THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
MONDAY 25 AUGUST 1997
020723/97 - JOHN WILSON v TERRENCE GREENWOOD & ORS
Plaintiff in person unrepresented.
Mr Katz with Mr S Gageler for the Defendants.
WILSON:Is there a transcript being made of this hearing?
HIS HONOUR: Yes. What do we have here?
KATZ: Would it be convenient for me to mention what appears to me to be the relevant papers. The first is Mr Wilson's statement of claim, the statement of claim
shows as having been filed on 24 July. The first page is occupied by style of cause. The second page beings Particulars. There are two notices of motion filed in court on 4 August, one filed on behalf of the first four
defendants, that is to say Mr Greenwood and Justices Hamilton, Clarke and Abadee, and another in materially identical terms on behalf of the then Justice Dawson and Justices Toohey and Kirby. Next, there three affidavits filed
on behalf of the applicant and one affidavit filed on behalf of Mr Wilson.
The affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents, the first is John Holloway, 1 August 1997. The second is John Holloway, 7 August 1997. That
affidavit is identical to the earlier affidavit of Mr Holloway save for the fact that it was filed on behalf of Mr Greenwood and the earlier affidavit was filed on behalf of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants. At the time the
earlier affidavit was filed we had not been able to contact Mr Greenwood to obtain instructions so it was thought appropriate to file a further affidavit on his behalf. The further affidavit on behalf of the applicant is one
sworn 31 July 1997 by Christopher Matthew Doogan.
Those at the papers that appears to me your Honour should have to hand for the purpose of the hearing of our applications.
HIS HONOUR: Are the applications in identical terms?
KATZ: Yes they are. If your Honour could go to the notice of motion first, your Honour will see the first order sought is irrelevant for the present purposes. The
substantive orders sought are, first, the summary dismissal of the proceedings. That is an application made under part 13, rule 5, subrule (1) of the Supreme Court Rules.
Alternatively to that an order is sought striking
out the statement of claim and that application is made under part 15, rule 26, subrule (1) of the Supreme Court Rules and then further an order for costs is sought.
The primary order being sought is an order for summary dismissal of the proceedings.
Your Honour will recall the terms of the relevant rules in each case provide either for summary dismissal or for the striking out of
the statement of claim on a number of different grounds and we rely on these grounds that the proceedings or, alternatively, the statement of claim are or is vexatious or, alternatively, that the proceedings are or the
statement of claim is an abuse of the process of the Court both under part 13, rule 5 and under part 15, rule 26.
The Court may receive evidence on the hearing of the relevant application and it is in reliance of those
provisions that we have filed and seek to read the three affidavits which I have mentioned to your Honour and no doubt Mr Wilson's position with respect to his affidavit of 11 August will be similar.
It is by reason
of 13(5) subrule (2) and Pt 15 subrule 26(1). In my case I do not really seek to rely on the second and the third affidavits in support of this material on behalf of Mr Greenwood who was not able to go along on behalf of the
first affidavit so I do rely on the two affidavits that I have mentioned.
They are relevant insofar as they annexe documentation and if it be convenient to your Honour I would simply refer to so much of the documentation
as be relevant in the course of my submissions rather than formally reading now the two affidavits, but there is one piece of evidence additional to that which I would seek to tender. That is a document headed "Information
for the People of Australia" signed by Mr Wilson and dated 27 May 1997.
HIS HONOUR: Do you have any objection to that, Mr Wilson?
WILSON: No. In fact there are more documents similar going back some time.
KATZ: That is the evidence on the application on behalf of the various applicants.
HIS HONOUR: Which of the Holloway affidavits do you wish me to read?
KATZ: The first, if it is convenient.
HIS HONOUR: I have read Mr Holloway's affidavit and annexure.
EXHIBIT #A TWO AFFIDAVITS OF MR HOLLOWAY TENDERED, ADMITTED WITHOUT OBJECTION
EXHIBIT #B DOCUMENT ENTITLED "INFORMATION FOR THE PEOPLE OF
AUSTRALIA" TENDERED, ADMITTED WITHOUT OBJECTION
EXHIBIT #C AFFIDAVIT OF MR DOOGAN DATED 21 JULY 1997 TENDERED, ADMITTED WITHOUT OBJECTION
HIS HONOUR:I have read that affidavit.
KATZ:As to Mr
Wilson's affidavit, may I make our position clear as to that? We object to all paragraphs subsequent to the first paragraph on the ground of relevance. I am conscious it will be necessary for your Honour to read the
material in order to determine if it is relevant or otherwise and so perhaps the best course would be for your Honour to admit it subject to relevance.
HIS HONOUR:Mr Wilson, do you seek to rely on the affidavit?
WILSON:The affidavit, yes, I am quite happy about the affidavit that the other fellow has put forward.
HIS HONOUR:Objection has been made to paragraphs 2 through to 12 of your affidavit of 11 August 1997.
think they are relevant because we are talking about justice and a very big issue here about the integrity of the Courts to administer justice and the people are at the mercy of the Courts and so I think what I said there is
HIS HONOUR:Do you wish to say anything more about the affidavit?
