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HIS HONOUR: Before the Court this morning is a notice of motion to strike out a statement of claim in principal proceedings current in the Court. The principal proceedings were commenced by the filing on 11 April 2000 of a statement of claim. The plaintiff in the statement of claim is Mr John Wilson. Mr Wilson himself drew and filed the statement of claim; and my understanding of the fact is that Mr Wilson has thereafter, at least in every substantive sense, continued to represent himself in connection with the progress of the proceedings commenced in the Court by the filing of his statement of claim.
In the circumstances of the present case it is, I think, important to attend with some care to the way in which the statement of claim has been framed.
The pleading begins by setting out in three numbered paragraphs and as follows what are described as "Particulars":-
"1. I have been imprisoned unlawfully on two separate occasions. The first was from 26 September 1997 to 28 September 1997 and the second was from 9 November 1999 to 29 February 2000.
2. The first episode of imprisonment relates to charges under section 326 of1 the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).

3. The second episode relates to the charge of contempt of court (a Common Law offence)."
Thereafter, there is stated as follows the substance of the relief claimed by Mr Wilson in the proceedings thus commenced;-
"1. That the Crown is vicariously liable for the unlawful imprisonment under section 8 of the Law Reform (Vicarious Liability) Act 1983 which states: "(1) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the Crown is vicariously liable in respect of the fcort committed by a person in the service of the Crown in the performance or purported performance by the person of a function (including an independent function)..."
2. That the Crown may be sued under the Crown Proceedings Act 1988.
3. Relief by:  (i) the Jury and the Court adjudging the awards, doings and proceedings in the matter of File Not 12914 of 1997 in the Supreme Court of New South Wales Common Law Division, Queen's Square, Sydney on 9 November 1999 to be of no consequence or example, in accordance with the Petition of Right 1628.
(ii) the Jury and the Court adjudging the awards, doings and proceedings in the matter of File No: 40928 of 1999 in the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Appeal, Queen's Square, Sydney on 29 February 2000 to be of no consequence or example, in accordance with the Petition of Right 1628.
(iii)- the payment of compensation for the denial of my right ("mon droit"), the injustice caused, time spent in prison, loss of earnings whilst in prison, the loss of earnings caused by interruption to business, damage to reputation, distress cased to my family and self. The amount in Australian dollars to be 5 (five) million."

