined by an independent and impartial tribunal in the form of a trial by jury because any judicial officer is employed by the Crown and has sworn an oath of allegiance to the Crown and, therefore, is not independent of the Crown.

3. I truly believe that this matter of alleging bias and partiality on the part of the judiciary towards itself can only be determined by a tribunal independent of and impartial towards the judiciary.

4. I truly believe that this matter of claiming that an Australian citizen's right to trial by jury can only be determined by a tribunal representing the people - or, in other words, a trial by jury which is also regarded as trial by the country.

5. I truly believe that the institution of trial by jury is the foundation and most important element in the preservation of democracy and the only sure protection the people have of their sovereignty.

6. I truly believe that the Notice of Motion filed by the Crown Solicitor representing the State of New South Wales alleging that the proceedings brought by me should be dismissed because they show "no reasonable cause of action", and "are frivolous or vexatious" and "are an abuse of the process of the Court" are a perversion of the role and the responsibility of the Crown because it is the primary and principal duty of the Crown to secure and preserve the rights of the people. To have the representatives of the Crown, whether solicitors or judicial officers, playing any active part in, or even considering, denying the rights of the people is tantamount to treason.

7. I truly believe that the referendum of 1988 was a clear expression of the will of the people that their right to trial by jury for the specified instances of contempt of court and court martial shall not be relinquished. And I truly believe that this rejection of an attempt to abolish trial by jury applies across the entire spectrum of civil and criminal offences.

8. I truly believe that no judicial officer should be subjected to any actions or devices, such as by way of Notices of Motion, that would place them in a position of embarrassment or compromise or might tempt them to do evil. Such Notices of Motion are repugnant to the Spirit and the Reality of Justice and are incompatible with the Common Law.

9. I truly believe that a Court is a place where people assemble to bear witness before God - that is why the Holy Bible is required when swearing oaths of allegiance and office and to "tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, SO HELP ME GOD.".  However, I have been attending these Courts for the past four years only to find that the words of Ecclesiastes 3:16 to be true, ie: "in the place of justice - wickedness was there".

10. I truly believe that without the acceptance of "God and My Right", as emblazoned on the Royal Coat of Arms, no Court can have any jurisdiction nor be said to administer justice.

     ......John Wilson.................

Sworn at ......North Rocks...........

on the  ......24th.... day of ......May.... ,2000

before me: ......C. Hamilton JP .. 9425132..


9

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
SYDNEY REGISTRY
COMMON LAW DIVISION File No: 20137/00

AFFIDAVIT

I, John Wilson of 19 Elm Place, North Rocks in the State of New South Wales, say on oath:

1. I am the Deponent.

2. Annexed hereto and marked "A" is a copy of the transcript of proceedings in the matter of CL 12914/97 in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Queen's Square, Sydney, NSW, Australia on Tuesday 9 November 1999.


......John Wilson.............

Sworn at ......North Rocks.........
on ...24th...day of ...May...., 2000
before me ......C. Hamilton JP 924 5132.......
(Justice of the Peace)
____________________________________________________________-
. ANNEXURE "A":

THIS IS THE ANNEXURE MARKED "A" REFERRED TO IN THE AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN WILSON SWORN AT NORTH ROCKS ON 24TH DAY OF MAY 2000 BEFORE ME C. HAMILTON JP.
 
THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH ALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
WOOD CJ at CL
Tuesday 9 November
12914/97 - THE PROTHONOTARY -V- JOHN WILSON

MR BUDDIN SC for the plaintiff.
The defendant appeared in person.


WILSON: You are a false Judge in a false court established by a false law. This court has no jurisdiction over people of Australia and I demand my rights under international law, in particular, the United Nations International Covenant of Civil and political Rights. Only yesterday I received a letter from the High Commissioner for Human Rights and I will read what he says. (Read) This is the actual material containing the Covenant on Civil and political Rights. It has been incorporated into domestic legislation under the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission Act 1986. Under article 14 it says. (Read)

You are a false Judge because yo have sworn an oath to do right and you are not doing right. This is the Petition of Right which clearly sets out. (Read) It also goes on, in par 11, to say. (Read)

I remember you saying before that the issue of trial by jury had been resolved. All those doings and proceedings should not be drawn into consequence or example. Therefore, I am demanding my right to trial by jury and this is not a legitimate court.

FOR JUDGMENT SEE SEPARATE TRANSCPIPT

WILSON: I protest because the Uriited Nations Covenant clearly says there must be a tribunal established by law. There is no law establishing this Court

HIS HONOUR: I have heard your submissions.

WILSON: You haven't heard this --

HIS HONOUR: I would ask you, please, to sit down. The matter has been determined.

WILSON: This has been formed under the Supreme Court ---

HIS HONOUR: I will ask you to sit down while the proceedings continue.

WILSON: Will you allow me to have -

HIS HONOUR: I have heard your application.

WILSON: This is a court that is su,pposed to establish the tribunal and administer justice. .1 am talking the truth in that I have said that this Court has been established under the Supreme Court Act 1970 which has been made - this legislation has been made by the legislature which clearly stated in the Constitution Act 1902, that the legislature means His Majesty the King. His Majesty the King is a foreign power and the United Nations clearly says that no foreign power shall impose its laws on a sovereign independent self-governing State.

So, therefore, all laws made by the King or the Queen of the United Kingdom are enveloped in Australia which includes the Supreme Court Act. Therefore, this Court is not established in law. It has no jurisdiction.

HIS HONOUR: I have determined the matter. The proceedings will continue.