WILSON:No. I will keep to that.
HIS HONOUR:I rule that paragraphs 2 through to 12 of the affidavit of Mr Wilson of 11 August
1997 shall be disallowed on the grounds of relevance. Do you have any other evidence you wish to put before me, Mr Wilson?
WILSON:It depends whether you want to hear what I have written.
HIS HONOUR:Any other evidence?
WILSON:It depends how much evidence you want from the previous court case because I submitted quite a few arguments in relation to that case but here and now what I have said in my
statement of claim and in the affidavits.
HIS HONOUR:The matter is of a long history. As you know, there has been a determination of Master Greenwood which has been upheld by his Honour Acting Justice Hamilton. That
decision has been upheld by the Court of Appeal and your application for special leave to the High Court was dismissed.
WILSON: I think it is a common theme going right through the whole case.
HIS HONOUR: The
present proceedings are a notice of motion that the proceedings be dismissed or, alternatively, struck out. Do you have any evidence that you wish to put to me to resist that application?
WILSON: Yes sir. I think this is a great civil wrong which has occurred.
HIS HONOUR: I am asking you whether you have any other evidence which you wish to put before me?
WILSON:I just want to get in before you
strike it out. I do not want to miss the opportunity. This is how I have prepared the argument in my case:
"The seven defendants have abandoned common law.
The case I brought against the St George Bank was on
the basis that under common law there must be certainty of terms for a contract to be created. The loan contract in question was for seven years with the first five years being on a fixed interest rate of 9.9 per cent and the
final two years to be either at a fixed rate which would be applicable at that time or at a variable rate applicable at that time.
I claimed that neither of the two alternatives for the final two years were certain at
the time the contract was made and they remain uncertain. Therefore, I asked the Court to sever that part of the contract because it was void under common law. It was not a contract for a loan at a fixed price.
'Certainty' means that which is absolutely assured, regular, fixed and the 'terms' of a contract means the conditions, stipulations, charge, price, rate of payment. Whereas 'variable' means apt to
change, changeable, uncertain.
The first defendant, Master Greenwood, said in his judgment that 'the rate itself is indeed certain' . However, the rate for the final two years is either variable or uncertain. A
'lie' is an intentional violation of the truth. Master Greenwood's lying judgment has been supported, in turn, by the other six defendants.
During the course of proceedings from the Common Law Division of the
New South Wales Supreme Court through to the High Court of Australia I filed 24 documents with affidavits, et cetera, repeating the same theme of the common law requirement of certainty of terms and pointing out that making out
a contract with variable interest rates or, in other words, uncertainty of terms to be a valid contract is false representation or fraud and that taking money by fraud is stealing. All this the seven defendants dismissed. They
have committed a terrible civil wrong. They are not immune from civil action for their offence because they have abused the process of the Court and the function of a court is to administer justice. t
I would like to
quote from Lord Denning (and this quote appears in my statement of claim) : 'In a civilised society, legal process is the machinery for keeping order and doing justice. It can be used properly or it can be abused. It is
used properly when it is invoked for the vindication of men's rights or the enforcement of just causes. It is abused when it is diverted from its true course so as to achieve an improper end. When it is so abused, it is a
tort, a wrong known to the law. The Judges can and will intervene to stop it. They will stay the legal process, if they can, before any harm is done. If they cannot stop it in time and harm is done, they will give damages
against the wrongdoer.'
The solicitors for the defendants have supplied me with some precedents which deal with the issue of immunity and I would like to quote passages from these documents.
In the case of
Gallo v Dawson where Wilson J said, 'If the Judge has accepted bribes or been in the least degree corrupt or has perverted the course of justice, he can be punished in the criminal courts.'
Here I would like to
quote from Halsbury's Laws of Australia on the subject of a judge being 'immune from suit in respect of acts done in the performance of judicial duties' . It says that, 'A judge acts in the performance of his or
her judicial duties when acting in the bona fide exercise of office and under the belief that he or she has jurisdiction.
The words 'bona fide' mean in good faith or having honest intentions.
From the text
of Rajski v Powell & Anor, Kirby P said, 'Such immunity rests, as it has been said, upon consideration of public policy.' 'Public policy' means in the interests of the community.
lies and concealing the truth cannot be considered to be 'acting in the bona fide exercise of office' nor in the interests of the community.
Also from Rajski v Powell & Anor, Kirby P refers to 'redress through the judicial commission'.
I have tried that path with a complaint against Master Greenwood (that is annexure A in the affidavit I filed on
12 August 1997) only to be rejected by a panel of more judges.
In order to seek redress, I also wrote to the Governor General of Australia on 25 April 1997 - only to be turned away with the comment that the Governor
General 'cannot intervene
I sent a petition to Her Majesty the Queen on 9 May 1997 - only to be rejected with a comment that 'she is unable to take any direct action on (my) behalf'.