The statement of claim cites as defendant the State of New South Wales. That defendant, by a notice of motion filed on 17 May 2000, has applied for relief as follows:-
"1. That these proceedings be dismissed pursuant to SCR Part 13 rule 5 on the ground that no reasonable cause of action is disclosed.
2.  Further, or in the alternative, that the proceedings be dismissed pursuant to SCR Part 13 rule 5 on the ground that the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious.
3. Further, or in the alternative, that the proceedings be dismissed pursuant to SCR Part 13 rule 5 on the ground that the proceedings are an abuse of the process of the Court.
4. Such further or other orders as the Court may deem fit.
5. Costs."
That notice of motion has been returned this morning before this Court. Mr Wilson, who appears for himself, has taken a preliminary point, the substance of which is that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the notice of motion. As will be seen presently, the substance of the preliminary point as argued ranges much more widely than that bald statement of it would suggest; but the essence of the point goes to that asserted lack of jurisdiction to deal at all with the notice of motion.
The substance of what Mr Wilson has submitted in support of his preliminary objection to jurisdiction can be summarised in the terms of his closing submission, which can be paraphrased fairly as follows: Mr Wilson has been wrongfully imprisoned as a consequence of decisions of particular judges of this Court; and it must follow that no judge of this Court can have any jurisdiction to deal in any substantive way with anything to do with any part of Mr Wilson's claims for relief as pleaded in his statement of claim. Insofar as there exists any jurisdiction of that kind, it resides in, and only in a jury, empanelled for the purpose of trying the proceedings commenced by the statement of claim.
Mr Wilson has not put the point in quite the following terms, but I take his objection to embrace the proposition that even an interlocutory application, such as the present notice of motion, cannot be adjudicated in any way at all by a Judge of the Court, but only by a jury empanelled for the purpose.
Mr Wilson has put a number of particular arguments in support of the preliminary point that he now argues. He has tendered to the Court copies of two documents published by him, which copy documents I have marked MFI l. It is not necessary to canvass the detail of the documents, for the reason that they are completely clear in what they say/ and they can stand, therefore, to speak for themselves. I have read and considered the contents of each.
Mr Wilson has tendered also a document which I have marked for identification MPI 2, and which contains excerpts from a large number of United States cases and various other documents. Some of the decisions thus cited are decisions of Federal Courts in the United States of America, and others of them are decisions of various State Courts in that country. No Australian authority has been cited. As to English authority, there has been a reference to a case involving William Penn, but it has not been cited in its detail.
For the sake of completeness it should be noted that the present interlocutory notice of motion came before his Honour Carruthers AJ on 9 November last. His Honour gave an ex tempore judgment. His Honour gave ex tempore what was,in fact, a judgment expressing his Honour's conclusion, insofar as he found it possible to reach any as matters then stood. A copy of what his Honour had to say has been engrossed and filed with the relevant Court file. It is not necessary to canvass in detail what his Honour said. It is sufficient to understand that his Honour felt that, in the circumstances as they then presented, it would be desirable that arrangements be made, if possible, for Mr Wilson to have the benefit of some properly qualified professional advice; and his Honour granted, in accordance with form 70B of the Supreme Court Rules, a certificate intended to make available to Mr Wilson professional assistance of that kind. I understand, from what Mr Wilson has said this morning, that some such advice was provided for him, but that he was not, and is not, disposed to accept it. That is his right, and there is nothing more that this Court either can, or .should, say in connection with that aspect of the matter.
The submissions which Mr Wilson has put have pointed in various ways to the importance in the administration of justice of the institution of the jury. No Judge of this Court would ever wish to be heard to the contrary. It is axiomatic that juries properly chosen, properly empanelled, properly directed as to the relevant law, and properly assisted as to the relevant facts and evidence, have a time-honoured, a well-entrenched, and universally recognised role to play in the administration of justice. It needs, however, to be clearly understood that the way in which, in practical terms, juries are thus to be employed is, and must in the nature of things be, subject to such lawful prescriptions as may be made, from time to time, by Parliament, in the form of relevant legislation; and by the Court itself, in the form of relevant and lawful Rules of Court.

Mr Wilson has submitted that, so far as is relevant at least to his present point, the only function that is properly exercisable,by a Judge of the Court is a purely clerical function, in the sense that the Judge is entitled, and empowered, to do nothing more than what has been described by the submission as "necessary paperwork so that justice can be administered." This is, to speak simply and plainly, a wholly misconceived notion. It does not accord with constitutional law and practice; nor does it accord with common law and practice; nor does it accord with the prescriptions of any lawful and relevant statutory or regulatory enactment. The submissions have continued to the effect that in proceedings of the present character "it is for the jury to say what the law is. The jury has a duty to nullify bad laws." I think that it is sufficient to say that those notions, also, are wholly misconceived, and wholly misapprehend the relevant constitutional law and practice; the relevant common law and practice; the relevant statute law and practice.
The notice of motion which the plaintiff has brought is grounded in the provisions of Part 13 Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court. There is no cause shown in any of the submissions put by Mr Wilson this morning for the drawing of a conclusion that Part 13 Rule 5 is irregular, or in any other sense unlawful. It seems to me to be beyond any serious dispute that the Rule is both lawful and regular.
The applicant in the present notice of motion, the defendant in the principal proceedings of which I have earlier spoken, is in my opinion perfectly entitled to invoke the Rule and to claim from the Court, upon proper cause being shown, the relief claimed in the notice of motion. I do not think that there is any serious basis upon which it could be contended that the Court does not have jurisdiction to deal with the notice of motion. The preliminary point taken to the contrary is over-ruled. The matter will proceed accordingly.






HIS HONOUR: I have before me a notice of motion in proceedings 20714/00, 'the parties to those proceedings being John Wilson, the plaintiff, the St George Bank Limited and the State of New South Wales, the defendants. The notice of motion seeks a "stay of the order under s 66 of the Supreme Court Act 1970, issued by Justice Simpson in the matter of St George Bank Limited against John and Lirane Wilson in file 11203/99, that St George Bank Limited be granted the right to possession until this case can be fully heard".