BUDDIN: The plaintiff seeks declarations in identical terms in a summons filed on 14 October 1997 that the defendant was guilty of contempt of court by reason of his conduct on 5 September 1997 following judgment having been given against him by Murray AJ in a matter in which his Honour had reserved the decision. The events which constituted the charges; mainly, two incidents of throwing paint at Murray AJ are particularised in the summons. There are a number of affidavits which I will read.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Wilson, you have a copy of the summons, have you not?

WILSON: This Court has no jurisdiction.

HIS HONOUR: You have a copy of the summons. I am bound to inform you that the proceedings will continue.

WILSON: I thought about that and I have come to the conclusion you can't defeat an enemy by running away from it. That's why I'm still here.

HIS HONOUR: I need to explain to you - and please listen to this because I need to explain some things to you - first of all, you must understand that these proceedings are criminal in nature. Certainly, you should understand that the offences which have been charged against you are those which are set out in the summons. It is alleged that you have been guilty of contempt in throwing the plastic bag of paint at Murray AJ, thereby conducting yourself in a manner which tended to interfere with the administration of justice. There are two such counts. You are entitled to legal representation.

Do I take it that you do not seek legal representation and will appear f or yourself?

WILSON: I might remind you that the first charges put against me were under s 326 of the rimes Act and I was bailed on those charges and I appeared at the Downing Centre Local Court and I clearly stated that I wanted trial by jury.

HIS HONOUR: I understand that, but these are contempt proceedings which will proceed in this court not in the Local Court.

WILSON: Those charges were withdrawn because I demanded trial by jury. I say again those charges were withdrawn because I demanded trial by jury.

HIS HONOUR: This is a separate proceeding. I am now explaining some things to you. Do I take it that you do not want to have legal representation today?

WILSON: This court has no jurisdiction, there is no need for representation.

HIS HONOUR: Being criminal proceedings the prosecution; that is the plaintiff, has to prove the various charges beyond reasonable doubt. The Crown is permitted to call evidence by way of affidavit and Mr Buddin has announced that that is what he is going to do.

You are entitled, if you wish, to cross-examine the persons who swore those affidavits.

WILSON: I am entitled to a fair hearing. This is not a fair hearing because I have been denied my rights, so it can't be a fair hearing.

HIS HONOUR: I have informed you that you are entitled, if you wish, to cross-examine the various witnesses who have sworn affidavits. You have the right to object to any of the evidence which they give if you think it to be inadmissible. If you make an objection to it I will rule upon its admissibility.

You will have the right to call evidence yourself at the close of the Crown case. You are not obliged to give evidence. If you remain silent then no inference of guilt or otherwise will be drawn contrary to your interests. However, if you do not give evidence the only evidence before me would be that in the affidavits. You are entitled - please listen to me - you are entitled to address me after the evidence is concluded as to whether contempt has been proved and, if it has been proved, you are also entitled to address me as to penalty.

If you are in any doubt as to your legal rights during the proceedings or as to the course of the proceedings then you are entitled to ask for assistance from me; that is, an explanation as to what the position of the proceedings are. I cannot advise you as to how you should conduct your case but I can give you some basic advice concerning matters of procedure and the like. Do you understand that?

WILSON:I have been frustrated in the courts for the last three years. I have found that Judges are lairs, criminals and traitors. I have no confidence in you or the system as it stands, it must be dismantled and rebuilt on the principles of justice. We do not have that.

HIS HONOUR:I have noted what you have said.

The proceedings being summary in nature and primarily seeking a declaration, do I take it it is inappropriate to formally charge the defendant and to seek a plea as to whether he is guilty or not of contempt?

BUDDIN: My instructing solicitor informs me that in fact a plea was taken on the first occasion. The matter was in for hearing on a prior occasion, so in so far as there is interest for the proceedings to be regularised in that fashion, that has been done.

HIS HONOUR: I will have it noted that the defendant on a prior occasion has pleaded that he is not guilty to the charges of contempt. I take it that is what you say, you say that you are not guilty?

WILSON: I would like to file a notice of motion supported by an affidavit in the court. (Handed up)

HIS HONOUR: I will grant you leave to file in court the notice of motion and also the affidavit sworn 8 November 1999. I note those documents. In substance, they record the submissions you made earlier this morning seeking that the hearing be vacated and the matter in effect stand over until after the proceedings; that is, your motion be heard in the Court of Appeal. The application raises the same matters based upon the Petition of Right and the other arguments pursuant to which you submit this court has no jurisdiction over people of the State. I have already dealt with that application and I will not deal with it any further.

WILSON: It is a matter of constitutional concern. Notices under s 78B of the Judiciary Act have already been circulated to the nine Attorneys-General. I have their replies here and because it is of such importance nationally the actual jurisdiction of the courts and the Parliaments, it cannot proceed until this matter is resolved. This is a false court.

HIS HONOUR: Can you hand me Buddin those replies? (Handed to counsel) (Handed up to his Honour) Mr Buddin, what do you say about those?

BUDDIN: None of the jurisdiction indicate that they wish to intervene at this stage and that is the only question that really should exercise your Honour'.~ mind in relation to this.

HIS HONOUR: The New South Wales Attorney, however might give an indication one way or the other.

BUDDIN: My instructing solicitor is of the view that the matter has been determined since the letter was sent.

HIS HONOUR: That should be confirmed.

SHORT ADJOURNMENT

BUDDIN: The New South Wales Attorney-General, I am instructed, does not wish to intervene and we will be bringing over a letter in due course which will indicate that that notification was sent, regrettably only yesterday. I do not have that letter at the moment.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Wilson, do you mind if I have these photocopied and give copies to Mr Buddin and also they will be an exhibit?