And again, from
Rajski v Powell & Anor, Kirby P quotes from an 1811 case in America of Yates v Yansing when Platt Sr said: 'Let us beware that in our zeal for securing personal liberty we do not destroy the virtuous independence and
rightful authority of our courts of justice, and thereby subvert the foundations of social order. So long as our courts are pure, enlightened and independent, we shall enjoy that greatest of earthly blessings, a government of
laws; but whenever these tribunals shall cease to deserve that character, the standard of justice and civil liberty must give place to the sceptre of a tyrant.'
'The sceptre of a tyrant' I
defendants have sacrificed truth, law, justice and the rights of the people to appease a tyrant. They have not acted 'judicially'.
The tyrant, of course, is in the form of the banks.
The Royal Coat of Arms and the Australian Coat of Arms have been displaced by bank logos.
Proof of the power of the tyrant was seen in the repealing of an important statute law in 1981. The Moneylenders & Infants
Loans Act of 1941, which stated that, 'A loan contract shall show ... the total amount of interest to be paid,' and outlawed compound interest and penalty interest rates was repealed and a consumer credit Act passed to
allow the terms of a contract to be varied by the lender.
This was and remains a violation of common law.
The fraud has persisted and this is what the banks now call a 'contract' -I will read from a letter
from a major bank where it says: 'Under the contract the annual percentage rate, the interest-free period, the minimum repayment, and the fees and charges may all vary without your consent. New fees or charges may also be
introduced without your consent.'
Such a document is no contract.
The banks have trampled common law and these seven judges have abandoned it.
What is at the heart of this case is a fight for democracy and against the tyranny of the banks.
Many, many people know what I am doing - farmers, policemen, bank employees - and they wish me good luck while telling me
that I can't win because the banks won't allow it.
It is the simplest of cases. I don't know the price of a loan and nobody can tell me because the terms of the contract were not fixed when the transaction
If the Courts were 'pure', that is not corrupt, my application for severance of the part of the contract which is void by common law should have been granted in the first instance.
didn't happen. I have attempted appeals to higher and higher authorities and it still has not been remedied to this point in time.
The entire system stands condemned in the eyes of the people.
That can be
turned around and hope can be restored or the corruption can be further entrenched by yet another denial of truth, law, justice and right.
These seven judges gave orders against me to pay the bank's costs for which I
have been sent a demand from their solicitors for $32,917.72.
I ask this Court for an order against the defendants for damages and costs in an amount of $32,917.72 to compensate me for the injury they have caused to me.
If there is any doubt in the mind of this Court as to whether the defendants are guilty, then I would simply like to say that: (1) variable does mean uncertain, (2) uncertainty does not mean certainty.
I have been denied common law and I have been denied natural justice."
HIS HONOUR:Is there anything else you wish to put before me?
WILSON: No, that will do.
HIS HONOUR:Mr Katz, do you wish to say anything?
KATZ: Yes. The first is a mere matter of housekeeping. Your Honour rejected many of the paragraphs in Mr Wilson's affidavit, although I did not object to the first of
them, so I gather in accordance with your Honour's practice Mr Wilson's affidavit, so much as was admitted in evidence, should be marked as an exhibit.
EXHIBIT #1 AFFIDAVIT OF MR WILSON DATED 11 AUGUST 1997
TENDERED, ADMITTED SUBJECT TO OBJECTION.
Could I ask you to have before you Mr Holloway's affidavit of 1 August. I wish to direct your attention to certain annexures of Mr Holloway's affidavit. Your Honour will
be aware from annexure A to that affidavit that it was Mr Wilson who first invoked the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by making a claim which he did in respect of a purported contract, as he would see it. The defendant to
that claim, the St George Bank, then moved for summary dismissal of his claim, annexure B to Mr Holloway's affidavit. Your Honour knows from annexure C that that application for summary dismissal came before Master
Could I ask your Honour to go to the Supreme Court Act which is in Ritchie, first to section 118 subs (2) , the provision which deals with the powers of Masters. Could I direct your Honour's attention also
to subs (5)
Then, if your Honour goes to pt 60 of the Rules, which is the Part dealing with Masters, Pt 60 rule 1A subr (1) paragraph (v) confers on a Master the powers of a court under any of the provisions of the Rules
and it is in that way that a Master has power to deal with the application for summary dismissal, as indeed Master Greenwood did as appears from arxnexure C. That being so, pursuant to section 118 subs (5), which I have
mentioned, Master Greenwood was constituting the Court.
The next step in the proceedings was that Mr Wilson invoked the Supreme Court appellant jurisdiction under pt 60 rule 10. That jurisdiction is to be exercised by a
judge as appears in pt 60 rule 9. Section 37 of the Supreme Court Act provides for the appointment of acting judges, section 37 subs (1), subs (3) of section 37.
It follows from section 37(1) that an acting judge could
hear Mr Wilson's appeal from Master Greenwood's decision and that is indeed what happened. Acting Justice Hamilton dealt with Mr Wilson's appeal from Master Greenwood's decision.