This morning Mr Wilson appeared in person, Mr Reuben appeared for the first defendant and Ms Mahoney for the second defendant. Mr Wilson indicated that his primary application was that the matter be sent to the listing judge so that any part of the proceedings could be tried by a judge. Mr Reuben indicated he sought a dismissal of the notice of motion and Ms Mahoney sought that it be adjourned to enable her client to put on its own notice of motion seeking to have the whole of the proceedings dismissed.

Following remarks by Mr Wilson, made at an earlier stage when I was still calling through the duty judge's list, I asked him whether he sought to pursue an application that I disqualify myself. He did and I dealt with that application before turning to the more substantive requests concerning the notice of motion itself.

For reasons given half an hour or so ago, I declined to disqualify myself. Following upon that decision Mr Wilson indicated that he no longer sought that I exercise any powers in relation to the notice of motion,contending I was not entitled to do so. When I then turned to Mr Reuben and he commenced to identify the evidence in support of his application, Mr Wilson left the court. The balance of proceedings today have been dealt with in his absence.

Ultimately Ms Mahoney did not press her application for an adjournment and particularly in light of the conclusions which I have arrived at so far as Mr Reuben's application is concerned a little history will be in order.

In proceedings 11203/99 in this division of the court, in which the plaintiff was St George Bank Limited and the defendants were John and Lirane Wilson, Justice Simpson delivered reasons on 30 November last. On 23 February orders apparently made on 22 December 1999 by her Honour were entered. Although I have not taken the time to study her Honour's reasons in detail, at first glance they seem to reflect those reasons. The orders were:

(1) there be summary judgment for the plaintiff in its claim;

(2) the plaintiff is entitled to judgment for possession of the land described in Certificate of Title folio identifier 116/598683 known as 19 Elm Place, North Rocks, New South Wales;

(3) the defence of the first defendant be struck out;

(4) the defence of the second defendant be struck out;

(5) leave is granted to the plaintiff to forthwith issue a writ of possession in respect of the land and premises known as 19 Elm Place, North Rocks, New South Wales;

(6) the first and second defendants pay the plaintiff's costs of the proceedings.

In support of the application, Mr Reuben read, and I use that term advisedly, part of paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 of an affidavit of Mr Wilson of 28 December 2000. That material and an annexure to the affidavit is to the effect that on the evening of 27 December Mr Wilson was served with a notice to vacate issued as a result of Justice Simpson's judgment of 30 November. The notice to vacate warned the occupants to vacate the premises in any event no later than 12pm, Thursday 11 January 2000, otherwise action to evict would proceed without warning.

Mr Reuben also read paragraphs 2 and 3 of Mr Wilson's affidavit of 15 January 2000. Those paragraphs are to the effect that at midday on 11 January the notice to vacate was executed and as of Monday 15 January Mr Wilson's wife was sleeping on the floor of a neighbour's place, he is sleeping on the floor of his surgery and his 26 year old son is elsewhere. In reliance on this material it was submitted by Mr Reuben that there was nothing upon which the notice of motion of 29 December could operate and hence it should be dismissed. Alternatively it was submitted that it was an inappropriate way of dealing with the order which Justice Simpson had made and the consequences of that order.

To adequately deal with those submissions it is, I think, desirable to recount a little more. Firstly while the notice of motion bears the number 20714/00, and most documents in it bear the same number, there are two copies of the statement of claim in the file. One has endorsed on it 207714/00 and the other 21714/00. They both seem to be otherwise in the same form. Each document is divided into two parts. Under the heading "Particulars" there are three paragraphs, one alleges a denial of natural justice and harm at the hands of Justice Simpson. The second alleges service of a notice to vacate, and the third contends that Justice Simpson's actions were unlawful and malicious and provide some further particulars of those. The second part of the document, under a heading "The Plaintiff Claims", asserts the Crown as vicariously liable for Justice Simpson's action. Second, that the Crown may be sued under the Crown Proceedings Act. Thirdly, it seeks relief by "The jury and the court adjudging awards, torts and proceedings in the matter of trial 11203/99.... and the subsequent judgment handed down on 30 November 1999 to be of no consequence", and also seems to seek the payment of compensation to the plaintiff in an amount of five million dollars.

