THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
TUESDAY 12 DECEMBER 2000
020137/00 - JOHN WILSON v STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
The plaintiff appeared in person
Mr Nicholls appeared for the defendant
HIS HONOUR: What is the application that is before the court?
NICHOLLS: It is the state's application for summary dismissal of the statement of claim filed by Mr Wilson.
HIS HONOUR: Let me have the file. Mr Nicholls, give me your assistance. There is
somewhere a notice of motion filed by Mr Wilson.
NICHOLLS: Filed by the state, that was filed on 17 May.
HIS HONOUR: It has to do with the statement of claim filed by Mr Wilson on 11 April 2000. I have
got that. How have pleadings progressed or have they not progressed beyond application to strike out the statement of claim?
NICHOLLS: That's right
WILSON: You have no jurisdiction--
HIS HONOUR: I understand. Mr Wilson, sit down and I will hear you on that point in a moment.
WILSON: I thought jurisdiction should be clarified before a word is said.
HIS HONOUR: It will be clarified before the matter is heard. There was a notice of motion filed on 17 May?
HIS HONOUR: I hand you down the document that I have got. Just confirm that that
is the notice of motion about which you are speaking.
NICHOLLS: Yes, that is the motion.
HIS HONOUR: Thank you. In relation to that, I imagine there have been affidavits filed in support of the notice of
motion, is that right?
NICHOLLS: There are two affidavits relied upon. One has been filed and that was filed on 17 May 2000.
HIS HONOUR: Just a moment. It is an affidavit of?
NICHOLLS: Natalie Jane Adams.
HIS HONOUR: Again I will hand you down what I have in the court file. Just check that that is the one about which we are speaking.
NICHOLLS: That's correct. Can I hand
up a further affidavit sworn on 11 December 2000 by Neil Richard Guy. I seek leave to file it and rely on it.
HIS HONOUR: We will come back in a moment with that one. Those are the only affidavits that you have filed or
will file, as the case might be, upon which your notice of motion depends?
NICHOLLS: Subject to this further affidavit. .
HIS HONOUR: There is only one affidavit, one to be filed, upon which you want to rely, if we go on.
NICHOLLS: That's correct.
HIS HONOUR: * Mr Wilson, just before we come to the question of jurisdiction, I
will be glad if you would help me to sort out the formalities of your side of the record. First of all, have you filed any affidavit in connection with the notice of motion to strike out your statement of claim?
WILSON: No, because it should go before the jury.
HIS HONOUR: But you have not filed any affidavits in answer to the affidavit of Natalie Jane Adams?
HIS HONOUR: And there are no affidavits, I take it, that you are wanting to file at this stage?
WILSON: Not today.*
HIS HONOUR: I understand. So there is the preliminary point that you wish to take
concerning the jurisdiction of the court, is that right?
WILSON: That's right.
HIS HONOUR: Just tell me simply and clearly what is the point you take.
WILSON: That you have no jurisdiction in this
matter to hear or judge the whole or any part of this matter. If you proceed your actions would be unlawful and malicious. Malicious being defined as premeditated, designed to do evil and injure me and the people of Australia.
You will be denying natural justice. I would like to ask you a series of questions.
HIS HONOUR: . The court is not here to answer questions.
WILSON: Before you answer, I would like you to swear on the bible
to tell the truth and nothing but the truth so help you God.
HIS HONOUR: The court is not here to answer questions.. How do you make good that the court has no jurisdiction?
WILSON: I am not talking about the court, you are the j udge .
HIS HONOUR: I am the court, for the purposes of this application.
WILSON: You are not. You have no jurisdiction in this matter. I have named
you as being one of the judicial officers implicated in this case. The officers I have named on 9 November are James Wood, David Hunt, Terence Greenwood, John Hamilton, Mathew Clarke, Alan Abadee, Kirby, Toohey, Dawson,
Brians-Murray, Caroline Simpson, David Levine, Peter Hidden, Kenrieth Handley, Paul Stein, lan Alien, Gaudron, John Dunford, Timothy Studdert, Graham Barr, Megan Latham, and your nkme, Brian Sully, Rex Smart, Hackett, Steve
Jupp, Murray Gleeson, William Fisher, Perlman, Reginald Blanche, Michael Campbell, lan Pike, Brian Beaumont, Roderick Meagher, Dyson Heydon, and Charles Sheller. I have already named you as being implicated.
HIS HONOUR: I do not quite understand. What do you mean?
WILSON: In the transcript of 9 November in the Supreme Court before Carruthers AJ on p 7 line 48. Also in the affidavit--
HIS HONOUR: I want to
follow what you are putting. I want to see what is recorded in the transcript. Pardon .me a moment while I do that. What was the basis upon which those particular names were chosen?