Annexure F to Mr Holloway's affidavit are Acting Justice Hamilton's reasons and G, which are his orders.
Next step, Mr Wilson again invoked jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, this time the Court of Appeal. That
application by Mr Wilson for leave to appeal came before Justice Clarke and an additional justice of appeal, Justice Abadee. Section 36 subs (1) and subs (3).
Annexures K and L to Mr Holloway's affidavit consist of
the reasons of the Court of Appeal for refusing Mr Wilson's application for leave. K is the reasons, L is the orders.
If your Honour would then turn to Mr Doogan's affidavit, section 35 subs (2) of the
Commonwealth Judiciary Act. I hand your Honour a copy. That confers on the High Court jurisdiction to determine cases like the case Mr Wilson had against St George Bank. That application came before Justices Dawson, Toohey and
Kirby. They determined the matter it appears from annexures B to Mr Doogan's affidavit.
One has successive occasions upon which Mr Wilson invoked the jurisdiction either of the Supreme Court or, alternatively, the
High Court. My submission is that each of the defendants in this present case has absolute immunity
from suit in the circumstances which I have just set out which has the consequence that the present proceedings must
necessarily be summarily dismissed with costs.
I have a number of authorities which I seek to hand to your Honour and I would wish to take your Honour briefly to certain extractions from those authorities. Could I ask
your Honour to go to the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Moore and Weaver reported in (1928) KB. Weaver had sued Moore and some letters from Moore to her own solicitors came into public domain in the course of those
proceedings. When Moore became aware of those contents she, Moore, sued Weaver in defamation and the issue was whether the communications were absolutely privileged in defamation. It was held by the Court of Appeal that they
were. "There are a few ... performance of his duty."
If I can take your Honour to Kebaci v Villar (1940) Vol 64 ACLR. at 140 and the reason of his Honour Justice Starke, "No action lies ... course of legal
The third case your Honour has is a recent case in the High Court of Australia in which the judicial officer in the proceedings number one was suing the disappointed litigant for defamation. Justice
Gummow at page 39 repeats what Justice Starke had to say.
The next decisions of various Justices of the High Court in Gallo v Dawson, beginning with Justice Wilson's reasons. These are reported in (1988) Vol 82 ALR
page 401. At 402, if your Honour would go to the paragraph which begins, "In the circumstances ... has been exercised." Gallo did not appeal in a timely way from the summary dismissal of her proceedings but some time
later she sought an extension of time. That came before Justice McHugh. The last in this is Gallo v Dawson No 2. The relevant test is that laid down by Justice Wilson at page 402 that provides the superior court has
jurisdiction in the sense that if it is the principal and general authority conferred upon the Court to hear and determine the matter, then the Court is absolutely immune from any cause of action whatsoever, not only defamation
but any cause of action.
The material to which I have taken your Honour in the two affidavits establishes beyond any real doubt that the Court had jurisdiction in the sense to which Justice Wilson was referring at each
of the stages of Mr Wilson's proceedings.
Some of the defendants were judges at the time they made their respective decisions. That applies to Justices Dawson, Toohey, Kirby and Clarke. Then there is Justice Abadee
who was not a judge of appeal at the time he sat in the Court of Appeal. Section 36 subs (3) confers on an additional judge of appeal the immunities of a judge of appeal. Then one goes to Acting Justice Hamilton, as his Honour
then was. I have taken your Honour to that immunity. I have taken your Honour to the section which provides Master Greenwood immunity, the position with respect to Master Greenwood, section 118 subs (5) . Master Greenwood
constituted the Court and for that reason has the same immunity that any judge or acting judge of that Court would have had if that judge had been performing the function.
Najar v Hanes (1991) Vol 24 NSWLR page 224 dealt
with the immunity of referees. There is an additional reference at page 234. In the middle of (c) page 234.3 his Honour is acknowledging that a Master acting as such is provided with he immunity.
In my submission it
would be appropriate for your Honour to dismiss the entire proceedings with costs on the basis that all of the defendants had absolute immunity.
WILSON: I was speaking to a lady patient of mine. I said, "The other
side claim immunity." She said, "That's scary. Judges aren't above the law." The cases that the opposition refers to do not refer to a situation where there is a fundamental lie at the focus of the whole
proceedings and that fundamental lie was said by Master Greenwood when he said, "The rate itself is indeed certain." There is no denying that is an outright lie and I believe that is pivotal of the case. As far as the
Judge being malicious, I would compare that to a football player who drives in a hard tackle as opposed to a football player who gouges the eyes of the opponent.
HIS HONOUR:I shall reserve my decision on this matter.
MrWilson, would you leave your telephone number with my Associate so she can contact you when I hand down my judgment on the matter.
Z3676 517/00 DV-G2
FRIDAY 26 SEPTEMBER 1997
POLICE v JOHN WILSON
CHARGE Threaten injury to person
Sergeant Croft for the Informant
Defendant appeared unrepresented
Defendant of f bail
BENCH: Is Mr Wilson here?