There are two further matters of history to which I shall refer. Firstly the matter came before me on 28 and 29 December when the plaintiff sought an early return date for the notice of motion. I declined that for reasons apparent in the transcript of those days. The matter again came before Justice Sully on 11 January and the transcripts of those proceedings indicates that the plaintiff then sought a stay of an order until the hearing of the motion, that is of the order to vacate, and the transcript records that by the time the matter came before Justice Sully the writ of possession had in fact been executed. His Honour is recorded as saying that in that situation there was nothing that he could do, possession of the premises having been formally delivered to the bank. He refused the application.

I would respectfully agree with his Honour's conclusion. The writ of possession, which is what I understand the plaintiff to refer to in the extracts of his affidavit read as "the notice to vacate", has been executed. Therefore it is just not possible to grant, as the notice of motion requests, a "stay of the order...for the St George Bank Limited to be granted a writ of possession...".

In .those circumstances of futility, the appropriate order is that the notice of motion be dismissed. I so order.

I order the plaintiff to pay the defendants costs of an incidental to the notice of motion.


CA 41074/00


Monday, 7 May 2001



1.MEAGHER JA: This is an application for leave to appeal from a judgment of Sully J.
The application must be rejected. We can discover no error in his Honour's judgment.
2     CLAIMANT: I will now be appealing to the High Court.





JUDGMENT - refusing plaintiffs application re objection to Court's jurisdiction, see p 1 of transcript

1.HIS HONOUR: The matters for hearing today are notices of motion seeking, pursuant to the Supreme Court Rules, that certain proceedings be dismissed or stayed or the pleadings be struck out as an abuse of process.

2     The respondent to those motions, Mr Wilson, who is unrepresented, has submitted that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear these applications because the Court is constituted by a judge without a jury.

3     The procedure governing the hearing of matters of this kind is determined by a combination of the Supreme Court Act 1970 and the Supreme Court Rules. It is sufficient for me to say that the Act and Rules provide that applications of this kind are to be heard by a judge of the Court without a jury.

4     Accordingly the jurisdictional objection to the hearing of these applications is dismissed.
I certify that this is a true copy of the reasons for judgment herein of His Hon Justice Adams     Associate Date:24 July 2001

1     HIS HONOUR: In May 1999, proceedings were commenced by the St George Bank to claim possession of certain land of which the respondent to the present application was, jointly with his wife, a registered proprietor. The matter in due course came on for hearing in this court before Simpson J.
2     The respondent had filed a defence to the Bank's statement of claim. The Bank sought by notice of motion to obtain summary judgment. The respondent submitted to Simpson J that he had the right to have all issues, including issues of law, determined by a jury. Her Honour ruled that the issues raised by the Bank's notice of motion were issues of law only and fell to be decided by a judge sitting without a jury. On hearing that ruling the respondent left the court and the matter proceeded before her Honour in the absence of both him and his wife.
3     It is unnecessary for me to detail the evidence before her Honour. It is sufficient to say for present purposes that she concluded that the Bank had established its entitlement to an order for summary judgment and her Honour entered that judgment in its favour on 30 November 1999.
4     On 28 December 2000 the respondent filed a statement of claim in this Court which asserted the following particulars -
" 1.  I have been denied natural justice and suffered harm at the hands of Justice Carolyn Simpson of the Supreme Court of New South Wales at Queens Square, Sydney on Wednesday 4 August 1999 resulting in her granting the St George Bank Limited a Writ of Possession for my home at 19 Elm Place, North Rocks, NSW, 2151.
2.  My wife and I have been served with a notice to vacate by the Sheriffs Office, Court House, corner George and Marsden Streets, Parramatta, NSW, 2150, in keeping with that Writ of Possession.
3.  Justice Carolyn Simpson's actions were unlawful and malicious in her denying trial by jury and concealing bank fraud. The bank fraud Justice Simpson concealed was in the form of variable interest rate loans and the fact that banks create their own money."
5     The respondent claimed that the State of New South Wales was vicariously liable for the claimed unlawful and malicious actions of the judge and sought relief in the following terms -
"(i)  the jury and the court adjudging the awards, doings and proceedings in the matter of File Number 11203/99 in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Common Law Division, Queen's Square, Sydney on 4 August 1999 and the subsequent Judgment handed down on 30 November 1999 to be of no consequence or example, in accordance with the Petition of Right 1628.
(ii)  the payment of compensation for the denial of my right ('mon droit'), the injustice caused and the distress caused to my family and self. The amount in Australian dollars to be 5 (five) million."
6     In so far as her Honour's judgment exhibited any error of law, including any denial of natural justice, the only way by which such error can be corrected is by appeal to the Court of Appeal. A statement of claim in the form in issue here cannot correct such errors.
7     The defendants to the statement of claim, St George Bank Limited and the State of New South Wales, seek by notice of motion to strike out or dismiss the proceedings brought by the respondent or otherwise strike out the pleadings. The respondent submitted to me at the commencement of these proceedings that they should be conducted by a judge with a jury. There is no merit in this submission and, accordingly, I rejected it at the outset.