WILSON: Because they were all
implicated in this affair. Affair meaning collection of cases which started in 1996 when I first brought an action against the St George Bank over uncertainty of terms.
HIS HONOUR: What am I supposed to have done?
WILSON: You have denied the right of the trial by jury. I have already prepared for you, on 6 Sept ember- -- -
HIS HONOUR: When?
HIS HONOUR: Do you have the transcript?
WILSON: I am just looking for it now. Yes, here it is.
HIS HONOUR: May I have a look at it, I do not have that?
WILSON: The judgment is attached to that, as well.
HIS HONOUR: I have read that.
WILSON: To expand upon that point, last week I distributed what I call press releases explaining judges judging themselves. I have several copies of that. I would like to pass up a copy for you and for the other side.
HIS HONOUR: Yes.
MFI #1 PRESS RELEASE ON THE PRELIMINARY POINT AS TO JURISDICTION.
WILSON: Further to the point of your lack of jurisdiction, are you employed by the defendant?
HIS HONOUR: I am listening to your submission.
WILSON: Are you?
HIS HONOUR: You are not here to ask questions.
WILSON: I am here to clarify the judges' jurisdiction.
HIS HONOUR: What are your submissions on the proposition that the court has no jurisdiction?
WILSON: I submit that you are employed by the defendant and therefore you are ineligible to judge any part of this case.
HIS HONOUR: Do you say that no judge of this Court has any jurisdiction over any part of the proceedings commenced by your statement of claim?
WILSON: It must be by a jury. That's the only tribunal which could be competent, independent, and impartial.
HIS HONOUR: But I want to be clear about the submission, it is that no judge of this Court has
jurisdiction to hear and judge or in any way to dispose of any part of the proceedings commenced by the plaintiff's statement of claim filed on 11 April; is that the essence of the submission?
WILSON: There is more
to it. There is the role of a jury. The role of a jury is very briefly summarised in a videotape put by the Sheriff's Office of the Attorney General.
HIS HONOUR: That's the obverse side of the submission you put
to me. The only tribunal having any jurisdiction of that kind is a jury?
WILSON: Is a jury.
HIS HONOUR: That is your real submission.
WILSON: Oh, yes.
HIS HONOUR: I understand. And how in your submission is the jury to be empanelled?
WILSON: It is empanelled by the court.
HIS HONOUR: But the court has no jurisdiction--
WILSON: I am saying no judges--
HIS HONOUR: Who empanels the jury?
WILSON: The normal procedure of empanelling the jury.
HIS HONOUR: What is the normal procedure, as you understand it, of empanelling a jury?
understanding is that jury notices are sent out, people come into court, they go through a qualifying or question and answer period to determine whether they are eligible on the ground of being competent, independent, and
impartial. Once they have satisfied those to the satisfaction of both sides, which is the plaintiff and the defendant, then the jury can be empanelled.
HIS HONOUR: How does that actually happen? Who does the empanelling of the jury?
WILSON: It is empanelled by the oath.
HIS HONOUR: Who administers the oath?
WILSON: The sheriff--
HIS HONOUR: Wrong. Before whom is the oath sworn?
WILSON: Before God.
HIS HONOUR: Partly right. In imperatorial terms, before whom is the oath sworn?
WILSON: Before the court.
HIS HONOUR: Who is the court?
WILSON: The court is the judge and jury.
HIS HONOUR: But the jury has not been empanelled. It follows that the judge is at least entitled to administer the oath and do the
other formalities that are necessary to empanel the jury, in order that the jury may have proper standing in the proceedings.
WILSON: The judge can act as Clerk of the Court and do necessary paperwork, in order to administer justice.
HIS HONOUR: That is completely clear: To do necessary paperwork/ and to administer justice.
WILSON: It is their responsibility not the judge's. The purpose of doing the paperwork is so that justice can be administered.
HIS HONOUR: So that justice can be administered. Does the clerical work that the judge
is entitled to do, do you submit, extend to controlling the good order of the conduct of the proceedings before the jury, so that the rules of evidence are complied with and the parties have a proper chance to explain to the
jury whatever their cases are, respectively?
WILSON: Yes, I think the plaintiff is entitled to inform the jury of their responsibilities, that the responsibilities of the jury is to determine the facts, determine what
is the law, judge the justice of the law, decide if the law is good if it is appropriate to that particular case, to judge the moral intentions of the parties, and to vote purely on their consideration and not to dictate to any
party in the proceedings.
HIS HONOUR: It is the practice of the court for the judge to give the jury such assistance by way of direction and instructions that the jury might require in the matter of law as distinct as
to the facts. Do you contend that the court has no jurisdiction to do that?