PROSECUTOR:Yes your Worship, Mr Wilson is before the court. The matter was mentioned earlier
today at 9.30 this morning in the Registrar's court, Mr Wilson is requesting the court to consider the question of varying bail. The matter has already been adjourned to 16 October for mention only, it's ..(not
transcribable).. , the appropriate orders have been made and it's a question of redetermining bail.
BENCH:Yes Mr Wilson, what are you asking me--
DEFENDANT:Yes I am asking that the conditions be removed
because I have business in the Supreme Court building and adjacent areas which are vital to my defence.
BENCH:Yes. What does the prosecution say about that?
PROSECUTOR: I suppose in some ways the prosecution agree
that bail should be varied, in spite of the case that in fact should be refused. I would like to address you on that issue.
The matters that are before you are offences which are not taken lightly by the prosecution.
I'd like to address you in terms of s 32 in view of the background, the general nature and the seriousness of the of fences before you.
BENCH: Mr Wilson, you don't have any legal representation take it?
DEFENDANT:No sir, I do not.
BENCH:You don't want any I take it, at this stage?
DEFENDANT:Well I asked various different legal opinions and no I don't particularly like the opinions I've been
getting, so, if I could find somebody who would support my cause - -
BENCH: Well, you realise that this is a criminal charge, the matter that is before me, I don't know anything about the matter that was before
Murray J and I am not here to decide that matter in any way whatsoever. I'm here purely to deal with what should happen to the criminal matter and what should happen to you in regard to the criminal matter.
The prosecution is just saying that they're now seeking that I refuse bail.
DEFENDANT: Well I think I should be given every opportunity to defend myself and be able to present the evidence at a proper time.
BENCH: Alright, just have a seat there for a moment.
PROSECUTOR: On the credit side, the defendant has been granted bail, indeed he seems to have been residing at the same premises a number of years and indeed he has no
If indeed the allegation before the court was perhaps one discourteous of behaviour towards a judicial officer as a result of perhaps a court result that he didn't like, then perhaps the bail set in
current terms are appropriate.
However the facts have a more sinister connotation than that and the behaviour of the defendant arises out of what we would say is a pre-determined and pre-planned attack upon a senior
judicial officer sitting in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
Worse, and justifying the consideration that bail should in fact be refused, is that the behaviour of the defendant is becoming aggressive towards
I read to you the facts in this matter. On 5 September 1997, the defendant attended--
BENCH: I take it an election has been made has it--
PROSECUTOR: No election has been made. A date has
been set for an election to be made in the orders that have been made.
The defendant attended the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Common Law Division to hear the judgment in the matter of Wilson and agreement of
others. That was.. (not transcribable).. which was an application made against a judicial officers including three High Court Judges, two Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeal, a Supreme Court Judge and a Master of the Supreme
Court. The plaintiff alleged that these judicial officers were corrupt.
In documents before the Supreme Court under Murray J's consideration was a document allegedly by the defendant where he says that those judicial
officers were accomplices in the crime of stealing and that he was stating that they
must disbarred and imprisoned. That's about a judge of the High Court of Australia.
It goes on, the Solicitor General applied to
strike out the action by the plaintiff on the grounds that it was abuse of process and that it was vexatious. Murray AJ was delivery his written judgment in the matter and part of his judgment was 'in his view the statement
claimed fails', he says 'it's vexatious and the proceedings are an abuse of the processes of the court'.
It goes on, perhaps more telling why bail should be refused, 'the statement of claim does more
than seek to re-litigate a question which has already been decided against the respondent in every step of the judicial hierarchy. The bias of its terms are no more than an unwarranted attack on the integrity of the judicial
That's the background as to why the defendant was before the Supreme Court judge and the terms of the decision being handed down by Murray J.
As he was pronouncing his order dismissing
the proceedings the defendant then threw a first missile towards the Supreme Court Justice and this missile was a plastic bag containing yellow paint like substance and actually struck Murray AJ. It hit him on the left side of
the chest causing damage to his suit. The paint bomb exploded on impact.
The defendant then threw a second paint bomb towards the Supreme Court Justice, this second paint bomb missed the Justice but exploded on impact
with the court bench. As a result of this impact paint was sprayed over those nearby, and of course over the Supreme Court.
A statement by one of the parties, Captain Olsen, associate to Murray AJ said 'I immediately
thought it may have been acid of some type and pulled it of f the bench onto the floor between me and the court reporter. The Judge appeared to be in shock and I urged him to get of f the bench. The court officer, Wally,
grabbed Mr Wilson who struggled with him and our Tipstaff Bernie Roach went to assist Wally after he checked on the Judge. I went to the ante room to assist the Judge and tried to ring security. I went back to the court, rang
the buzzer and about 15/20 minutes later security officers arrived'.