EXHIBIT #1 BUNDLE OF CORRESPONDENCE FROM ATTORNEYS-GENERAL TENDERED, ADMITTED WITHOUT OBJECTION

I will have it noted that Mr Wilson, in support of his application, relies, in essence, upon an argument that the Supreme Court Act 1970 was invalid because the legislature which he submits was a foreign power ceased to have any power to make laws when the Constitution Act 1902 was extinguished.

The argument rests upon the proposition that the Supreme Court was not established by law as required by Article 14 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

I am of the view on this argument, which has been addressed in various forms by Mr Wilson during these proceedings, is utterly without merit. The Constitution Act of 1902 provides sufficient authority for the legislature of this State to pass laws, one of which was the Supreme Court Act 1970.

Mr Wilson has given notice under the Judiciary Act to the Attorneys-General for the purpose of arguing this point. A bundle of correspondence has been tendered in support of the application which reveals that all Attorneys-General, both State and Federal, do not intend to intervene in the proceedings. I have been informed from the Bar table this morning that the Attorney-General of New South Wales, whose reply as tendered was somewhat equivocal, is similarly taking that approach and I am further informed that a letter to that effect will be tendered later in the proceedings.

Upon that basis there is no reason for the proceedings to be stayed or for the matter to be referred to the High Court. As previously indicated, the matter will now proceed.

WILSON: I take it you don't consider the constitutional matter worth passing on to the High Court?

HIS HONOUR: That is the position, yes, I do not consider it to be a legitimate argument and the matter will proceed.

WILSON: So you are taking the position of the High Court.

BUDDIN: I have an affidavit of Natalie Adams sworn 14 November 1997.

HIS HONOUR: I will note the affidavit of Natalie Adams sworn 14 November 1997. Mr Wilson, if there is any portion to which you object will you please say so.

WILSON: I object to the whole proceedings.

AFFIDAVIT OF NATALIE ADAMS SWORN 14 NOVEMBER 1997 READ

BUDDIN: The next affidavit is of Walter William Baer sworn 12 November 1997.

HIS HONOUR: I will hand the originals of the correspondence back to you, Mr Wilson. The copies will be Ex A and a further copy will be handed down to Mr Buddin. Again, Mr Wilson, if there is any part of the affidavit to which you object you may indicate that and I dill hear any objection to the admissibility that you may have.

WILSON: This court has no jurisdiction.

AFFIDAVIT OF WALTER WILLIAM BAER SWORN 12 NOVEMBER 1997 READ.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Wilson, I should ask you do you wish to cross-examine Natalie Adams or Walter William Baer?

WILSON: In front of the jury by all means, not here.

BUDDIN: The next deponent in Mama Gordon, an affidavit sworn 12 November 1997.

HIS HONOUR: I will note that affidavit. Mr Wilson, if you wish to object to any portion of this affidavit you may say so and I will rule upon its admissibility.

WILSON: This court has no jurisdiction.

AFFIDAVIT OF MAINA GORDON SWORN 12 NOVEMBER 1997 READ.

HIS HONOUR: Do you wish to cross-examine Mama Gordon?

WILSON: Judges must never be given nor allowed to assume absolute power whereby they can conceal their own incompetence, corruption and treachery.

HIS HONOUR: I take it that answer indicates you do not wish to cross-examine.

BUDDIN: The next is the affidavit of Gregory Peter McNally sworn 11 November 1997.

HIS HONOUR:I will note that affidavit.

AFFIDAVIT OF GREGORY PETER McNALLY SWORN 11 NOVEMBER 1997 READ.

HIS HONOUR: Do you wish to cross-examine Mr McNally?

WILSON: I have constantly been refused the right to trial by jury and in the judgment of Mr Greenwood he said, "Judges are immune from suit." Judges are not above the law. If they are corrupt they should be tried and imprisoned.

HIS HONOUR: I take it your answer is you do not wish to cross-examine Mr McNally?

AFFIDAVIT OF CATHERINE OLSEN SWORN 12 NOVEMBER 1997 READ.
HIS HONOUR: Do you wish to cross-examine Catherine Olsen?

WILSON: Juries the only defence the people have against judicial corruption.

HIS HONOUR: I assume by the answer again that you do not wish to cross-examine her?

(Mr Buddin sought leave to file in court a
further affidavit of Catherine Olsen sworn
4 November 1999.)

HIS HONOUR: Do you have a copy, Mr Wilson?

BUDDIN: A copy was served on Mr Wilson.

HIS HONOUR: I will note the affidavit.

AFFIDAVIT OF CAThERINE OLSEN SWORN 4 NOVEMBER 1999 READ.

HIS HONOUR: I take it you do not wish to cross-examine her on that affidavit or do you?

WILSON:In front of a jury.

AFFIDAVIT OF BERNARD LEE ROACH SWORN 11 NOVEMBER 1997 READ. HIS HONOUR: Do you wish to cross-examine Mr Roach?

WILSON:This story of judicial corruption can be found on the internet on "http://www.rightsandwrong.com.au."

BUDDIN: I tender the black folder that had been described in the affidavit.

HIS HONOUR: Do you wish to examine the black tolder?

WILSON: This court has no jurisdiction.

EXHIBIT #A BLACK FOLDER TENDERED, ADMITTED WITHOUT OBJECTION

JUDGMENT OF MURRAY AJ DATED 5 SEPTEMBER 1997 TENDERED.

HIS HONOUR: Have you seen this document, Mr Wilson, and do you object to it?

WILSON: Not having trial by jury for contempt of court it is the Star Chamber of old re-visited where you have despotic Judges, it was banished in 1641 and now we have an equivalent situation where Judges refuse to submit themselves to any cross-examination by the people. A jury is a tribunal of people and Judges are not above the law.