8     The respondent read in these proceedings a large number of affidavits. It is unnecessary for present purposes to give details of the content of those affidavits. It is sufficient to say that, broadly speaking, they seek to maintain the argument that the trial before Simpson J should have been by way of judge and jury and that by not acceding to submissions or arguments made to the judge as to the nature of credit, the function of banks, the calculation of liabilities, the inappropriate exercise by the judiciary of its power and the like, the case sought to be advanced by the statement of claim was, if not proved, particularised to the extent sufficient to identify justiciable issues.
9     The principal argument advanced by the State of New South Wales is that
Simpson J was protected by the well-known principles concerning the immunity of judicial officers from suit in the exercise of their judicial functions. There can be no doubt and, indeed, it was submitted by the respondent, that his complaint against "Simpson J did arise out of the purported but, he claims, wrongful exercise by her of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
10    I consider that her Honour exercised her undoubted jurisdiction in connection with the case determined by her. Whatever might be the scope of judicial immunity, it certainly applies where there is an alleged departure from jurisdiction said to have occurred in the purported exercise of judicial powers in the course of a trial for the conduct of which there was undoubted jurisdiction. Even if I were not of this view, however, the affidavits read by the respondent on this application demonstrate that his complaints against Simpson J have no basis in fact, let alone the law.
11    I can understand why someone in the respondent's position feels aggrieved by the determination, such as was made by her Honour, in which a jury took no part. However, it has been the law for well over two hundred years that juries decide facts and not the law. In relation to the facts of any case it is true that trial by jury has by succeeding statutes of the Parliament of New South Wales been whittled away and.
12    It is not surprising that litigants feel, on occasions, that they are the victims of an impersonal and dispassionate institution of justice rather than being dealt with by a process which involves the good sense and sound judgment of their fellow citizens. However, the extent to which there should be trial by jury in cases of the kind in which the respondent has found himself involved is a matter for the judgment and responsibility of the Parliament of New South Wales.
13    The applications must therefore be granted with costs. The statement of claim is struck out.
! certify that this and the three preceding pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment herein of His Hon Justice Adams        Associate
Date:  24 July 2001

1     HIS HONOUR: Mr Wilson has sought an adjournment of these proceedings because he has said that he is emotionally distraught and is not ready to argue his case. I have been listening to him for the last five minutes or so. He shows no signs of any emotional distress of any kind. I have no doubt that his application is simply an attempt to manipulate the court into granting an adjournment.
2.MEMBER OF PUBLIC: You are wrong. I think there is a bias in this court. This gentleman here came and notified the lady here and didn't notify Mr Wilson-
3.HIS HONOUR: Please leave.
4.MEMBER OF PUBLIC: -- it would only be two minutes so there is a bias in this court as I have seen in other court cases concerning John Wilson.
5.(Above mentioned member of public escorted from court.)
6.HIS HONOUR: However, because Mr Wilson is unrepresented and he has been given a large number of authorities to which the applicant in the notice of motion wishes to rely and, as he is unrepresented, it may be that after consideration of the reasons of judgment which I have just delivered in case number 20714/00, he will, despite his present adamant attitude, recast his arguments and put submissions to the court which are, at least, arguable.
7.Whilst the course of granting an adjournment in the face of the behaviour of Mr Wilson might be seen as giving in to that manipulation, I consider, nevertheless, that the interests of justice favour an adjournment. I think the appropriate thing is to put this down in the list judge's list to set a fresh trial date. I set the matter down in the hearings list next after this week.
I certifv that this and the 1 preceding pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment herein of
His Hon Justice Adams
Date: 24 July 2001

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