WILSON: The court is the jury and the jury will decide what the law is. It will not be thrusted upon them by any party. Evidence shall be
presented that this is the certain law. In fact, the jury has a duty to nullify bad laws.
HIS HONOUR: That is completely clear. Thank you. Is there any case law that you want to cite in support of any of those
WILSON: I can go back to my files and bring up cases if necessary. I do not think I brought any with me. I have a few instances here which I have just taken off the internet. I am quite happy to submit
HIS HONOUR: Yes. I will have a look at it . I noticed that these are all United States authorities.
WILSON: I got that off the internet.
HIS HONOUR: Are there any Australian authorities?
WILSON: If you are looking at English cases, there is the 1670 case of William Penn where a jury refused to convict William Penn because they considered that the law was bad. That is a precedent, as far as English law is
HIS HONOUR: Do you have a copy of it?
WILSON: Probably not.
HIS HONOUR: I take it, this is the only copy of this document that you have?
WILSON: At the moment. It is on my computer.
HIS HONOUR: I will have it marked in due course as MFI 2 on the present preliminary point. Do you have any Australian authorities?
WILSON: I do not know.
HIS HONOUR: What's your next submission.
WILSON: It is to do with the fact that a jury is indispensable. I refer to this videotape made by the Sheriff's Office with the introductory segments by Spigelman CJ, Chief Justice of New South Wales, who said about
juries that they are an essential part in the protection of personal liberties. He said the word "essential". Essential means indispensable, necessary, all important, crucial, imperative, mandatory, it cannot be
We are talking about the administration of justice. I have a legal definition of what is justice out of the Oxford Legal Dictionary. It says, "moral ideal that the law seeks to uphold in the
protection of rights and the punishment of wrongs. Justice is not synonymous with law. It is possible for a law to be called unjust."
HIS HONOUR: I understand all of that. In connection with this
preliminary point that you are taking, can you tell me this, Mr Wilson--
WILSON: That you have no jurisdiction.
HIS HONOUR: No, you have told me that. You can take it that I understand with complete clarity
that that is what you are wanting to argue.
WILSON: Or any judge.
HIS HONOUR: You can take it that I understand that. What was the result of the way in which Mr Acting Justice Carruthers dealt with the matter on
9 November? His Honour seems to have had the idea that you might be given some legal assistance of some kind, is that right?
WILSON: Yes, and Justice Kirby before him. That is dealt with in the transcript of 9 November.
HIS HONOUR: But can you tell me what actually happened? Did you apply for Legal Aid?
WILSON: Justice Carruthers made out an order.
HIS HONOUR: He gave a certificate.
WILSON: He made out an order and I have a copy of the order. The Principal Registrar, Nerida Johnson, did line up a
barrister to give advice and an instructing solicitor. The solicitor faxed me the advice from the barrister, who is Kim Morrissey, and I rejected that as being no good advice. In fact, I put that into an affidavit, which I have
HIS HONOUR: Could you tell me this. I see that from the concluding paragraph of Carruthers J's judgment on 9 November that his Honour--
WILSON: There was no judgment.
HONOUR: -- that his Honour asked the Registrar that the matter be referred back to him after appropriate pro bono assistance had been tendered to you.
WILSON: I got in touch with his associate and she said he is no
longer available because he had been put in the Court of Criminal Appeal. He then sent a copy of my letter to Justice Kirby and he is then appointed you.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, I understand. What other submission do you have on this preliminary point?
WILSON: It is to do with what is a court. A court by definition is a place where justice is administered. Justice must be
seen to be done. So on the issue of bias, I am suing the Crown according to the Crown Proceedings Act under the title of the State of New South Wales.
There is another pertinent question I have to ask you, even though you
don't want to. Have you sworn an oath of allegiance to the Queen?
HIS HONOUR: That question is noted.
WILSON: In pursuit of justice, bias, and jurisdiction, it is a necessary question.
HONOUR: You have no right to ask it. Why are you making a submission like that to the court in support of your preliminary point? What's your next submission?
WILSON: That you by swearing an oath of
allegiance to the Queen are sworn to uphold what she has sworn to uphold in her coronation oath. I would like to find a copy of it--
HIS HONOUR: There is no need. I am familiar with the terms of the coronation oath.
WILSON: You are aware that she's sworn to execute justice with mercy? You realise she has accepted the Holy Bible as "Royal law? Do you understand what Royal law is?
HIS HONOUR: Go on.
WILSON: Royal Law is mentioned in Matthew Chapter 22 Verses 35 to 40. I would just like to be allowed to find that. Matthew Chapter 22 Verse 35:
"Then one of the lawyers asked him a question testing him saying,
'Teacher, which is the greatest commandment of all in the law?' Jesus said to him, 'You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind. This is the first and greatest
commandment. You shall love your neighbour as yourself.' And the final verse 40 says: 'On these two commandments and all the law and all the prophets'."