This is no off the cuff sort of behaviour by the defendant. It's a pre-planned attack on the Justice. Indeed the defendant had secreted inside
the folder that he had these particular missiles which he threw at the Justice and he one left in reserve when he is finally subdued.
It's a very strong case against the defendant. A number of witness saw the
incident complained of. The penalty if indeed found guilty would probably attract a gaol sentence.
An inescapable conclusion is that the alleged behaviour is as a result of pre-arranged and well thought out physical
planned attack upon a Supreme Court Justice in New South Wales. A matter of great concern, is there no obvious motive for the alleged attack on that particular Justice other than the fact that the Supreme Court Justice was
doing nothing other than his lawful duty.
Owing to the nature of the serious circumstances of this alleged offence, the prosecution harbour a genuine concern for judicial officers who are involved in litigation that the
defendant's been involved in.
They're serious allegations, they're table 1 of fences, it is not as if it's a matter where a person comes before the court and for one reason or another loses the plot, it
is not that it wasn't premeditated nor pre-planned, it was a calculated move and what is worst of all it's virtually at random an attack upon a judicial officer performing their judicial function.
Murray J could
have been anybody sitting there, it was selected at random to deal with the matter the defendant went before.
On that basis bail shouldn't be granted to this defendant, and bail should be refused.
BENCH: He's been already granted bail, it's a bit hard to refuse bail.
PROSECUTOR: Just because a police officer makes a mistake, there's no reason to compound that mistake and keep on granting the defendant
bail in circumstances - it's remarkable he was given bail in the first place by a police officer.
This is unprecedented. I've never heard of a Supreme Court Justice being attacked in this manner. Of course
it's not only just the attack on the Supreme Court Justice where the sinister note comes in, look at the other comments that he said about the defendant and the type of attack he was giving to other judicial officers.
It's nearly up to a crescendo, and his aggressive behaviour towards judicial officers is increasing. That is the reason why bail should be refused.
BENCH: Yes Mr Wilson.
WILSON: Your Worship, this is a matter
of national importance because the whole basis of my original action was the fact that banks are levying variable interest rates which is contrary to common law. Right from the outset the judges have given rulings against my
statement of claim was to bring blatant lies.
Each time I have appealed I've had more lies, more cover ups, and the only way of getting this - in fact I was in a total shock of never ending corruption from the bench.
The only way I could bring this to an outside decision, such as jury of the people, was via a, like you say, a pre-meditated act and it was not meant to be doing harm, it's just a matter of protest in order to bring
about a trial by jury.
This is why I am pleading not guilty, and this whole matter, I have so much support in the general community for this action against what is nothing less than massive fraud on the part of the banks.
I wish to be allowed to go at bail so that I can put together my case for the jury trial.
BENCH: What case are you going to put together Mr Wilson?
DEFENDANT: The fact that I was doing a right thing and the fact that--
BENCH: That doesn't excuse the behaviour though does it?
DEFENDANT: Yes it does. And in fact the original charge has been changed. The
original charge was that I did cause an injury. There was no injury caused, in fact the newspaper article the following day said that no one was hurt. Strangely enough that reference has been dropped in the new charge which
BENCH: Did cause detriment--
DEFENDANT: Yes, not an injury.
BENCH: It all depends how you define injury doesn't it Mr Wilson.
DEFENDANT: In fact I am rather suspicious--
BENCH: I don't think I would like to get something thrown at me, even though it didn't--
DEFENDANT: Go a bit..(not transcribable).. , in fact since the incident I have had numerous phone calls from many
supporters around the country, from Queensland, from South Australia, who know exactly what I've been doing. In fact I've been on this campaign to the eliminate this bank fraud for 10 years. I tried to do it through
BENCH: You understand that if you get tried for this matter, you're not going to able to bring up those issues in the trial. All the court--
DEFENDANT: I hope I still have an angle, though I
did have three lines of attack in the first charge, in fact this is what I have been telling people on the phone.
The fact that two of those aspects of my defence have now been eliminated in the new charge, number one
that an injury has not been caused - they've changed that to a detriment. And the second one was on account of thing lawfully done, and I was going to challenge that. Now what they're saying is that as an act as a
judicial officer, they have dropped the word lawfully.
So it is quite strange that my original three prongs of attach, that two of those have been deleted. I still have the third one, in so far as--
they are doing is putting the charge in the terms of the section of the Act, the charge originally wasn't drafted correctly but that's not a problem, it's been drafted correctly now apparently. I presume the
Director of Public Prosecutions will be appearing in this matter, is that--
DEFENDANT: I would like to be able to put my point of view before a jury and my all means..(not transcribable)..
BENCH: A jury is only
going to be concerned about - they're might interested in your point of view but they're basically going to be--
DEFENDANT: I hope they are sir because I'm after the truth-
BENCH: --only concerned about whether or not you did throw this missile at the judge.
DEFENDANT: It's a matter of right and justice sir.
BENCH: That doesn't excuse it.
DEFENDANT: I think it does sir.
BENCH: You might think it does and you're entitled to think that, but--
DEFENDANT: That's what I'd like to put a jury.