EXHIBIT #B JUDGMENT OF MURRAY AJ DATED 5 SEPTEMBER 1997 ADMITTED WITHOUT OBJECTION

PHOTOGRAPHS TENDERED.

HIS HONOUR: Do you wish to examine the photographs?

WILSON: In front of the jury.

EXHIBIT #C PHOTOGRAPHS TENDERED, ADMITTED WITHOUT OBJECTION

CASE FOR THE PLAINTIFF CLOSED.

(Mr Buddin sought an order for the witnesses to be
excused.)

HIS HONOUR: On the basis there has been no request for any of the witnesses to be cross-examined, the witnesses may be excused.

WILSON: I have a request to examine witnesses in front of a j ury.

HIS HONOUR: This is a trial without a jury. You have chosen not to exercise the right here so the witnesses may be excused.

WILSON: I am denied my right.

HIS HONOUR: That is the plaintiff's case. Do you wish to place any evidence before me today?

WILSON: The charge in the first place was for causing a detriment or injury to an official officer.

HIS HONOUR: What I am asking you at this stage is not to address me on the substance of the matter but as to whether you want to call any evidence yourself.

WILSON: I want to call evidence in front of a jury.

HIS HONOUR: You do not wish to call evidence today before me, is that the case?

WILSON: I don't mind if you are there but I want a jury.

HIS HONOUR: I understand that.

WILSON: You can be there to assist the jury.

HIS HONOUR: This matter is proceeding as a trial without a jury before me. If you want to place any evidence before me this is your chance to do so.

WILSON: You must disqualify yourself because you are not a competent independent and impartial tribunal as established by law.

HIS HONOUR: I am only taking it from your answer that you do not wish to place any evidence before me today.

WILSON: Not before you, not before a Judge only.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Buddin, in the circumstances where the defendant is appearing for himself it is probably not appropriate that the Crown address me. Perhaps you could tell me what relief it is you seek.

BUDDIN: The relief that we seek appears in the first three paragraphs of the summons; namely, declarations that the defendant is guilty of contempt of court and then that an order that the defendant be punished or otherwise dealt with for such contempt of court. I do have some written submissions in terms of the general principles which I am happy to hand up to your Honour.

WILSON: I am not and never have been in contempt of court. I am in great respect of the court where a court administers truth and justice. This is not. I am never guilty of interfering with the administration of justice. I want to see the administration of justice. There is no contempt of court on my behalf. I am in great respect of the court and truth and justice.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Wilson, do you understand these charges relate not to your general attitude about courts but rather to the occasion on 5 September 1997 when it is said by a number of witnesses that you threw paint at a Judge. That is what we are concerned with and the question before me to decide is, first of all, whether that constitutes a contempt of court and, if it does, to determine what the appropriate response of the court should be.

If you wish, you may address me now as to whether, first of all, those events occurred as the witnesses have described and if they did occur as they described, whether they constitute a contempt of court. If you want to do so you have the chance to address me now. If you do not wish to do so then I will not compel you to do so.

WILSON: The duty and responsibility of a jury is to determine the facts and to judge the justice of the law. That is the function of a jury, so determining the facts must be done by a jury, determining the justice of the law must be determined by a jury.

HIS HONOUR: I understand the submission you make in that regard but it is a submission which has failed before other Judges and before Courts of Appeal. The matter is proceeding as a trial without a jury. This is your chance to address me, if you want to, as to whether you were guilty of conduct which constituted a contempt in the face of the court on 5 September 1997.

WILSON: I am not guilty of any such charge. The contempt of court, as I interpret it, means interfering with the administration of justice. I have never done that. I have always sought justice. Murray AJ was not administering justice. He was administering injustice. So I can't be held in contempt of court where justice was not being administered.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Buddin, I think in the circumstances where the defendant is appearing for himself I will not invite you to give me your submissions I think the principles are probably clear enough and, in fairness, it is better to follow the traditional course.

BUDDIN: I am happy with that. I have had it noted on the record that there are such submissions available.
 
EXHIBIT #2. SUPPLEMENTED BY THE ADDITION OF A PHOTOCOPY OF
THE LETTER SENT TO MR WILSON YESTERDAY FROM THE NEW SOUTH
WALES ATTORNEY-GENERAL.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Wilson, it is your exhibit. It is a matter whether you want to add this to your exhibits if not, the Crown will tender it.

WILSON: The Attorney-General of New South Wales mentions the High Court.

HIS HONOUR: He says that he has decided not to intervene. What he has said is that he has decided not to intervene but should the matter be removed to the High Court or proceed to appeal and further notice be given, then he will reconsider.

WILSON: There is no doubt about that because I have to exhaust all the domestic remedies before I can go on to the United Nations, so I quite anticipate appealing to the High Court and true to form, I will not succeed there, so the only course I have for justice and truth is to go international to the United Nations.

HIS HONOUR: Do you want to add this to your bundle of letters you tendered or do you require

WILSON:I haven't got the original.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Buddin, I think it would be better if you tendered it.

EXHIBIT#D LETTER FROM THE CROWN SOLICITOR'S OFFICE DATED 8 NOVEMBER 1999 TENDERED, ADMITTED WITHOUT OBJECTION

FOR JUDGMENT SEE SEPARATE TRANSCRIPT.

HIS HONOUR: On the basis of those findings, Mr Wilson, it is necessary that I proceed to consider the matter of sentence. Do you wish to be heard in relation to sentence?

WILSON: In regard to sentence; as far as the paint incident, this was to try to secure justice, to try to secure a trial by jury which has been denied to me many, many times through the course of the last three years. My original case in the Supreme Court was on the issue of bank fraud in which I stated that variable interest rates render contracts void for uncertainty because the definition and the reality of "variable" is that it. is uncertain.