So that is why bad laws must be nullified. Any law
that attempts to deny the right of trial by jury certainly qualifies to be nullified.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, I understand. What's your next submission on this question of jurisdiction?
WILSON: I will just have a look.
So you have already got the copy of judges judging themselves. Then there is this circular I put out entitled "Judges versus Democracy." (Handed up and added to MFI 1.)
HIS HONOUR: I have read that.
WILSON: At the trial before a jury, I will be submitting not only--
HIS HONOUR: You need not tell me what you are submitting to the jury, that is not yet a question for me. The question is whether I have
jurisdiction to deal with the Crown's notice of motion. You submit that I do not have jurisdiction. I simply want to know the propositions of law upon which you rely in support of the submission that I have no
jurisdiction to deal with the notice of motion that is before me.
WILSON: That is contained on a CD of my website. I would like to submit it
HIS HONOUR: I reject. It is not relevant.
WILSON: It is because it contains many, many issues along the path--
HIS HONOUR: I am sure it does. I reject it. What is your next submission, please?
WILSON: My submission goes along the same lines as the
argument I have already put many, many times, that an Australian citizen is entitled to the right of trial by jury and cannot be denied it.
HIS HONOUR: I am familiar with the argument. Is there
anything in text that
you wish to put in support of your present submission that I have no jurisdiction to entertain the notice of motion?
WILSON: I would like to submit my publication which contains many of the arguments relating to the
incidences of a jury and the fact that a judge cannot judge in his own cause.
HIS HONOUR: I reject that document.
WILSON: You are rejecting that?
HIS HONOUR: I reject the document because it adds
nothing to the very succinct statement in the two prereleases which are MFI 1 which were completely clear in what they have to say as to the argument that you are trying to develop. What is your next submission? '
WILSON: What happened to the transcript of Acting Justice Carruthers, do you still have that?
HIS HONOUR: Yes, I do.
WILSON: In that I mention the fact that motions must be heard by a jury in this case.
Have you read that paragraph?
HIS HONOUR: Yes.
WILSON: I am referring in particular to the Supreme Court Procedure Act (1903) section 3. (Read) "In any action by consent of both parties the whole or any one
or more of the issues of fact in question may be tried, or the amount of any damages or compensation may be assessed by a judge without a jury." (THIS PASSAGE WAS LEFT OUT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DEPARTMENT'S
HIS HONOUR: Has that not Act been repealed by the Supreme Court Act (1970)?
WILSON: It would not matter if it had because any rights cannot be disposed of even if an Act is repealed. That is in the
HIS HONOUR: So any Act repealing the 1903 Act by the Supreme Court Act of 1970 would be ineffective because?
WILSON : Because it says in the Interpretations Act--
HIS HONOUR: What section, please?
WILSON: Section 30 of the Interpretations Act (1987) number 15 (read). "The amendment or repeal of an Act or statutory rule does not affect (b) any right, privilege, obligation or
liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the Act or statutory rule." (THIS PASSAGE WAS LEFT OUT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DEPARTMENT'S TRANSCRIPT). So that right is not abolished by any Act that supersedes it.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, I understand. What is the next submission?
WILSON: The requirements for a jury, as I say, I have outlaid in the affidavits which I have been filing and I think there is about fourteen or
fifteen affidavits, and it is all contained within already filed affidavits. Have you read all those affidavits?
HIS HONOUR: No. You told me at the beginning that there were no affidavits that you wanted to rely on for
the reason that I had no jurisdiction anyway.
WILSON: No, you asked--
HIS HONOUR: Mr Wilson, I will ask the court reporter to go back to the beginning and read out what was said.
THAT PART OF P 2 MARKED WITH AN ASTERISK READ.
FOR JUDGMENT SEE SEPARATE TRANSCRIPT.
WILSON: I ask for an adjournment so I can prepare a case under your particular directions that it will be heard by a judge. As far
as I am concerned, you have no jurisdiction. You have ignored the issues. You have made judgment in this before.
HIS HONOUR: I understand entirely all of that. Your preliminary objection is over-ruled. Now
what do you want to do?
WILSON: Well, I place all my assertions on the fact that you do not have jurisdiction. I still maintain that. So therefore I require time to organise an adequate defence against this notice
of motion from the Crown with whom you are employed and with whom you are not impartial.
HIS HONOUR: How much time do you say you want?
WILSON: I would say at least possibly five weeks.
HIS HONOUR: What
are your movements, Mr Wilson, in the second week of January, that is the week of 7 or 8 January?