PROSECUTOR: I would like to just briefly respond. It has been confirmed
this was premeditated attack on a Supreme Court Justice. There is certainly no remorse given by the defendant, he says he'll do it again. When asked by yourself, he wouldn't throw and do anything to you, he says 'I
hope you don't deserve it'. The prosecution do have genuine fears for other judicial officers.
DEFENDANT: I did not say I would do it again.. (not transcribable).. that was all. I will not do it again--
BENCH: I don't think it is really case that deserves me refusing bail though.
PROSECUTOR: That's our view your Worship, that's what I am asking. You've heard him here say he's justified in doing it,
and would do it again.
What more does one need under the Bail Act to refuse bail? Seriousness, circumstances, increasing behaviour by the defendant, he's told you he's seeking to get attention, he's going to
increase his behaviour to get attention--
DEFENDANT: I did no such thing.
PROSECUTOR: He's got a just cause that he believes in, and clearly doesn't believe he'd done anything wrong and he's
entitled towards anything to get attention.
DEFENDANT: It's a conspiracy, that is not true--
BENCH: Sending him to gaol will really give him a lot of attention--
DEFENDANT: The sergeant at police centre
asked me if I had a shooter's licence, I said 'no'. 'Did I have a gun', I said 'no', he said 'are you likely to do anything like this again', and I said 'no, it's achieved what I set
out to achieve'. I have no intention of - I'm not a violent person, in fact by nature and by profession I care for people. That is in fact why I am doing.
BENCH: What you did isn't very indicative of that though Mr Wilson.
DEFENDANT: I think it is. As a matter of desperation because I've been in the courts since September last year, appeal after appeal. I think a
very important part of my evidence is to show that I've been provoked to this action and I will be submitting judgments and court documents from that series of cases.
BENCH:You won't be allowed to do that Mr Wilson. You must understand that--
DEFENDANT: I am certainly going to try--
BENCH: You can't use these proceedings to ventilate your concerns about the faults that
you perceive in the judicial system.
DEFENDANT: I just hope to be able to put my case.
BENCH: You may find that your perception of your case is not one that you will be able to put before a jury.
I just saw a witness over there swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, and that's exactly what I am after. I'm after the whole truth. I don't want it sort of mitigated or censored for
the convenience of banks giving away their diabolical crime they've been inflicting on people of Australia.
On the Monday after the incident a sergeant from the police station phoned up and asked to speak to my wife,
I passed the phone over, and when she came of f the phone she said that the police regarded me as being dangerous and they wanted me to do a psychiatric examination. I said 'yes I'll do any examination you want to put
before me but I am not violent'.
BENCH: My advice Mr Wilson really would be when this matter is dealt with to forget it all and go somewhere else because quite frankly I don't think you're doing yourself or
anyone else any great favours by continuing in the way that you're doing it.
DEFENDANT: Now sir if I could explain another cause that I have been on for many many years. It's in regards to mercury poisoning by
dental nurses. Back in 1972 I had a research scholarship at London university and got very interested in the toxic effects on dental nurses, including spontaneous abortions and all the other very serious effects which resulted
from the negligent handling of mercury in the dental surgery.
I formulated the code of practice which I had a great deal of difficulty getting through and the only way I can get it even into the text books was by
fronting up to Mr Ralph Nadar in Washington, getting his support and the support of his medicals there, to then force it through the US Department of Labor.
That's how the new code of practice came about. That took
me about 12 years to achieve that. I just did not like the fact that nurses were being poisoned and the were having still births.
So if I feel something is criminally and tragically wrong, I'm afraid I've just
got to fight the campaign. This is another issue.
BENCH: I am sure Mr Nadar doesn't go around throwing things at people in court though.
DEFENDANT: No sir.
Your Worship, could I make a suggestion, that
if that condition is to stay place on the bail that each time that I want go to the Supreme Court or to the records building or where ever, I be allowed the escort of a police officer from the Central Police Station.
BENCH: I am not going to do that Mr Wilson, it's impracticable. People have got other things to be doing. Do you still live at 19 Elm Place, North Rocks?
DEFENDANT: Yes sir.
BENCH: Is that your own home?
DEFENDANT: I have mortgage on it, yes.
BENCH: Are you practicing as a dentist now?
DEFENDANT: Yes. I should have been seeing patients this afternoon, I thought it was going to be this morning.
this matter the charge against Mr Wilson is a serious matter although it is a matter that can be dealt with summarily on election.
I am asked to refuse bail but I don't really think that, even having regard for all
the circumstances, that's appropriate, although I am concerned, having regard to the remarks that Mr Wilson has made, that this behaviour not occur again.
