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Ex tempore – revised






1 HIS HONOUR: On 18 August 2003 the plaintiff, John Wilson, was served with a Court attendance notice alleging that he was an elector who failed to record his vote at an election when required to do so, the election in question being the State General Election on 22 March 2003. If the plaintiff did so without lawful excuse he committed an offence under s12017 of the Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Act 1912.

2 The parties to those proceedings were Mr Brandtman as Prosecutor and Mr Wilson as defendant. Neither the State Electoral Office nor the State of New South Wales were parties. On the date set for hearing Mr Wilson appeared. He was asked whether he wished to plead guilty or not guilty to the charge and asserted:
"I am not ready to plead until I have a jury. I have not given my consent to be tried without a jury. It is my constitutional inalienable right to have a trial by jury. There is no jurisdiction unless there is a jury."

3 So far as the constitutional right is concerned that applies only to a trial upon indictment for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth. This was not a trial upon indictment, the alleged offence was under State law, and it was a summary trial by virtue of the Local Courts Act 1982 and the Criminal Procedure Act 1986. The latter Act provides:
         "6 Certain offences to be dealt with summarily
(1)The following offences must be dealt with summarily:
(a)an offence that under this or any other Act is required to be dealt with summarily,
(b)an offence that under this or any other Act is described as a summary offence,
(c)an offence (not being an offence that under this or any other Act is required to be dealt with on indictment) for which the maximum penalty that may be imposed is not, and does not include, imprisonment for more than 2 years.
(2)An offence may be dealt with summarily if it is an offence that under this or any other Act is permitted to be dealt with summarily or on indictment."

4 The plaintiff submitted to the learned Magistrate, when it was pointed out to him that the offence was necessarily to be determined summarily, as follows:
          "There can be no summary jurisdiction without my consent.That is the law. That is Magna Carta, Bill of Rights, Habeas Corpus, Petition of rights. It is constitutional law."

5 As 1 have already pointed out it is in fact the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 which determines the question.

6 The learned Magistrate rightly dealt with the plaintiffs submission as a plea of not guilty. The plaintiff, however, refused to permit the matter to proceed at that time. The learned Magistrate stood the matter down in the list. When the case came back before him he was informed that Mr Wilson had left the Court premises. The Prosecutor's solicitor sought to deal with it ex parte in accordance with the procedure prescribed by s196 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986, where the accused person is not present at the hearing of which due notice had been given. The learned Magistrate had Mr Wilson called. He returned to Court. He informed the Magistrate that he had:
     "Just come back to get a transcript because in fact 1 walked up to the Supreme Court and 1 will be putting in an appeal so you have no jurisdiction. You are nothing."

7 He was again invited to plead. He again asserted that there was no jury and no Court. The learned Magistrate asked the Prosecutor to commence proceedings. Mr Wilson refused to be seated and continued to interrupt the proceedings. The solicitor for the Prosecutor attempted to continue nevertheless and eventually Mr Wilson left the courtroom. The learned Magistratefound the offence proved on the material that had been tendered before him and fined the plaintiff $50, Court costs of $61 and professional costs of $500.

8 The plaintiff commenced proceedings in this Court by summons seeking an order that the judgment in the Local Court be set aside and an order to set the matter down for trial by jury. He filed affidavits in support of his application. Those affidavits in substance allege that all persons in New South Wales who claim to be judicial officers, that is "Registrars, Magistrates and Judges" have no legal entitlement to those offices because their appointments are invalid.

9 I do not propose to set out in this judgment the facts alleged in the affidavit to support this conclusion. It is sufficient to say that they are argumentative and irrelevant. They also make assertions as to the law which are strictly inadmissible in an affidavit and at all events wrongly state the law. The flavour of the affidavit is sufficiently to be understood from the following paragraphs:
       "'11. Because the Executive Arms of Government in Australia is defunct?, no so?called Judicial Officer has a valid warrant to preside over any Court in Australia.
         12. Therefore, because there are no legitimate Judicial Officers of the Commonwealth nor of the States of the Commonwealth and, as sovereignty lies with the People of Australia, the only form of Judicature in Australian Courts, to judge both the laws and the facts of any actions, are Juries.
         13. Magistrate Garbett insisted that the matter was a "Summary Offence", which eliminates the Right to Trial by Jury. However, I truly believe that Juries are an integral part of the JUDICATURE Arm of Government ? the definition of "Judicature" being "the administration of Justice"
         14. PEOPLE make up JURIES and, in a DEMOCRACY, when (from the Greek) "demos" means "people" and "kratos" means "rule", PEOPLE RULE and SOVEREIGNTY, ie: "the ultimate authority to impose law on everyone else in the state and the power to alter any pre?existing laW', lies with the PEOPLE.
         15. I truly believe that COMMON LAW is the law "of the People, by the People and for the People". It is created by decisions resulting from Trials by Juries. JURIES judge not only the facts but also the laws pertaining to each case before them ? including STATUTE LAW which is the law made by the PARLIAMENTARY Arm of Government and enacted by the EXECUTIVE Arm of Government.

         If this were not so and Statute Law could not be judged by Juries, then Statute Law would be immune from Common Law and Parliament and the Executive would be superior to the People, ie: Sovereignty would not lie with the People.


          SUMMARY LAWS are INCOMPATIBLE with DEMOCRACY and JUSTICE because Justice is "the protection of rights and the punishment of wrongs".

          Should both Parties to a court action give their consent to be without a Jury, then both Parties consent not to avail themselves of the Process of Common Law ? instead they entrust their case to one or more Judicial Officers who have sworn to "do right to all manner of persons without fear or favour, affection or ill?wilf' and who are appointed by the Executive Arm of Government. Even then, should the Judicial Officer decide the matter requires "community input', then he or she can summon a Jury.

          NO RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY means NO JUSTICE ? and certainly NO DEMOCRACY."

10  It is clear beyond demonstration that the affidavit of the plaintiff expresses no valid ground for the relief sought and the proceedings are vexatious. I have already mentioned that the summons is formally in error since it names as parties bodies which were not parties to the proceedings in the Local Court. Were it not for the completely groundless character of the summons I would have favourably considered an application to amend by substituting the correct defendant. However, that is pointless.

11   When the matter was called on for hearing in this Court this morning, Mr Wilson asserted that my appointment was invalid, that I was not a judge, and made a number of other silly accusations. This would not of itself have led to my refusing to hear the matter. However, when I attempted to
hear the matter he simply continued with his tirade. I have some sympathy for the mental difficulties under which Mr Wilson obviously labours. However, the administration of justice cannot be interfered with by
behaviour of a kind which he exhibited. I warned him that if he did not resume his seat and allow the matter to proceed he would be removed. He ignored this warning. I adjourned and he was removed and the
hearing proceeded.

12  For the reasons that 1 have given the orders sought in the notice of motion that the plaintiffs summons be dismissed and the plaintiff pay the costs of the motion must be granted and I do so.


I certify that this and the 4 preceding pages are a true copy of the reasons
for judgment herein of
His Hon Justice Adams.
A.Ritchie, Associate
Date: 23 March 2004.

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