WILSON: Nothing I can think of, at the moment. Just regular work.
HIS HONOUR: Mr Nicholls, will you be available?
NICHOLLS: I am not available at that time, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: I am thinking of this, it is desirable that this matter be brought to a head one way or the other, sooner rather than later.
require time to get a transcript of what you said so I can inform the people of Australia of your judgment. I have to put an application to the Reporting Services and to get it back and then have to feed it out to other
Australian citizens from whom I am drawing advice and support.
HIS HONOUR: I understand. I imagine you know that the Court Reporting Service will take out a transcript of what I have said. I will correct it, if that is
necessary. I do not mean I will alter it, I mean will correct it. The it can be engrossed and made available to you in the normal way. There is no problem about that. I would hope that will be done by this week, so it will be
available for you, say, from the beginning of next week.
WILSON: I require time for my supporters to offer their advice because there is an awful upsurge of the Australian people against the injustices perpetrated by
judges and the outrage is becoming quite paramount.
HIS HONOUR: I think you should understand two things. I hope you will not mind my saying this. You are perfectly entitled, as far as I am concerned, to say,
within the limits of the law, whatever you please to your fellow citizens. But, first, there is no purpose served by making to me a speech of that kind. None at all. Secondly, I would like you to understand this, just in case
you have any doubt about it, I am not afraid of any of those threats that I understand you to be making. You achieve absolutely nothing by making those military rhetorical statements in court. Make them if you wish,
however that cuts absolutely no ice with me.
WILSON: It is natural justice.
HIS HONOUR: Natural justice may be thought to entail a certain civility and prudent balance in the kind of allegation that one makes in
public. But that is also a matter for you. Five weeks, you say?
WILSON: Natural justices entails that you cannot judge in your own cause.
HIS HONOUR: You would be available on 5 January? WILSON: I
would prefer at least another week after that. HIS HONOUR: When are you back, Mr Nicholls?
NICHOLLS: Approximately 24 January or thereabouts. We oppose any adjournment.
HIS HONOUR: I will grant it simply
because the preliminary point has been over-ruled. I propose, or if not me somebody else, to deal with the notice of motion in proper form and that requires that Mr Wilson should have a proper opportunity to put on
affidavits, if that is what he wants to do. I will give directions as to the timing, but in the case of somebody, who has Mr Wilson's altitude and who is appearing for himself, I think that is the proper way to do it.
NICHOLLS: I do not wish to be say anything against what you are suggesting, however, the circumstances of this case are peculiar, in the sense that this motion was filed on 17 May this year. Mr Wilson has had ever
opportunity to file affidavits and, in fact, he has filed in excess of ten affidavits in the proceedings.
HIS HONOUR: Let me put the proposition,the other way. Has there been prejudice to the present applicant in the
course that I propose?
NICHOLLS: The only prejudice is in respect of costs.
HIS HONOUR: There is no problem as to costs, that can be protected by proper order in a form which both can and will be enforced.
NICHOLLS: I cannot point to substantive prejudice except to say this: Mr Wilson has been afforded every opportunity by this Court to file affidavits and to obtain legal advice.
HIS HONOUR: Mr Nicholls, he has had advice
and it is his right not to accept it and he does not accept it. That being so, I think he should be given reasonable opportunity to think through what he wishes to do in connection with the hearing of the notice of motion which
is going to proceed in the court. I have no idea what assistance Mr Wilson may wish to take. I think within the bounds of what is reasonable he is entitled to have that opportunity. I have no idea whether Mr Wilson will wish to
rely formally upon the fourteen affidavits which he tells me has filed or some of them or none of them or some additional affidavit or affidavits that he wants to file.
NICHOLLS: Yes. I can't say anything further than what I have.
HIS HONOUR: Mr Nicholls, let me ask you this. It happens that I am the vacation judge on 16 January.
WILSON: There is issue as to
whether I wish to appeal against your interlocutory judgment. What time limit do I have? I believe it is 28 days.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, that is affected by the commencement on Monday of next week of the. fixed
summer vacation during which generally time does not run, is that right?
NICHOLLS: That is correct. I think Mr Wilson requires to file an application for leave to appeal which has to be filed within fourteen days.
HIS HONOUR: Why then do I not do this: Stand the hearing of the notice of motion to a date to be fixed by the list judge. Direct that the matter go before the list judge for mention on Friday of this week by
which time it ought to be possible for both of you and Mr Wilson to have an idea of what you are wanting to do. The list judge can then set the necessary time limits and make all the necessary orders; is that not the
sensible thing to do?
NICHOLLS: Would your Honour be minded to make directions in connection with the filing of affidavits?