I found that the first Judge, Master Greenwood, lied absolutely when he said that the rate itself is indeed certain. That is unconscionable, it is corrupt in the extreme. My appeals to subsequent courts upheld Master Greenwood's lies. This is corruption beyond understanding.

With the course of other cases I have brought, including the one involving Murray AJ, I accused seven Judges of civil wrong, that they had lied, supported lies and concealed the truth to the detriment of the community. Master Greenwood dismissed those by saying that Judges are immune from suit, that Judges are above the law and not accountable to the people.

The first charges were indeed indictable offences and I demanded trial by jury. In fact, in the Local Court in the Downing Centre the opposition tried to railroad me through to a summary hearing and I said no, I wanted trial by jury. Six weeks after the incident on 5 September I received a summons for contempt of court.

It has been the tradition, the practice, to hold contempt of court hearings without a jury for the last 100 years but prior to that it has also been by a jury. Judges have secured for themselves protection against being accountable to the people. When I insisted on a trial by jury for the first charges the Public Prosecutor withdrew those charges, they had no intention of me being allowed to subpoena Judges to answer questions before a jury.

The function of a jury is to judge the facts and the justice of the law and only through a jury can we protect our freedoms as a safeguard against tyrannical, arbitrary, corrupt judicial system. This is an example of what I am talking about: I am being denied a jury against all the charges and the statutes which I have nominated in the High Court and now I am relying upon international law to get me justice.

HIS HONOUR: I think you are not addressing the point, the matter of sentence. Do you want to put any evidence before me about sentence?

WILSON: Sentence is a matter about severity and I am trying to tell you why I am seeking justice.

HIS HONOUR: I understand what you are doing in that regard, but do you want to put any evidence before me on sentence?

WILSON: My evidence is that in fact I took the paint bombs, which I regarded as a harmless gesture, I took them to courts on three other occasions. I was waiting for an absolute dismissal by a Judge because I knew it was coming, I have had experience of lies in the judiciary for the last three years. It was a deliberate attempt to put the issues of bank fraud, which has caused untold misery and hardship to the people of Australia, and I find the Judges have been lying and protecting that crime and the only way of resolving it: I approached the Judicial Commission and they dismissed it. I approached various bodies at the ICAC and they don't want to handle it. It is a closed shop, not unsimilar to the Star Chamber of old where it was found to be deliberately intolerable and I found that our system, which denies trial by jury, to be intolerable.

This must be taken further and my intentions have always been in the interests of truth and justice and the fact that I will be convicted here is a foregone conclusion because even delaying tactics - ano~her issue I have before the courts where the St George Bank are trying to get money out of me. I have put a notice of motion for discovery and it has been denied by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court are concealing bank fraud over and over.

Every time I ask for a jury it has been denied. There has been an out and out conspiracy to protect the banks in their criminal activities and the Judges have become involved. I have even published a small book which I call "Banks and Judges", I put them both in the same category. it is an intolerable situation where a person or an Australian cannot put the evidence before a tribunal of the people, only to be frustrated by Judges who are protecting themselves.

So far as the severity of the sentence goes, you can say what you like but I intend to pursue truth and justice wherever I am, in gaol or out of gaol. This will ultimately go to the international courts because, quoting from the United Nations, and I believe this court is in violation of this - so far as the sentence goes it is up to your discretion but I will not stop fighting for truth and justice.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Buddin, is there any prior record that I need to be aware of?

BUDDIN: I am just checking on that.

HIS HQNOUR: Mr Wilson, I understand the submission you make and the reasons for it but is it correct that you do not wish to call any evidence in mitigation of sentence from any other person?

WILSON: I have found by telling the truth in court is a total waste of time.

HIS HONOUR: You understand it is open to you to call witnesses as to your character or otherwise or anything that you might wish to plac.e before me which I would take into account as to severity of the criminality and a~ to appropriate sentence?

WILSON: First of all, there is the conviction.

HIS HONOUR: Leaving that aside, I am just giving you a chance - -

WILSON: Before you get to a sentence you have to have a conviction.

HIS HONOUR: You have been convicted.

WILSON: That is unjust.

HIS HONOUR: Is there any witness ycu want to call?

WILSON: I have been involved in fighting for occupational safety for many, many years. I am a dentist by trade and I care for people and I want to defend them and defend them against the criminality of the banks and now the criminality of the Judges. You can impose whatever sentence you like.

HIS HONOUR: I take it you do not wish to call any evidence?

WILSON: Not in front of a Judge only but in front of a jury.

HIS HONOUR:  In case you misunderstand the situation: had you been tried before a jury the jury's role is to determine whether you are guilty of an offence. It would then be up to a Judge to sentence you. We have now got to a stage where you have been convicted of an offence and it is up to me alone to sentence you, as it would be if you had a jury trial. It is open to you to call evidence, if you want, in relation to penalty. If you do not want to do so - you are not obliged to do so - you have a chance --

WILSON:  The function of the jury is to vote on their conscience and to disregard any law which they feel inappropriate or bad. That is the system of English justice. They must consider the facts, whether I am guilty of an incident, they must consider the justice of the law and many times through history notable people have said the Judge is entitled - they have said -he jury is entitled to return a verdict in the face of any evidence, if they believe that justice must be served. A jury is not at the dictate of a Judge.

HIS HONOUR: I think I have made the position clear. I have given you the chance to call evidence. From what I understand you do not wish to exercise that right.

WILSON: I do in front of a jury.

LOVETT:  May I make mention?

HIS HONOUR: The only way you can say anything is if you are called as a witness and give evidence.