I propose to allow conditional bail and it is subject to some
fairly stringent conditions. The first is that he not approach the Supreme Court, Queens Square, Sydney or be within 500 metres of it. Second, that he not approach or contact any judge of the Supreme Court or their officials
any way or by any manner, no matter where they may be sitting or residing from time to time. Third, that he accept supervision of the Probation and Parole Service and report to that service within seven days. Fourth, that an
acceptable person acknowledge in writing that they're acquainted with him and he's a person likely to comply with his bail undertaking. Fifth, that he enter into an agreement without surety to forfeit an amount of
money, namely $10,000 if he fails to comply with his bail undertaking and that an acceptable person enter into a similar agreement without security to forfeit $5,000 if he fails to comply with his bail undertaking.
Wilson, what that means is that those conditions apply. So you're going to have to get someone to come along to court today, otherwise you will be kept in custody, to give an undertaking that they're prepared to forfeit
$5,000 if you don't comply with your bail undertaking, and also to say that they know you and agree that you are person who is likely to comply with your bail undertaking. You understand that?
DEFENDANT: If I can't find somebody to give me a surety, what happens then
BENCH: It's not a surety, it's without security, that someone is entering into an agreement to forfeit $5,000 if you don't comply
with your bail.
DEFENDANT: If I can't find somebody to come along--
BENCH: You will remain in custody until that happens and if still no one is coming forward you can make an application to have the bail
DEFENDANT: In what time? How long do I have to stay in gaol before I can do that?
BENCH: You can do it immediately, it can be done at any time.
DEFENDANT:Can I apply now?
BENCH: Can't you get someone to come along here and go surety for you?
DEFENDANT: I don't like putting people into embarrassing positions.
BENCH: Why do you think they'd be embarrassed about it.
DEFENDANT:I just don't like subjecting anybody to any inconvenience.
BENCH:You subjected one of the judges to a fair amount of inconvenience and all their staff--
DEFENDANT:That was a matter of necessity to
bring this matter of national importance before the jury, not judges.
BENCH:I would have thought this is fairly necessary from your point at this point of time.
DEFENDANT:I believe that what I'm doing is right and just.
BENCH: If you've got the conviction of your beliefs that's fine but I am concerned as to the protection of the community and in particular certain
members of it in the intervening period between now and when this case eventually gets heard, whether it is in this court or another court.
DEFENDANT: I think though it's unfair sir because I always said that I will
not be doing any similar thing again.
BENCH:Why should I accept what you say to me about that, when you've already done it once you sir.
DEFENDANT:It was a matter of necessity, it had to be done.
BENCH:It didn't have to be done did it?
DEFENDANT: There's no other way of bringing it before a jury. I was just going from one judge to another, who would say that that is indeed certain, the other one would say
no you'll now have to establish, made a contact, and the other one would refuse to answer the question I put before them of whether variable meant uncertain, you know it's just been a closed shop. I've not been able
to break out of the cycle.
BENCH: I don't know anything about that situation but obviously there are limitations as to how far you can take your avenues of appeal is not an appropriate method of appealing.
I have told you, the issues that you wanted to raise in the other litigation you won't be able to raise in the matter before the jury, they're not going to be interested in it.
DEFENDANT: What I hope to challenge
here is the fact that Mr Murray as a judicial officer, in fact I think I can prove quite clearly that he's broken his oath of office and therefore is no longer a judicial officer. I think I can prove that quite clearly.
BENCH: I will be very surprised if you could quite frankly.
DEFENDANT: I will put the evidence before a jury sir.
BENCH: They're the bail conditions that I am setting.
DEFENDANT: I would rather not
contact anybody, unless you can - I am not asking you to go guarantor, the last several weeks up until now I've compiled with those conditions, I don't see why they should any more strict, in fact I would rather they be
removed so that I can go to the Supreme Court, do my subpoenaing, go to the records office, get the transcripts--
BENCH: You can do all that without going to the court. No need for you to go to the court to do those sort
DEFENDANT: What, by couriers you mean?
BENCH: You get someone else to go there for you, no need for you to go there. There's a legal aid solicitor around here today, if you want to get some legal
advice about your current situation you're welcome to do that. But until those bail conditions are entered you'll remain in custody, do you understand that?
DEFENDANT: Oh yes, back in the cells.
DEFENDANT:I believe in this cause so much, I think so many people have been destroyed by banks because of this lie--
BENCH: Mr Wilson, I know that so many people have been destroyed by the banks, you don't
have to convince me about that. But this is not the way to go about going it.
DEFENDANT: I tried to go through the Supreme Court, the Common Law Division, asking for severance, that was the original case. I said I
BENCH: I don't know anything about the Supreme Court proceedings but I'm just looking at--
DEFENDANT: Yes, that's why I am here now because of all these wrongful decision one after another.
BENCH: Alright. Well it's up to you, okay.
CERTIFICATION OF TRANSCRIPT
I, the undersigned, being a Sound Reporter do hereby certify that the within transcript is a correct transcript of the
depositions sound recorded at the Local Court DOWNING CENTRE in the matter of POLICE V JOHN WILSON on 26 SEPTEMBER 1997
'Threaten injury to person'
Dated at GOODSELL BUILDING
this TWENTY NINTH day of JUNE 2000