HIS HONOUR: No, not until I know what Mr Wilson wants to do, whether he is going to
make an application for leave.
I think the simplest way is to require him and you to make up your mind, respectively, by end of term on Friday, so the list judge can do what is necessary to bring the matter to a head in some
NICHOLLS: As your Honour pleases. The difficulty is this, there has been a long history of litigation which you have not touched on because it is not relevant to this aspect of the motion this morning. It is
stretching back to three or four years. Mr Wilson has taken every opportunity to appeal every interlocutory judgment or indeed any judgment over that period.
HIS HONOUR: But why is that a matter of complaint? He is entitled to do that.
NICHOLLS: In respect of this particular application, there is no utility in further adjourning the matter.
HIS HONOUR: Let us speak
frankly about the matter. Whether we like it or not, the phenomenon of litigants appearing in person is becoming an increasing frequent one in the court. There is no point in being overwhelmed about it. They are extremely
difficult matters to deal with, for the judge is expected to do the impossible. There is no point in complaining about the situation. That is the fact on the ground. So far as it concerns the matters that we are
discussing, the litigation commenced years ago, but it was against the filing of a statement of claim. What was done in connection with the incident is done. The courts have to look at those things and there is no profit
in rehatching all of that. The question is, is the amended statement of claim justiciable in the court? Where is the merits? Now 'that just cannot be dealt with in a series of short sharp blows.
submission is this, Mr Wilson has been given every opportunity by the court to present his case and has been given the opportunity to obtain legal advice which he has not accepted.
HIS HONOUR: I have some sympathy with
that point of view. But once again, let us be practical. Mr Wilson has a ruling of substance made against him on the preliminary point. I do not see that it is unreasonable that he wants some opportunity to look at the text of
what has been said in the judgment and to consider whether he wishes to make an application for leave to appeal. I do not think that he is entitled to have, as it were, at his dissertation an open end opportunity, but a
reasonable opportunity to consider that. That alone would justify the course I was proposing to you a moment ago.
There is no prejudice at all that I can see. The substantive hearing of the notice of motion will stand to
Friday of this week, 15 December at 10 am before the list judge, Justice Kirby. The matter is referred to his Honour by this Court so that his Honour can make appropriate orders as to the listing of the hearing of the notice of
motion any other ancillary order that might be appropriate.
Mr Wilson, will you make sure that my associate has your address to which a copy of your judgment can be sent? Do you have a fax?
HONOUR: We will fax a copy of the judgment when the text of it has been typed out. Mr Wilson, I ask this of you. On the Friday when the matter is before Kirby J, I think you ought to be in a position to tell the judge
whether or not you are going to make an application to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against my interlocutory judgment this morning. You would understand, as matter of commonsense, that that is a very important
practical matter. If you have made up your mind that you want to make an application to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal, then Justice Kirby will make certain facilitating orders. If you have decided that you
do not want to do that, that you want to fight out the substance of the notice of motion, then the judge will fix that hearing for a day on which both you and Mr Nicholls can be available and on which the matter can be
litigated to some sort of finality.
WILSON: I think at this point, the appeal against your judgment is crucial to the administration of justice.
HIS HONOUR: I have nothing to say about that. It is a matter for
you as to whether or not you want to do that. All I am saying to you is I will see to it that you have a copy of the reasons that I gave this morning and that you have them prior to Friday. We should be able to let you
have them tomorrow. The court will want to know on Friday what decision you have made in principle about making an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Would you just give consideration to that and be able to
tell the court on Friday where you stand in that regard?
Any outstanding questions of costs are reserved.
THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
FRIDAY 15 DECEMBER 2000
020137/00 - JOHN WILSON v STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES,
No appearance for the Plaintiff at 9.00 am.
Mr N A Nicholls for the Defendant.
The Plaintiff appeared in person at 9.10 am.
THE PLAINTIFF WAS CALLED THREE TIMES OUTSIDE THE COURT AT 9 AM; NO APPEARANCE.
HIS HONOUR: It might be noted that Mr Wilson was called and there is was appearance. What are you seeking, Mr Nicholls?
NICHOLLS: The position in this case is that there is currently before a court a motion for summary dismissal of the proceedings commenced by Mr Wilson. That motion came been Justice Sully -
HIS HONOUR: I have
read the judgment and as I understood it this morning was to give Mr Wilson the opportunity to do one of two things; first, to indicate whether or not he wished to seek leave to appeal against the interlocutory order made by
Justice Sully, in which case it would be appropriate for me to put him on terms as to the time for the taking of that step or, secondly, to have the matter set down for hearing of your Notice of Motion.