WILSON: Can I call Mr Ray Lovett as a witness?

<RAYMOND RONALD LOVETT (11.45 AM)
SWORN AND EXAMINED

HIS HONOUR: You wish to ask some questions of him, Mr Wilson?

WILSON: Yes.

HIS HONOUR: Q. Would you give your full name?

A.Raymond Ronald Lovett, 32 Atunga Road, Miranda.

WILSON:  Q.. Are you a member of the organisation known as FLAC?
A.Yes.

Q.Which stands for For Legally Abused Citizens?
A.I am ashamed to say I am in as much as I don't think there should be reason in our community for citizens to have to form such a group but the evidence, not of one, two, three but hundreds of people, proves that this legal system is out of balance, is not giving justice where justice is deserved.

HIS HONOUR: Mr Lovett, you are really embarking upon a matter which is not relevant.

WITNESS: I believe it is. I don't wish to be disrespectful, but I am an ordinary layman that hasn't had much of an education but I have beliefs as to this system we are in now.

HIS HONOUR: What is relevant is anything that might touch upon Mr Wilson, his character or otherwise that would be of assistance to him.

WILSON:Q. We have only known each other a short while but can you say anything as to my character?
A. I have made the commitment with John that I will be his friend in his matter totally and utterly because what is happening to him is happening to others of our group and that is what I was trying to get around to, the fact that John has a dedicated belief that there is a wrong in the society as far as the law profession goes and there is hundreds of people, not one or two, but hundreds that can give you instances of not where they are sorry they lost the case but of fraud, of deceit, of mis-management, whatever you like to call it, that people's lives have been ruined and John is the flagship of this cause at the moment. He might be able to do something for us. He believed, as we all do in the group, that we are totally and utterly right and we have the evidence to present but that evidence at every turn is being prevented from being given to the authorities and accepted as such.

There has been enough on television, in the papers, to say what is going on in the system. The barristers, solicitors, Judges, they are all crooks but I reckon there is more crooks than goodies, because the crooks seem to be controlling the system and John is there to help to do something about it. If you take the value of what he is saying, it is an enormous upheaval for the legal profession of Australia but it must be fought and we don't see any help coming from the legal profession ar.d I believe John to be true, just and, if he did throw the paint - I don't know -but I just wonder whether paint to 3ome people is sufficient


Q. Do you believe in the jury system for acquiring justice?
A. I think, and it is always understood, that the jury system was the heart and the understanding of the court of law. Once or twice I have been called to jury earlier in my life and proud and privileged to act --

OBJECTION. DISALLOWED.

Q.In regard to sentence, do you believe I should be in prison for what I have done or not done --

OBJECTION.

HIS HONOUR:It is not a matter foz him. He can give evidence, for example, about your character, as to whether you are a person of good character, what you have done, what your life is and so on but he cannot - the ultimate question is for me rather than for him. If you want to ask him questions about what he knows of your character you may do so.

WILSON:Q. Do you know of anything of the work I have done for many years in regard to mercury poisoning of dental nurses?
A.No, I am sorry, John, I don't, to be truthful. John is a truthful man as I find him and a man that will do things to help the community. He is there for that one and only reason. Today he could go to gaol, I expect. Why would he put himself in that position unless he was an honest, decent citizen believing what he was doing was true. It is a very hard.thing, I know, for the legal profession to be hit in the face with what he is saying without being hit by the yellow paint but through the membership of FLAC I honestly believe that paint is nothing - I am frightened of what might happen, we talk to people, people are frightened of the guns being taken away from them, they are frightened of the migration that is sneaking into the country and people's lives are being ruined, their houses gone, their families gone and John is there trying to dc" what is right so the system, I believe, is crooked can he made healthy and made well and soothe people rather than destroy them.

NO CROSS -EXAMINATION

WITNESS RETIRED

(Mr Buddin stated Mr Wilson had no prior
convictions.)

FOR SENTENCE SEE SEPARATE TRANSCRIPT.


10

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
SYDNEY REGISTRY

COMMON LAW DIVISION File No: 20137/00

AFFIDAVIT

I, John Wilson of 19 Elm Place, North Rocks in the State of New South Wales, say on oath:

1. I am the deponent.

2. Annexed here to and marked "A" is a copy of the "INFORMATION AND SUMMONS" made out at the Downing Centre Local Court on 3 April 1998 against Justice Peter Hidden of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. 

3. Under section 4A of the Crimes Act (CTH) 1914 an "indictment includes an information and a presentment". Therefore, the Annexure "A" is an indictment and section 80 of the Australian Constitution says that "The trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by jury,...".

4. Annexed hereto and marked "B" is a copy of a letter from Mr. Craig Norman, Chamber Magistrate, Court House, Level 4 Downing Centre, Sydney and dated 6th April 1998 confirming his omission to issue the "INFORMATION AND SUMMONS" to Justice Peter Hidden thereby usurping and taking upon himself the function of a jury to dismiss the indictment. I truly believe that Mr. Craig Norman, being a judicial officer in the employment of the Crown, did not act impartially but obstructed the course of justice and acted "in his own cause" to protect a fellow judicial officer by preventing the trial by jury of Mr. Justice Peter Hidden.

5. Annexed hereto and marked "C" is a copy of a letter from the Director General of the New South Wales' Attorney General's Department and dated 30 September 1997 expressing the view that Magna Carta 1297 and the Bill of Rights 1688 are "liable to be displaced by Commonwealth and State legislation.". 

6. Annexed hereto and marked "D" is a copy of a "Complaint Against a Judicial Officer" I filed with the Judicial Commission of New South Wales in November 1996 against Master Greenwood of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Judicial Commission is made up of judicial officers and legal personnel. Also annexed hereto and marked "E" is a copy of a letter dated 11th February 1997 from the Judicial Commission of New South Wales dismissing that complaint.