Since Mr Wilson is
not here - though I note from the file that a fax was sent to him notifying him of this hearing on 13 December 2000 - it seems to me that the appropriate course is to set the matter down for hearing. What is your
estimate as to the length and what dates are you seeking
NICHOLLS: My assessment of the length of the hearing would be one and a half hours, taking into account Mr Wilson is a litigant in person, he indicated on the
12th that he would file some affidavit material in relation to the motion and we would seek that that be done within three weeks.
HIS HONOUR: In terms of the actual hearing date after that three weeks? Does the
time for filing of affidavits run during the vacation? In other words, if I were to make an order for filing it within three weeks, is that in any suspended by reason of the law vacation?
NICHOLLS: Not by reason
of the whole vacation. There will be a few days that will not be reckoned, but there is no need for that to be taken into account. We would seek a week
following 22 January or early February.
HIS HONOUR: The
order I make is in these terms; first, that Mr Wilson file, by 4 pm on 19 January, such affidavits and other material upon which he wishes to rely. Is it anticipated that you would want to file any material in reply?
NICHOLLS: No, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Secondly, the matter be set down for hearing on Wednesday 24 January 2001 before the Duty Judge, estimate one and a half hours. I think it is appropriate to go before
the Duty Judge at that time - - - -
THE PLAINTIFF APPEARED IN PERSON AT 9.10 AM
PLAINTIFF: I was told 10 am.
HIS HONOUR: I will vacate those orders now that Mr Wilson has
arrived. Mr Wilson, I had proposed to make some orders, but perhaps you would like to moment to compose yourself?
PLAINTIFF: While ever judges conceal bank fraud, and by that I mean variable interest rate
loans, and the fact that banks create their own money, while every judge continues to deny people their rights which would enable them to defend themselves against fraud and corruption, banks will just sit back and laugh at
their victims. A court is a place where justice is supposed to be administered. In these courts justice is not being administered. These courts have become corrupt. That is my opening volley.
HONOUR: The business for today, Mr Wilson, really concerns two things. First, Mr Justice Sully having given his judgment, which I have read, on 12 December 2000, the appropriate course really is to do one of two
things; the first is for you to consider your position which, as I understand it, just Sully enjoined you to do, as to whether or not you intend to seek special leave to appeal against his interlocutory order. If you do,
then it would be appropriate for me to impose some form of term upon you as to the time within which you do that.
The alternative to that is that I will set the matter down, and I had proposed to set the matter down for late
January, perhaps 24 January before the Duty Judge. They are the courses that are open.
Mr Wilson, I am sitting here as List Judge. I am not sitting here in any way to hear the merits and you might just address
those two alternatives.
PLAINTIFF I will, because the judgment made by Justice Sully on Tuesday is unlawful and malicious.
HIS HONOUR: Do you intend to appeal against it?
PLAINTIFF: I am appealing here right now.
HIS HONOUR: I am not a Court of Appeal. You have got to file a document which seeks leave from the Court of Appeal to appeal against what is an interlocutory
order. It is not a final order
PLAINTIFF: The well, recognised principle is that in the exercise of its lawful jurisdiction the court may employ all the appropriate remedies, and that principle is not affected by
the fact that in certain cases the nature of the remedy sought is made on grounds of jurisdiction. So you have the capacity to set unlawful and malicious judgments aside and set the matter down itself for trial by jury.
HIS HONOUR: Mr Wilson, I will not repeat it - perhaps I will so I am absolutely clear that you have got it; if you tell me now that you intend to appeal, then I will make an order that you do so within a certain
time. If you do not respond to that, I will certainly set the matter down for hearing on 24 January, 2001.
PLAINTIFF: I intend to defend my rights as an Australian citizen.
HIS HONOUR: If you intend it
appeal, that's fine, but you do so in the appropriate way, which is by lodging an appeal and you are familiar with the process. That has to be done within a certain time.
PLAINTIFF: I certainly intend to
defend my rights in every way I can, and if you refuse to administer justice by setting aside this unlawful and malicious judgment - I was faxed by the judge's this on Wednesday, (Indicated) - and during the
course of that hearing on Tuesday, I presented to Justice Sully documents which proved conclusively that he has no jurisdiction to make any such judgment whatsoever. The two most serious accusations have been the fact that he
himself is implicated in the denial of the right of trial by jury and I presented him a transcript of his own hearing and judgment -
HIS HONOUR: I assume, Mr Wilson - just to interrupt you for a moment, because I do not
want to go into the merits of the matter - you want to appeal. Therefore, the order I will make is that you lodge your application for leave to appeal within the time prescribed by the rules.
I will make a further
order that if you fail to do so, then I give the State of New South Wales leave to approach the list office to have the matter listed for the hearing of the merits of their Notice of Motion.
PLAINTIFF: I have already said I will be appealing to the ends of the earth to defend my rights.
HIS HONOUR: I understand that, and you have that right, and I am sure you will exercise it, but all I have done is
to remind you that there is a time limit that applies in respect of have - I think it is 28 days.
NICHOLLS: I think it might be shorter for an application for leave to appeal, but I will just check that.
HIS HONOUR: We will look up the time limit for you, Mr Wilson - -
PLAINTIFF: Do you refuse to set aside Justice Sully's judgment of Tuesday?
HIS HONOUR: Yes, I do.
PLAINTIFF: Then you are failing your duty.
HIS HONOUR: I understand that that is your point of view, but I believe myself to be doing my duty. But, in any event the time limit, which is the only concern we
have is - and it is just being looked up - -
PLAINTIFF: The legal definition of malice is a premeditated, pre-designed act to do evil, and that has been consistent with judges to do evil in these courts. The
document I produced on Tuesday, and Justice Sully accepted and marked it as Exhibit 1, is this document which describes judges judging themselves and it goes into the fact that Justice Sully on, I think, 9 September 1999, not
only made a judgment denying the right of trial by jury, but also rejected my submissions relating to the United Nations Civil Rights Act. Now, that is a gross, gross miscarriage of justice.
HIS HONOUR: Can I ask Mr Nicholls, have you been able to find that?
NICHOLLS: 28 days is the appropriate time.
HIS HONOUR: It appears you have 28 days to file a notice of appeal and I am sure the registry
will assist you in that regard - -
PLAINTIFF: Again, that will be before a judge? This is the whole point, because judges have conspired to deny access to juries..
NICHOLLS: Can I say one last thing with the
directions your Honour propose. Your Honour will appreciate the Crown's anxiety to have the matter dealt with. We would press for a hearing date of the motion in any event. The filing of the appeal could not
ultimately have any consequence upon the hearing of the motion itself for summary dismissal.
HIS HONOUR: As I understood what Justice Sully was proposing, it was either that Mr Wilson appeal against, or seek leave to
appeal against, his order or, alternatively, that I, as the List Judge, set the motion down, one or the
other. What you say may ultimately be right, but I am sure the matter has got to pursue its course and endeavours
to shore cut are the longest way home. '
NICHOLLS: The reason I say that is that if the motion is successful and the proceedings are dismissed, then any application for leave to appeal can, no doubt, be amended to
include, as no doubt we expect Mr Wilson to appeal any order on the motion, and the appeal can be lodged. The state would be very concerned if Mr Wilson were permitted to appeal each and interlocutory order, which will extend
the proceedings out an extraordinary length of time.
HIS HONOUR: As I understood it, Justice Sully set the matter down before me - -
NICHOLLS: His Honour certainly did invite Mr Wilson to indicate what he
proposed to do in connection with that interlocutory judgment, however I don't think his Honour indicated quite so clearly that he required one or two of those courses to be pursued.
PLAINTIFF:I protest the hearing put
of being put on at 9 am today have a document here stating that it would be proceedingon 15 December at 10 am.
HIS HONOUR: You are quite right. Looking at that, that is a mistake - -
PLAINTIFF: Another miscarriage of justice. It is a premeditated act.
HIS HONOUR: It overlooks the fact that I have another case at 10 am and I am the List Judge and handle a lift every morning at 9
PLAINTIFF: I was not informed of the 9 o'clock start. HIS HONOUR-: But you are here now - -
WILSON: By chance I happened to get off the train at Town Hall, there was another train to
Bondi Junction on the other station. I just happened to get onto that train, otherwise I could be another 20 minutes late and sure as eggs, it would be assumed that I was not here and you would just proceed without me or
strike out any sort of - it is a premeditated design to do evil.
HIS HONOUR: Mr Nicholls, I am just addressing your point. It is not obvious to me, looking at the judgment again, exactly what Justice Sully had in
mind, but thinking it through, it seems to me that Mr Wilson should file his application for leave to appeal.
PLAINTIFF: I request that that be before a jury - -
HIS HONOUR: And the issue of whether or not the Notice of
Motion should, in that circumstance, be reinstated and given a hearing date, can be revisited once that has been done. In other words, if in the absence of an
investigation of the rules and following it through - I do not feel inclined to deal with that issue today - but I give the State of New South Wales leave to have the matter restored to the list in order that the
Notice of Motion may be set down, notwithstanding any application for leave to appeal.
NICHOLLS:Thank you, that may be an appropriate course.
PLAINTIFF:Can I ask you about leave to appeal?
HIS HONOUR:I am not in a position to give you advice - -
PLAINTIFF: As far as procedures go, to appeal to judges alone - can I appeal to the High Court direct?
HIS HONOUR: No. I will adjourn.