7. I truly believe that the Judicial Commission, being predominantly judicial officers in the employment of the Crown, did not act impartially but in their "own cause" by deciding to endorse Master Greenwood's judgment that a variable or uncertain rate of interest was "indeed certain" when I truly believe, and the Oxford English Dictionary confirms, that "variable" means "uncertain" and "certain" means "not variable". I truly believe the action on the part of the Judicial Commission of New South Wales to be corrupt.

8. I truly believe that the right of trial by jury, guarantied in Magna Carta, can not be displaced or abolished by any legislation. And whereas the Magna Carta of 1215 and the Declaration of Rights 1688 are not vulnerable to any legislation passed by Parliament.

9. I truly believe that the denial of trial by jury is the ultimate act of tyranny and oppression.

10. On or about 30 December 1998 I visited the 5th Floor of the Law Courts Building, Queen's Square, Sydney and took a numbered ticket to see the Duty Registrar. After a short wait, I was ushered into a office and spoke to Deputy Registrar Haggett and explained my predicament of having to complain to the very people I was complaining about, ie: the judges. Mr. Haggett thought it was funny and laughed at me saying "You're in a CATCH 22" and said he could not help me.

11. I truly believe that this CATCH 22, where there is the perception and the reality of judges judge in their "own cause", is intolerable and that only by way of trial by jury can the common people be protected against judicial incompetence, corruption and treachery which provide the greatest threat possible to democracy and freedom.

12. Annexed hereto and marked "D" is a copy of a Complaint Against a Judicial Officer I lodged with the Judicial Commission of New South Wales dated 26th November 1996 and annexed hereto and marked "E" is a copy of the letter from the Judicial Commission dismissing the complaint.

13. I truly believe that the Judicial Commission is composed mostly judicial officers that they corruptly determined the issue raised, ie: that Master Greenwood lied when he said that the variable or uncertain interest rate was "indeed certain", and that they were determining it in their "own cause".


   ............John Wilson..........

Sworn at .........North Rocks........

On this ......31st.....day of ...May.. 2000

Before me .........A. Burrows................
(Justice of the Peace) 7100108



Annexure "A":

FOR HEARING AT LEVEL 4 DOWNING CENTRE ;\LOCAL COURT
ON

             INFORMATION AND SUMMONS

ACT: IMPERIAL ACTS APPLICATION ACT NO 30 OF 1969
SECTION/REGULATION: S. 43

OnTHIRD (3RD) APRIL, 1998
atSYDNEY
JOHN WILSON (the Informant)
of19 ELM PLACE NORTH ROCKS
appeared before me, a Justice, and informed me that
PETER HIDDEN DOB (Defendant)
ofC/- SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES,
QUEENS SQUARE SYDNEY
on SIXTEENTH (16TH) MARCH, 1998 at SYDNEY
in the State of New South Wales did
DID COMMIT AN OFFENCE UNDER AN IMPERIAL ENACTMENT INCLUDED IN PART 1 SECOND SCHEDULE OF THE IMPERIAL ACTS APPLICATION ACT, TO WIT, MAGNA CARTA 25 EDWARD 1 (1297) IN THAT HE DID DENY THE RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY WHICH IS SPECIFIED IN SECTION 39 OF MAGNA CARTA AND WHEREIN THE "LAW OF THE LAND" BEING THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION.

Contrary to the Act so provided.

.........John Wilson...........
Informant

Exhibited at LEVEL 4 DOWNING CENTRE,
 143 - 147 LIVERPOOL STREET, SYDNEY
on    03/04/98 before me:
.......Craig Norman..........
(Justice of the Peace)
(C. A. Norman)


SUMMONS
TO:   PETER HIDDEN
OF:   C/- SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES,
QUEENS SQUARE, SYDNEY

You are commanded to appear on
at  before the Local Court at LEVEL 4 DOWNING CENTRE
to answer the said Information and be dealt with according to Law.

DATED:  03/04/98 AT LEVEL 4 DOWNING CENTRE,
 143 - 147 LIVERPOOL STREET, SYDNEY

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE

THIS IS THE ANNEXURE MARKED "A" REFERRED TO IN THE AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN WILSON SWORN AT ....North Rocks...
THIS ...31ST....DAY OF ....May, 2000 BEFORE ME .....A. Burrows....
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 7100108


Annexure "B":
COURT HOUSE
Level 4 Downing Centre
143-147 Liverpool St
SYDNEY 2000
Ph: 9287 7665

Mr John Wilson
19 Elm Place
NORTH ROCKS NSW 2151

6th April, 1998

Dear Mr Wilson

I refere to your letter dated 3rd April, 1998, received today. I have read it and the accompanying documents.

As I indicated to you at your interview, I am not prepared to issue a summons in this matter as in my view, there is no offence disclosed at law. None of the material sent by yourself has altered that position.

There would seem to be little point then in your making an appointment to come back and see me. I will not be issuing a summons in this matter unless directed to do so by the Supreme Court. I gave you a basic outline of your remedies in that area, either an application under Section 134 of the justices Act, 1902 (NSW) or an application for the relief in the nature of mandamus.

Yours faithfully,

.....Craig Norman....
Craig Norman
Chamber Magistrate.

THIS IS THE ANNEXURE MARKED "B" REFERRED TO IN THE AFFIDAVIT
OF ...John Wilson...
SWORN AT ...North Rocks...
THIS ..31st... DAY OF ...May, 2000 
BEFORE ME ......A. Burrows...
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 7100108


Annexure "C":

Attorney General's Department
NEW SOUTH WALES

Mr J Wilson
PO Box 4520
NORTH ROCKS NSW 2151Our Ref: S35573
File No: 97/3106
Contact: PD Boyd
Phone: (02) 228-8461

30 SEP 1997

Dear Mr Wilson

The Attorney General, the Hon JW Shaw, QC, MLC has asked me to respond to your letter concerning the Bill of Rights 1688.

I have carefully noted your comments and concerns that your petition was returned by a Simon Gimson who signed the covering letter from Buckingham Palace.

Please let me assure you that the 1688 enactment is part of the law of England that was received in Australia on settlement as is recognised by the Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 (NSW). It is, however, liable to be displaced by Commonwealth or State legislation.

Section 6 of the Imperial Acts Application Act specifically provides that the Bill of Rights remains part of our law. That same Act also provides that the Magna Carta of 1297 remains part of the law of New South Wales.

However, as I am sure you are aware, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights and all the legislation in force in New South Wales, is subject to legal and judicial interpretation by our courts. How the Bill of Rights impacts upon the daily administration of the State and upon members of our community remains an issue of legal interpretation.

If you are interested to know how these Imperial Acts apply in any particular case or circumstance, I would suggest that you seek some form of legal advice. You may also contact the Legal Information Access Centre ("LIAC") which provides information about the law in certain areas. I have enclosed a fact sheet on LIAC for your information.

The Attorney regrets that he is unable to meet with you and would like to thank you for making your views known.

Yours faithfully,

.....??????.....
for Director General

Goodsell Building, 8-12 Chifley Square, Sydney 2000 Box 6 GPO Sydney 2001 Tel: (02) 9228 7777 Fax (02) 9228 8608 Dx 1227

THIS IS THE ANNEXURE MARKED "C" REFERRED TO IN THE AFFIDAVIT
OF ...John Wilson..
SWORN AT ...North Rocks..
THIS ....31ST..DAY OF ..May 2000 BEFORE ME ...A. Burrows ...
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 7100108


Annexure "D":

Complaint Against a Judicial Officer

TO - THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF NEW SOUTH WALES

I,JOHN WILSON
of19 ELM PLACE, NORTH ROCKS, NEW SOUTH WALES, 2151 wish to complain against MASTER GREENWOOD (Judicial officer's name) of the SUPREME Court.

My complaint is as follows:

ON TUESDAY, 17TH SEPTEMBER, 1996, IN THE SUPREME COURT, AT A SPECIAL FIXTURE IN THE CASE OF JOHN WILSON V. ST. GEORGE BANK LIMITED MASTER GREENWOOD LIED IN ORDER TO PERVERT THE COURSE OF JUSTICE. MASTER GREENWOOD SAID, "THE RATE ITSELF IS INDEED CERTAIN." . "CERTAIN' MEANS "ABSOLUTELY ASSURED, REGULAR, FIXED.". MASTER GREENWOOD'S STATEMENT IS A LIE. AND, USING THAT LIE, MASTER GREENWOOD DISMISSED MY STATEMENT OF CLAIM.  IF THE COURSE OF JUSTICE IS TO BE FOLLOWED, THEN LOAN CONTRACTS WITH UNCERTAINTY OF TERMS MUST BE DECLARED VCOID IN THE COURTS WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF TERMINATING THIS FRAUDULENT PRACTICE AND FACILITATE IN THE PROCESS OF VICTIMS MAKING THEIR CLAIMS FOR RESTITUTION.


In support of these allegations I submit the Details of Complaint which I solemnly and sincerely declare are true, and request that the complaint be investigated by the Judicial Commission.


I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true and by virtue of the provisions of the Oath Act 1900.


Subscribed and declared at NORTH ROCKS
this ...26th..day of ..November
one thousand nine hundred and ninety ..six..    .........John Wilson......
before me: ....A Burrows....
(Signature and title of witness)
Justice of the Peace 7100108

THIS IS THE ANNEXURE MARKED "D" REFERRED TO IN THE AFFIDAVIT
OF ...John Wilson..
SWORN AT ....North Rocks...
THIS ..31ST ..DAY OF ..May, 2000
BEFORE ME ....A Burrows...
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 7100108

Annexure "E":

JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF NEW SOUTH WALES

File No. C/96/90
    11th February, 1997

Mr. J. Wilson,
19 Elm Place,
NORTH ROCKS N.S.W. 2151

Dear Mr. Wilson,

I refer to the complaint you lodged with the Commission against Master Greenwood of the Supreme Court.

The Commission has carefully reviewed the material you have provided, including the judgment in the case.

This examination has revealed nothing which would suggest that Master Greenwood dealt with the hearing in other than in an impartial manner. In regard to the matters detailed in your complaint, the Commission is satisfied that the allegations against this judicial officer have not been made out. The Commission has particularly noted your complaint that Master Greenwood "lied in order to pervert the course of justice" and used this "lie" to dismiss your statement of claim. The Commission has found no evidence t support this allegation.

The Commission also notes that it does not examine the decisions of judicial officers which are subject to review by a superior court. In this matter the Commission is aware that you have exercised your appeal rights against Master Greenwood's decision to the court of Appeal and that appeal was dismissed.

In the circumstances the Commission has determined that your complaint should be dismissed.

Yours faithfully,

....E J Schmatt...
E. J. Schmatt,
Chief Executive.


THIS IS THE ANNEXURE MARKED "E" REFERRED TO IN THE AFFIDAVIT
OF ...John Wilson..
SWORN AT ...North Rocks..
THIS ...31ST..DAY OF ...May, 2000
BEFORE ME ....A Burrows...
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 7100108


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